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RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse étudiera les discours de résistance prédominants dans la construction
des identités québécoise et anglo-québécoise. Elle a comme objectif premier de déterminer
de quelle façon les identités québécoise et anglo-québécoise peuvent s’insérer dans le
champ d’étude postcolonial. Pouf ce faire, cette thèse examinera comment l’identité
culturelle en général peut être construite en résistance à une menace d’ordre coloniale.
Richard Terdiman a développé sa théorie du contre-discours selon laquelle tout discours
engendre la production d’un discours de résistance chez l’autre; ces discours de résistance,
ou contre-discours, peuvent servir de fondation à la construction de l’identité. L’approche
de Terdiman est donc foncièrement constructiviste plutôt qu’essentialiste. En employant la
théorie de Terdiman aux théories postcoloniales, nous sommes forcés d’admettre que le
Québec, bien qu’il soit une colonie d’établissement plutôt qu’une colonie d’occupation,
peut également exhiber des instances de contre-discours de type postcoloniale. En effet,
l’identité québécoise semble se construire comme étant quelque chose entre la colonie
d’occupation et la colonie d’établissement. De ce fait, le Québec représente un cas unique
pour la théorie postcolomale. Les Québécois, se percevant colonisés, ont réussit à
développer une identité culturelle solide et très bien définie. Toutefois la relation entre
l’identité québécoise et l’Autre demeure symbiotique et réciproque. Cette relation est
paradoxale dans la mesure que le discours colonial de l’Autre est représenté à la fois
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comme une menace à l’identité québécoise et comme le carburant des discours de
résistance qui définissent cette même identité. La résistance discursive québécoise se
manifeste dans trois types de processus de construction identitaire: l’indigénisation,
l’appropriation et l’institutionnalisation des discours. La force de l’identité québécoise se
manifeste dans ces processus. Mais ces mécanismes sont également la source de
l’émergence d’une autre identité collective: celle des Anglo-Québécois. Tandis que les
Québécois se plaignent d’un manque de reconnaissance de la part du Canada anglais, les
Anglo-Québécois se plaignent d’un manque de reconnaissance de la part des Québécois.
Les Anglo-Québécois sont alors engagés dans un processus de construction identitaire
semblable à celui des Québécois: une construction identitaire fondée largement sur des
discours de résistance qui dépendent d’une relation symbiotique avec l’Autre.
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Résistance
- Indigénisation
- Appropriation
- Institutionnalisation
- Néocolonialisme
VABSTRACT
This thesis will demonstrate how identity in Québec is largely constructed by
discourses ofresistance. Its primary objective is to illustrate how Québec inserts itsetf in
the field ofpostcolonial studies. To do this. this thesis will first look at how cultural
identity in general can be the product of resistance to colonialism. Richard Terdiman’s
theory ofdiscourse/counter-discourse shows us how counter-discourses can be central
components in the construction of identity. Terdiman’s views are constructionist rather
than essentialist. By applying Terdiman’s theories to postcolonial studies, we are forced to
accept that the Québécois can also exhibit instances of postcolonial counter-discursive
resistance; and this, despite the fact that Québec was originally a settier colony and bas
neyer really been a colony of occupation. In fact, Québécois identity seems to be
constnicted as something between the settier colony and the colony of occupation. As
such, the Québécois represent a unique case in postcolonial studies. Seeing themselves as
colonized, the Québécois have deveîoped a strong and well defined identity, but this
identity is nonetheless involved in a symbiotic relationship with the other. This relationship
is somewhat paradoxical in that the colonial discourses ofthe other are at once seen as a
threat to the Québécois and as that which fuels the resistant discourses that strengthen
theïr identity. Québécois discursive resistance is involved in three types of defensive
mechanisms: indigemsation, appropriation and institutionalisation. These three
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mechanisms contribute to the strength of Québécois identity; but they are also the basis for
the construction and emergence of Anglo-Quebecer and Anglo-Québécois identitarian
discourses. White the Québécois feci threatened by the colonial discourses and lack of
recognition from the other, so does the new Anglophone community of Québec feel
threatened by the Québécois. Anglophone Quebecer identity therefore reflects much ofthe
resistance present in Québécois identity. Both communities have constructed their
identifies in resistance to one another, thereby creating a state of symbiosis.
KEY WORDS
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- Postcolomalism
- Identity - Anglo-Quebecer
- Anglo-Québécois
-
Counter-Discourse
- Resistance
- Indigemsation
- Appropriation
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FIICKS 1
INTRODUCTION
The goal ofthis thesis wil be to develop an approach that might contribute to our
understanding of the persistent tensions between the French and English-spealdng
communities of Canada, and ofQuébec more specifically. There have already been
innumerable works that have tried to achieve the same objectives. This project is intended
to add to what has already been said by focussing mainly on how those commumties
actually perceive themselves rather than how they should perceive themselves. In the
words of Lester B. Pearson, “understanding the nature ofconflict leads to peace” (1960).
Following Pearson’s example, I shah avoid judging or evaluating the validity of resistance
or daims to sovereignty to instead look at why such resistance exists. This thesis will thus
be a work of discourse analysis in the general fleld ofcultural identity. Although cultural
identity is intimately associated with politics and socio-economic conditions, I will try to
limit my research to how the Québécois and English-speaking Quebecers have constructed
their imagined communities, to use Benedict Anderson’ s term (1991), and their sense of
self
The discourses of identity in Québec have predominantly been discourses of
resistance. Identity in Québec has been constmcted chiefly in resistance to a significant
other. The Francophone population ofQuébec has defined itself in contrast to what it
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considers to be a dominant Anglophone presence. The same, altemately, can be noticed in
the discourses ofresistance ofthe Anglophone population ofQuébec. As we shah see,
both communities have also defined themselves as victims of colonialism. As such, we are
compelled to look towards the critical fleld that has most extensively studied the impacts
of coloniahism and the vanous resïstant strategies developed to counter them.
Consequently, this thesis will analyse Québec’s discourses ofresistance in relation to
postcoÏoniat theory. The inclusion of Québec in the postcolonial fleld is controversial, to
say the least. However, this thesis will contend that Francophone and Anglophone cultural
identities are inescapably linked in Québec, in ever shiffing pattems ofpostcolonial
resistance, indigenisation and appropriation. Studying these patterns can flot only
contnbute to our understanding ofthe identity crises in Québec, but ofpostcoloniality
itself.
There have been many terms designating the French speaking population of
Canada. Before the Conquest, there were essentiafly only French colonists living here.
Afler the Conquest the French settiers who stayed were called Canadiens. Afier the Union
Act of 1841, when the Upper (English) and Lower (French) Canadas were united, and
especially when Canada became a country in 1867, the Canadiens became french
Canadians or Canadiensfrançais. The French Canadian community included the Franco-
Ontariens, Franco-Manitobains, and the rest ofthe French-spealdng diaspora in Canada.
But ever since the Quiet Revolution ofthe 1960’s in Québec, a majority ofFrench
speakers of Canada started progressiveÏy referring to themselves as Québécois. This shifi
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in nomenclature was flot necessarily meant as an exclusion of Francophones living outside
Québec, most ofFrench Canadian history took place in Québec and the vast majority of
French Canadians reside in that province. Although Québec nationalism and resistance are
typically perceived as forms ofrejection by the french Canadian communities living
outside Québec, the Québécois will oflen refer to those communities as les Québécois
hors-Québec (tins, perhaps curiously, does flot usually include the Acadiens who are
generally recognized as having their own unique culture as well as their own distinct
history and origins). The various shifts in nomenclature ofthe French Canadian
community is, in itself, an extremety interesting phenomenon from a postcolonial
perspective, and worthy of in-depth study; however in order to facilitate my task, I shah
refer to French Canadians simply as ‘Québécois’ throughout tins thesis. So when I refer to
certain moments in Québécois history, these can include events pre-dating the Quiet
Revotution. Mso, I shail refer to English Canadians simply as Canadians. I must
emphasize that using the CanadianlQuébécois dichotomy is flot intended as a political
statement but is merely a way ofmaking the text more readable. Finally, I shah! use the
term ‘Anglo-Quebecer’ or ‘Anglo-Québécois’ to designate those Anglophones who have
chosen to stay in Québec to form a new community.
I should also note that tins thesis will flot deal directly with the issues conceming
the First Nations or Native communities of Québec or Canada. I behieve that focussing on
the conflict between the two dominant hinguistic groups of Canada will already take much
time and space. I do however concede that there are indeed three distinct national
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communities in Canada, and that the Abonginal peoples question will have to be further
addressed in the near future by Canadian and Québécois scholars.
As mentioned earlier, this will be a work of discourse analysis. The discourses I
wil be most interested in are the discourses of resistance or counter-discourses that
construct and defend the community’ s identity against the threat of assimilation or what
has been called cultural genocide. The terms ‘community’ or ‘collective’ will be used as
synonyms of ‘social group,’ and ‘identity’ as that which defines the community and its
boundaries, as well as creates a sense of belonging in its members. The discourses of
resistance I will examine are found in the literatures ofthe respective communities.
Literature here is used in its broadest sense. following the current trends in comparative
literature, a community’s literature can include flot only its poetly, prose and plays, but
also its music, its films and its essays. Although I will refer to and quote from ail six of
these literary genres, most of my research will be focussed on non-fictional genres (critical
essays, editoriais, social commentaries). Discourses of resistance and identity are generally
more intensely clustered and most clearly articulated in the essay format. I believe that the
essay usuafly offers a more direct or efficient route to observing identity than other literary
genres. In other words, a community’s literature, as seen especiaily in its essays, is one of
its most important tools of resistance and one of the more observable facets of its identity.
This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I - Counter-Discourse and
the Politics of Identity in the Postcolonial Context - will look at how Québec Studies can
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be included within a postcolonial framework. It will further develop the approach to
postcoloniaÏ theory that can include settier colonies within its theoretical boundaries. The
first chapter will establish the theoretical groundwork from which I will analyse both
Francophone and Anglophone identifies in Québec. Chapters 2 to 5 will examine how the
dominant identitarian discourses of resistance are constructed in Québécois culture.
Chapter 2 - The Indigenisation of Québécois Identity - will look at how the Québécois
have constructed their identity as that of a colony of occupation. Chapter 3 - The
Appropriation ofCounter-Discursive Resistance in Québec - wilI examine how the
Québécois, seeing themselves as a colony of occupation, have appropnated many of the
resistant tactics prevalent in other colomzed societies. Chapter 4 - The Institutionalisation
of Québécois Counter-Discourses - will demonstrate how the Québécois have created
institutions that support their resistant identitarian discourses. Yet, despite the existence of
these institutions, the Québécois nonetheless stiil constmct their identity as that of a
colonized people. These institutions have nevertheless instigated the emergence of another
collective identity, which brings us to the final chapter. Chapter 5 - The Construction of
Anglo-Quebecer and Anglo-Québécois Identities
- will use the same approach as the
previous chapters in understanding the genesis and appropriation of discursive resistance
but in the context of Anglophone Quebecer identity. Here I wiIl attempt to demonstrate,
in opposition to the standard perspective on the subject, that there are indeed the signs
within the English-speaking community of Québec of the emergence of a distinct identity
rather than the mere remnants of a dominant Canadian presence.
WCKS 6
CHAPTER 1
COUNTER-DISCOURSE AND THE POLITICS 0F IDENTITY
IN THE
POSTCOLONIAL CONTEXT
FUCKS 7
Postcolonial theory is a relatively new area of study. We find its origins mainly in
the anti-colonial writings and theones of the I 9404s to the I 96Os. This era was largely
defined by the histoncal shifi from the predominance ofluropean colonies found around
the globe to the newly-formed independent nation-states that we know today. European
colomalism has had, above ah other types of colonialism, the greatest impact on the entire
planet and its geopolitical structure. M Ania Loomba pointedly remarks in her work
CoÏonialismPostco1oniaÏism, 84.6 percent of the inhabited world was stii under the
direct influence ofEuropean colonialisms in the 1930’s (Loomba 15).
Since then, the former colonies, whether or flot they fought revolutionary wars of
independence, have been struggiing to define themselves and create sovereign identities.
This task has been difficuit for many reasons. Among these is the question ofauthenticity:
how can a people retrieve its pre-colonial identity affer having been displaced or heavity
tainted by a colonial presence that has dominated them for centuries? Even if the
colonizer’s presence has been mostly expeÏled, its influence is stii felt in many (if not ail)
“postcolonial” societies today. Similarly, language is another problem. Having adopted the
colonizer’s language and rejected traditional linguistic forms, it is that much more difficuit
for postcolonial societies to create a proper sense of self and unrealistic to revert to a pre
colonial language that has perhaps been unused or extinct for several generations.
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In addition to these problems (and many others), there is the question of
neocoloniaiism. Where the European colonialisms ofthe nineteenth century are now gone,
their impact has arguably paved the road for other so-called super powers. During the
coid war, the US and USSR basicaliy divided up the world in a manner much akin to that
oftheir European predecessors. Mthough the techniques used during the cold war era
were different, the influence they generated had essentiaily resuscitated an oid and ail too
familiar monster. And, especiaily since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union aimost eveiy
culture bas had to contend with, in one way or another, the persistence ofwhat lias
ftequently been described as American neocolonialism and global hegemony.
What aroused the interest of seminal scholars in the anti-colonial movement, such
as Frantz fanon, Albert Memmi or Amilcar Cabrai, was not only the political and
economic impacts of colonialism, but the cultural implications of colonial oppression, how
culture can be an important tool of resistance. As Cabrai states in one of his speeches,
The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies
in the fact that culture is the rigorous manifestation on the ideological or
idealist plane ofthe physical and historicai reality ofthe society that is
dominated or to be dominated. (Cabrai 54)
The value ofliterature in anti-colonial stwggle is a prevalent theme in fanon’s ground
breaking and influential work Les Damnés de la terre:
C’est la littérature de combat proprement dite, en ce sens qu’elle convoque
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tout un peuple à lutter pour l’existence nationale. Littérature de combat
parce qu’elle informe la conscience nationale, lui donne forme et contours
et lui ouvre de nouvelles et illimitées perspectives. (Fanon 179)
Anti-colonial theorists could therefore analyse the effects of colonial experience on the
collective and individual psyches ofthe colonized and how they would subsequently react,
by studying the colonized’s cultural production or lack thereof Both Fanon and Memmi
(Portrait du colonisé; précédé de portrait du colonisateur, 1957) analysed the damage
sustained by the collective and individual psyches ofthe colonizer as well.
Postcolonial theory began as a way of ftirthering the research and analyses initiated
in the anti-colonial era. The study of literature, cultural identity and their relation to a
colonial past became increasingly popular. While it was originally a field uniquely
concemed with the former colonies ofthe Third World, many theorists have feh that the
presence ofneocolonialism has broadened the scope and the potential applications ofthe
theory. In concert with post-stmcturalïst theories ofhistoiy and discourse, postcolomalism
has become fashionable ail around the world. Even the wealthiest of nations have been
able to relate to colonial ailenation and have produced instances, albeit moderate, of
postcolonial resistance. Therefore, where the ‘post’ in postcolonialism used to only signify
‘afier,’ it is now often interpreted as a more dynamic ami flexible prefix (Loomba 12). As
Stephen Slemon, a Canadian critic, writes: “The ‘post’ in postcolonialism is inherently a
responsive term; h names a promise that (neo)colonial violence genuineÏy is being
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responded to within at least one field of academic enterprise” (Siemon, “English Side”
275). The debate over the more historical and purist approach to postcolonial theory
versus its more critical post-stmcturalist tenants is stiil veiy much alive and active today.
This thesis will obviously lean towards the latter approach to postcolonialism and how it
can be applied to Québec Studies.
This chapter will first explore the post-structuralist approach to postcolonial
theory. This approach relies almost entirely on theories of discourse and how discourse
relates to, or influences, the production or construction ofidentity. In 1985, Richard
Terdiman published Discourse’Counter-Discourse: The Theoîy and Practise ofSymbolic
Resistance in Nineteenth-Century france. In the first part of bis work, Terdiman develops
bis views on how discourses can generate resistance or rather how discourses aiways
contain within them the means oftheir own subversion. Terdiman’s theoiy ofsymbolic
resistance or counter-discourse allows us to see how postcolonial theory can no longer be
limited to the study of former colonies of occupation. This chapter will thus examine
Terdiman’s theory and expand on it in order to determine how discourses ahvays impose
themselves and can have a colonising effect on any community, regardless of its bistoncal
past. I shaH explore Terdiman’s views on how hegemony is established today through
discursive influence and how subsequent discourses of resistance or counter-discursive
strategies are generated. The importance of doing this lies in the fact that typical settier
colonies like Québec, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa (etc.), which have
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contributed greatly to the postcolomal field, have flot aiways been included as major
producers of postcolonial identities or resistance. I wiII argue that settier colonial identities
and their discourses ofresistance (counter-discourses) are best studied in the context of
postcolonial theory. In fact, as we shah see, settler colonies can actually produce some of
the more enlightening forms of discursive resistance.
HICKS 12
1.1 Constructionism and the Agency of Discourse in the Politics of Identity
The previously mentioned rifi in postcolonial studies between its more purist
tenants versus the post-structural perspective is similar to the rifi that exists between
essentialists and constwctionists in the politics ofidentity. Here, I am borrowing
terminology that has been developed mainly in social theoiy. For the past decade, social
theorists have grouped post-stmcturalist and other neo-Nietzschean approaches to the
politics of identity into what they have labelled Constructionism. Constructionists are
defined as being those theorists who reject the concept of an essence behind culture and
identity. As Craig Calhoun writes in his introductory essay to Social Theoiy ami the
Folitics ofldentity (1996),
Social constructionism has become extremely widespread, well beyond
sociology. It challenges at once the ideas that identity is given naturafly and
the idea that it is produced purely by acts of individual will. At their best,
social constmctionist arguments also challenge “essentialist” notions that
individual persons can have singular, integral, altogether harmonious and
unproblematic identities. Md by the same token subtie constmctiomst
arguments challenge accounts of collective identities as based on some
“essence” or set of core features shared by ail members of the collectivity
and no others. (Caihoun 13)
The constructionist approach is the approach I wil be adoptmg in this first chapter and
throughout this thesis. While it may be unjust to accuse the more purist postcolonial critics
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ofbeing essentialists, it is difficult flot to see a certain kind ofessentialism in their
exclusion of certain identities in their field of inquiry.
Richard Terdiman and the authors he frequently refers to, fali into Calhoun’s
constmctionist category. As such, his essay is of direct relevance to the question at hand.
One of the common threads linking the theories of Terdiman and the other authors I shah
refer to shortiy is that they ail reject the concept ofa primordial or essential core to
identity. Constructionists will sec essentialism in the study of identity as being very
dangerous in that it eau easily lead to the justification of intolerance, oppression and
exclusions. If there is no primordial essential or stable identity, then identity must be and
will aiways remain in a constant state of flux. Their view of identity attempts to disengage
us from what they sec as the domineering tendencies of modemism and universalism.
Being unable to locate an essential core to identity, ail we eau perceive then are discourses
ofidentity. The study ofthese discourses and how they create the illusion ofstabiÏity in
identity will be of primal interest in the next sections.
In his essay, Terdiman relies heavily on the post-structuralist theories of Michel
foucault. foucault’s L ‘ordre du discours is one ofthe best known works on the relation
between power and discourse. for foucault, discourse is omnipresent in ail that is social
and consequentÏy in ail that is written, spoken, constructed (etc.) by human beings. As
Foucault writes: “discourse is not simply that which expresses struggies or systems of
domination, but that for which, and by which one stmggles; it is the power which one is
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striving to seize” (Foucault 12). foucault suggests that discourse is a kind of violence that
we impose on things, it is our way of ordering the world. But this violence does flot only
order the materiallphysical world, but also generates cultural production and identity. In
other words, according to authors like foucault, Calhoun or Terdiman (or constructionists
in general), we are constantly being pressured to think, express or act in a certain way by
the dominant discourses of our community. A discourse is dominant when it is
successffihly reproduced by the majority or at least the most powerftil few ofa given
community. Discourse is flot only present in speech, but also in the cultural institutions of
the community. Therefore, dominant discourses tend to remain dominant because they end
up controlling the institutions that disseminate cultural production. This is the link
between discourse and power according to Foucault; only the most dominant discourses
will have the tools necessary to be heard, read or seen and consequently to influence the
largest group of people.
from a constmctionist’s point ofview, a strong identity will depend on how
dominant certain discourses become within a community. Dominant discourses and
cultural identity are aiways intrinsically linked together because a sense of identity is ofien
created around the same establishments that reproduce discourses. Referring to Foucauh’s
work, Terdiman explains in Discourse. ‘Counter-Discourse that:
Engaged with the realities of power, human communities use words not in
contemplation but in competition. Such struggles are neyer equal ones. The
facts of domination, of control, are inscribed in the signs available for use
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by the members ofa social formation. The weight of tradition, the promise
held out by reputation, the fear of repression, ail contrive to estabÏish what
we cali an ‘establishment’ and an established language. (Terdiman 38)
Here, we begin to see why certain critics like Charles Taylor (in “The Politics of
Recognition” for example) have problems with neo-Nietzschean or post-stwcturalist
approaches to history, discourse and identity. If the nature ofdiscourses is to compete,
then the concepts of social stability or the resolution of conflicts between social groups
become relatively hard to envisage. If we are aiways being influenced in one way or
another by the establishment or established language (or what I would call the dominant
dîscourses) ofour community; and if these are produced in competition with the
discourses of others, then we must always be (to varying degrees) in competition with
others. But as Terdiman suggests, it is that very same competition that tends to create
cohesion and a sense ofbelonging within the community:
[...] discourses are the complexes of signs and practises which organize
social existence and social reproduction. In their strnctured, material
persistence, discourses are what give differential substance to membership
in a social group or class or formation, which mediate an internai sense of
belonging, an outward sense of otherness. (Terdiman 54)
Therefore, according to authors like Terdiman or Foucault, where a certain level of
stability can be - albeit only temporarily - achieved and maintained within a single
community, there will aiways be clashing identitarian discourses between different
communities.
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In “The Politics ofRecognition,” Taylor does flot reject the above mentioned
concepts of dialogically constmcted identities (Taylor 32, 34). However, although he
definitely suggests that competing discourses are important to identity, Taylor seems to be
reluctant to recognize the primordial importance of discourse and its agency on human
will or initiative:
Denving frequently from Foucault or Demda, they [neo-Nietzschean
theonstsJ daim that ail judgements of worth are based on standards that
are ultimately imposed by and further entrench structures of power {...]
Then the question is no longer one of respect but of taking sides. But this
is hardly a satisfactoiy solution. (Taylor 70)
Taylor’s reluctance opens him to criticism from the constructionist camp.
Constructionists (or Taylor’s neo-Nietzscheans) are flot necessarily trying to find a
solution, but are rather trying to determine what it is that we are forced to work with.
Perhaps the reason Taylor discards neo-Nietzschean or constructionist perspectives on the
matter is that. if we cannot escape the power of dominant discourses, we cannot escape
conflict. Nevertheless, even though conflict may be unavoidable, avoiding certain /dnds of
conflict is stiil quite feasible. Although discourses can generate a violent climate in certain
communities, it remains possible, as we will see ftirther on, to resist another’s influence
through discursive means.
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The agency of discourse in social expenence has been studied in the works of
many authors that, I believe, cannot be discarded or ignored. In L ‘institution imaginaire
de ta société, for instance, Comelius Castonadis suggests that:
Eveiything that is presented to us in the social-historical world is
inextricably tied to the symbolic. Not that it is limited to this. Real acts
whether individual or collective ones - work, consumption, war, love,
child-bearing
- the innumerable matenal products without which no society
could live even an instant, are flot (flot aiways, flot directly) symbols. Ml of
these, however, would be impossible outside oja symbolic network. [my
italicsJ (Cartoriadis 117)
Castoriadis clearly demonstrates how the very fabric of society is structured by discourse
(le réseau symbolique). This is why Castoriadis can assert that “[tJhe ‘real social
relations’[...J are always instituted” (Castoriadis 124). Not unlike Foucault, Castoriadis
believes that the discourses ofa society are ffised with its institutions and establishments,
and the latter often serve as vehicles ofdiffiision for the former within the community.
Although discourses are flot the be-ali and end-ail of social experience or language, their
influence is aiways present. Jacques Derrida goes a step further than Castonadis when he
writes, in Writing andDfference, that the moment when we ceased to look for a centre
or an essential cote to meamng and existence, was “the moment when language invaded
the umversal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a centre or origin,
everything became discaurse” (Derrida 280). Here, Derrida explains wdll the emergence
of constructionist theories; and these basically state that there is no way of expressing or
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perceiving onese1f flot even in thought, outside of a preestabiished language; language
being necessarily aiways a social phenomenon
American pragmatism, through the works of Richard Rorty in particular, seems to
align itself along the same argumentation. Rorty writes that
there will be no way to rise above the language, culture, institutions, and
practices one has adopted and view ah these as on par with ail the others
[...J Or, to put it in Heidegger’s way, “language speaks mari,” languages
change in the course of histoiy, and so human beings cannot escape their
historicity. (Rorty 50)
Once again, this expresses the view that we are dominated by discourse rather than the
other way around. Rorty is careftil in choosing the word ‘adopted’ over ‘chosen.’ We do
flot, according to Rorty, ‘choose’ our language, institutions or practices because ‘we’ do
flot fully exist outside ofthem. It is, according to Rorty, the competition between the
various discourses ofthe community that create the appearance offteedom ofchoice.
According to American pragmatists, human beings are neyer ‘ftee agents.’ Here, I feel
that Rorty should be read in conjunction with Castoriadis who suggests that:
It is one thing to say that we cannot choose a language with absolute
fteedom, and that every language encroaches on what ‘is to be said’. It is
something else again to believe that we are fataliy subject to language and
that we cari neyer say anything except what language makes us say. We
can neyer get outside of language, but our mobility within language is
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limitless and aÏlows us to question everything, including language itselfand
our relation to it. (Castonadis 126)
In other words, there is of course a certain measure of fteedom, but we must realize that
this fteedom is limited to the options presented to us within the framework ofthe
languages and discourses we have adopted.
I believe that Marc Angenot also aligns himselfwith the thoughts ofthe above
mentioned authors when he defines social discourse as
tout ce qui se dit et s’écrit dans un état de société; tout ce qui s’imprime,
tout ce qui se parle publiquement ou se représente aujourd’hui dans les
médias électroniques et, [au-delà de ce tout empiriqueJ les systèmes
génériques, les répertoires topiques, les règles d’enchaînement d’énoncés
qui, dans une société donnée, organisent le dicibte
- le narrable et
l’opinable - et assurent la division du travail discursif (Angenot 368).
According to Angenot’s description, it is difficult to imagine ourselves expressing ideas of
any kind outside the influence
- if flot control - of social discourses. Given the inherent
social nature of discourses, I shall flot differentiate discourse from social discourse as does
Angenot.
It is important to notice the extent to which so many theorists believe that it is
conceivably impossible to escape the grasp of, and, the power connected to discourse.
Being part of a community, we will necessarily express the views and perspectives
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associated to that community. An author is always. in one way or another, reproducing
the discourses (whether they are dominant or flot) ofhis or her community. An awareness
ofthis has considerable implications as to how divergent identitarian discourses from
different communities will compete and potentialÏy oppress or repress one another. Thus,
understanding that the agency of discourse is an important premise to the constructionist
approach to theories of identity, we can examine the implications such an approach will
have in colonial discourse and postcolonial theories.
HICKS 21
1.2 Colonial Discourse and Censorship
We have seen how the constwctionist approach supports the idea that discourse is
present in eveiy part of social existence, and especially in questions of identity. But if
identity is constmcted diaÏogically or in contrast to others, this implies that the other’s
discourses are always present, to varying degrees, in the cultural space of the community
that is trying to deflne itself. Thus discourses do flot only function within a single group
but bleed out, potentially assimilating or at least alienating surrounding communities. As
Terdiman writes:
In our penod, dominant forms of discourse have achieved unprecedented
degrees of penetration and an astonishingly sophisticated capacity to
enforce their control of the forms of social communication and social
practise which provide the configurations of modem existence. (Terdiman
39)
This phenomenon is signiflcant as to how many communities, even post-independence and
sovereign communities, stili perceive their cultural identity as being under constant
discursive, cukural assault from others. The competition among the discourses ofdifferent
communities usually draws far more attention and is perceived as representing a far
greater threat than the competition among the discourses within a single community.
When perceived as originating from another social group, such discourses are labelled as
being colonial discourse.
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Edward Said was one ofthe first authors to have applied foucault’s theories of
discourse to the colonial context. In Orientalism (1978), Said uses the term colonial
discourse to designate how the West has used discursive strategies to order, represent and
subsequently dominate the cultures ofthe Orient. This imposition of Western
interpretations of the Orient has locked the Orient in Western stereotypes, and has
consequently eroded the Orient’s capacity of seif-representation. Thus Orientalism is more
a reflection ofthe West and its prejudices than an accurate depiction of Oriental cultures.
By controlling the representations of the Orient, the West has essentially attempted to
control and subdue the Orient’s identity. As such, Orientalism has been an extension of
Western discourses to Oriental cultures (Said 6). Colonial discourse designates the
discourses that invade (ofien subtly) and control the other’s cultural space while
subjugating its identity. In other words, we can study and detect the power of discourses
within eveiy society, but we can only study colonial discourses in the context ofwhat
Samuel P. Huntington cails “cultural fault lines” (Huntington, 1997). The study ofhow
colonialism manifests itselftoday through discourse rather than through military or
political occupation, has become the primary focus of at least one approach to
postcolonial studies.
But Said adds another interesting element to bis description of colonial discourse.
He writes that “culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society (as opposed
to political society), where the influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons
works not through domination but what Gramsci cails consent” (Said 7). By invoking
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Gramsci’s concept ofhegemony, Said suggests that colonial discourses are flot aiways
easy or obvious to detect in the colonized’s culture. Hegemony is defined in Gramsci’s
writings as ruling by coercion and consent rather than ruling by coercion only (Gramsci,
Prison Notebooks 1971). Hegemony is central to our understanding of modem
colonialism. Traditional colonialisms would overtly take over or even create the cultural
institutions ofthe colomzed in order to disseminate the colonizer’s culture and ensure its
dominance. Colomalism today, by means of hegemony, is far more potent in that it
covertly subdues the colonized social group by maldng it desire and support the
colomzer’s dominance oftheir cultural space. Ibis makes the submission and subsequent
assimilation ofthe colonized a far easier task.
The connection of hegemony to colonial discourse is extremely well encapsulated
in Terdiman’s work. Terdiman writes:
The concept [ofthe hegemomc] attempts to take account ofthe
increasingly intricate means by which the social force of dominant interest
in society could be extended over larger and more diverse populations than
could ever have been coerced by the older mechanisms of the traditional
oppressive state. (Terdiman 53)
In this passage, the author describes the shift from European colonialisms to
contemporaiy colonialism. The discourses of a society will more ofien today be extended
to other communities, flot because they are already dominant, but in order to create
dominance. Stephen Slemon has appropnately remarked that it is easy to find major
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Amencan consumer products. like Coca-Cola or Levis jeans for instance, ail over the
Third World and even sec starving chiidren in Bombay wearing Harvard or UCLA T-
shirts (Slemon, “EngÏish Side” 275). The manifestation of colonial discourse in India, does
flot mean that India is no longer an independent community; but it does suggest that
Indian culture, like so many others, is under the pressure ofAmericwiization. Modem
colonialism, or what many authors have called neocolonialism, as opposed to older forms
ofcoionialism is a battie fought to a large extent on the discursive level. This battie can
instigate older forms of militaiy and political domination, as we have recently seen with
the war in Afghanistan. The difference however is that warfare today is more a resuit of
discursive colonialism than ever before.
It is important to note that the stmggle for domination among the competing
discourses of different communities is flot as conscious or wiilfiil in the new global order
as it was with the old European colonialisms. The transformation ofthe world into a
global village implies that the discourses of any society or nation could more easily
penetrate the cultural space of others. The predominance of the United States in global
telecommunication networks inevitably marks American culture as being guilty of
producing hegemonic neocolonial discourses even though it may flot be America’s intent
to colonize. If we accept that we live in a new global order, we should be compelled to
distance oursetves from the more temporal or historical interpretation of postcoloniality;
as Ania Loomba suggests:
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The new global order does not depend upon direct mie. However, it does
allow the economic, cultural and (to varying degrees) political penetration
of some countries by others. Ibis makes it debatable whether once
coÏonized countries can be seen as properiy ‘postcolonial’ [in the
temporal/historical sense of ‘post’J. (Loomba 7)
In other words, former colonies stiil suifer ftom colonial alienation; oniy they suifer more
from indirect colonial discursive mie (cultural hegemony). Md the realities of colonial
discourses and hegemony are flot necessarily limited to Third World societies. The new
global order has added an extra degree of agency to discourses. The discourses of the
powerful, whether it is their intent or flot, wiii have a colonizing influence on the culturai
identities of the Iess powerful (who, it should also he noted, are flot aiways limited to the
Third World).
Colonial discourses have the eifect of creating a hegemony of the powerful over
the production ofdiscourse
- and subsequently the identity - ofthe powerless. Terdiman
summarises what we have seen up until now when he writes:
In Gramsci’s notion ofhegemony the whole question of mie or domination
of one group over another is radically transformed. The muitilayered,
palimpsest discourses which we saw critics in diverse traditions striving to
conceptuaiize begin to be comprehensible as the traces of the competitive
process of domination and contestation by which society is constituted in
the modem period. (Terdiman 43)
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Colonial discourses will become dominant when they are being reproduced by the majority
ofthe colonized community or when the colonized community is unwilling or unable to
resist them. When this happens, the colonizer’s dominating discursive strategies create a
state of hegemony in which the colomzed and its production of discourses are
subordinated to the other’s colonial presence.
When discourses compete, the dominant discourse uses a variety of social
mechanisms to marginalise and repress what subsequently become discourses of alterity.
These mechanisms have been largely defined as forms ofcensorship. Foucault’s work is
once again ofrelevance here. Terdiman reads three modes ofordenng ofdiscourse in
Foucault’s L ‘ordre du discours. The first being “the coercive taboo upon the forbidden,
the irrational, the mad, and the false,” the second is “the internalization by individuals of
such outward authority in the form of ‘naturalized’ habits and practices,” and the third, the
“material control over access to or production of discourse through barriers to
appropriation, circulation and so on” (Terdiman 56). Here, we sec how established
discourses will maintain their dominance over alternative discursive strategies. These three
modes of ordering ensure the production of a certain type of knowledge, thus generating
power and control over divergent views. If one does flot subscribe to the dominant point
ofview, he or she will be excluded or ignored by the community.
Foucault’s three modes ofordering are veiy close to what has been described as
the three types of censorship. The first mode is similar to proscriptive censorshzp, Pierre
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Hébert has deflned proscriptive censorship as “la censure répressive, qui s’attaque à
l’hétérodoxe, et ses moyens sont l’exclusion, la mutilation, la condamnation” (Hébert 12).
Foucault’s second mode is partly what Hébert cails autocensure or se(f-censorship. Self
censorship is almost impossible to study or detect because, as Foucault points out, it is
intemalized; it happens before the subject exterionzes bis or ber thoughts. What Hébert
defines as prescriptive censorship appears to be a combination ofFoucault’s second and
third modes of ordering. As Hébert writes, “cette censure [prescnptive] vise à faire croître
l’orthodoxie dans un sol fertilisé par les intitutions, les relais de dissémination de
l’imprimé” (Hébert 12). Prescriptive censorship is a mix ofFoucault’s second and third
modes ofordering in that prèscriptive censorship influences the subject (through
established language and institutions) to think a certain way. While self-censorship is a
conscious internalization, prescriptive censorship happens at a subconscious level. Thus
prescnptive censorship is considered the most efficient form of social control because the
censored individual is made completely unaware of the forces at play. If the individual is
aware, and chooses to conform to the dominant discourse, he or she is then practising
self-censorship. Proscnptive censorship is consequently scen as the weakest form of
censorsbip because it only happens when the two others have failed. Being forced to
reveal proscriptively what is flot permissible to say or write, one is stiil disseminating
alternative and subversive discourses.
The connection between censorship, hegemony and colonial discourse will be of
central interest to this study. According to Angenot, “l’hégémonie fonctionne comme
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censure et autocensure: elle dit qui peut parler, de quoi et comment” (Angenot 382). But
the inherent problem with prescriptive censorship in the colonial or postcolonial context is
that, like self-censorship, it is rather difficuit to study or observe. Although we can
acknowledge its presence and that its influence is considerabie and undeniabie, we cannot
easily distinguish it from common social occurrence. Basically, prescnptive censorship is
in play onÏy when the colonized social group is assimilated to the dominant colonial
discourse; whereby a state of cultural hegemony has already been established by that
discourse. Therefore, when a minority group is under the influence ofprescriptive
censorship, it has already become a part of the invading community. However, even afier
the establishment of the other’s hegemony, internai differences wiil aiways remain present
- communities are neyer entirely homogenous, and thus complete assimilation neyer reaily
happens. Prescriptive censorship is successful when the diverse factions of that community
stili work together towards what is consented as a ‘common’ or ‘greater’ good.
As such, prescriptive censorship is in effect practically synonymous with those
discourses that constmct the community’s identity. It defines the community in its
restrictions, its Umits and its boundaries. I feel that Stanley Fish paraphrases Foucault
when he writes that “without restriction, without an inbuih sense ofwhat it would be
meaningless to say or wrong to say, there could be no assertion and no reason for
asserting it” (Fish 103). Fish also argues along the same unes as Castoriadis: “there is no
such thing as ftee (nonideologicaliy constrained) speech, no such thing as a public forum
purged ofideological pressures or exclusions. That’s my thesis, and waiting at the end
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(really at the beginning) ofit is, as my respondents have said, politics” (Fish 1 16). In other
words, without prescriptive censorship and subsequent self-censorship, there would be
absolutely no meaning to the concepts of discourse, community, self or other. As foucault
would suggest, there is no way of escaping the play of power and politics.
This being said, I do flot contend that it is entirely ffitile to study prescriptive
censorship. I am merely stating that it is so intrinsically linked to identitarian discourse in
general that it cannot be studied independently from it. As Charles Grivel comments:
La «vraie censure» est donc le code idéologique considéré comme
language de contrainte dit sujet e exprimant ce szjet (le sujet a pour
language les propres termes de sa répression) [...J La censure [.1 est alors
obtenue: c’est une nature, elle existe là où on ne l’aperçoit pas. (Gnvel
102)
But ail ofthis goes almost without saying. By definition, prescriptive censorship only
works when we are flot aware ofit. Becoming aware ofit implies that it is no longer
prescriptive, that we have adopted a divergent discourse or perspective to be capable of
noticing it, and what was prescriptive wiil now have to ffinction proscriptively.
Censorship, then, is most apparent only in its proscriptive form, when colonial
discourses affempt to institute a state of hegemony by repressing the discourses of the
colonized. Where older forms of colonialism would rule by coercion by forcibly imposing
institutions and an established ianguage on the colonized, modem colonial discourses mie
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more by consent in that they try to extend the hegemony of a community’s dominant
discourses (which are acquired through prescriptive censorship) to the other’s cukural
space (that which differentiates it from the colonizer). In other words, what is perceived as
a non oppressive act of cultural exchange by one group can easily be seen, at the very
same time, as the proscriptive censorship of colonial hegemonic discourses by the group
that secs itself as subjugated or at Ieast threatened by foreign influence. As Terdiman
suggests: “the discourses that ensure cultural stability neyer conceive their actions as
‘repression.’ from within such discourses it is hard to think that there is anything to
repress” (Terdiman 14). It is very difficuit for a community today to see itself as a
colonizer. In the older more coercive forms of colonialism, colonizers would actually sec
themselves censor proscriptively, but for the good of the colonized (we sec this in the
Victorian concept of ‘the White man’s burden’). To reiterate, proscnptive censorship can
manifest itself as colonial discourse, and Hébert’s prescriptive censorship is indissociable
with discourses ofidentity. What is most important is that discourses can aiways be seen
as both prescriptive and proscriptive. Discourses will be prescriptive to the community
whose identity is shaped by it - and consequently, as Terdiman would suggest,
imperceptible as an act of repression - and proscriptive to the community that feels its
cultural space invaded or threatened by it. Only in the latter case will the invaded
community label such a discourse as colonial discourse.
The most common effect ofthe proscriptive censorship of colonial discourse on a
community, and this is especially relevant today, is silence. When a community’s
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discourses are dominated by others, the members ofthat community find it impossible to
express themselves in their own distinct way. Sue Curry Jansen explains this phenomenon;
The powerful require knowledge to presen’e, defend, and extend their
advantage. for them, knowledge is power. The way the powerful say
things are is the way they are, or the way they usually become because the
powerfiul controt the power to narne {my italics] (Jansen 6)
In this context, it is easy to see how a dominating discourse will alienate and marginalise
those with divergent views. Terdiman also adds that censorship, as the stabiising
mechanism of social discourse, and however innocent in its intentions, “functions to
exciude the heterogeneousfrom the domain oJ utterance [my italicsj” (Terdiman 14). At
first glance, it would certainlv appear that the only option left to the marginalised. being
excluded from the domain of utterance, is silence.
Gayatn Chakravorty Spivak is undoubtedly the most famous critic to have written
on the theme of silence. As Spivak puts it: “For the ‘tme’ subaltem group, whose identity
is its difference, there is no unrepresentable subaltem subject that can know and speak
itself’ (Spivak 27). For Spivak, the subaltem group is condemned to silence because there
can be no language, no discourse available to them that is entirely ftee from the
dominant’s influence or prescriptive censorship. However, in spite ofthe threat of
alienation and subsequent silence, the subaltem can voice opposition if it is aware of its
subordination. What I mean here is that if one is aware of oppression or of the repressive
mechanisms of the other’ s colonial discourses, one has already afortiori articulated a
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divergent and subversive discourse to that ofthe dominant. Even though the problem of
in±luence stili remains, as does the threat of silence, I believe that being conscious of
difference automatically shields you from the prescriptive control of a dominant discourse.
Silence is nonetheless stili a real threat because even if your identity is constmcted in
difference to the other, you are stili (and even more so) vuinerable to proscriptive
censorship. Hébert’s proscriptive censorship can impose silence in that it can deny the
subaltern access to the proper podium needed to be heard. So the question, as I have
aiways feit, is flot SO much ‘can the subaltem speak?’ but ‘can the subakern be heard?.’
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1.3 Counter-Discursive Resistance and the Construction of Identity
The play between prescriptive and proscriptive censorship can, I believe,
contnbute to our understanding of identity. I have argued that the discourses of a
community will function prescriptively by influencing its members to think, act ami
especially define themselves in a certain way. This also creates a sense ofmembership,
inclusion and identity. When discourses are met with resistance, they begin to function as
proscnptive censorship, or they are at least perceived as such by the resisting group.
Therefore, when we encounter acts described as proscriptive censorship, we begin to sec
the cultural fauh unes that distinguish one community from the next. Colonial discourses
act as proscriptive censorship, in that they exciude or repress difference, thereby
attempting to silence the colonized, forcing upon them discourses that are flot their own. I
believe that the connection between proscriptive censorship and colonial discourse and
subsequent counter-discursive resistance makes the whole theme of censorship
considerably relevant to postcolonial studies.
Proscriptive censorship and cultural fault unes are of course not always limited to
the relations between national communities. Cultural fault unes can as easily appear within
a single community as well. This can explain the inclusion of feminist studies in the fleld of
postcolonialism, as weIl as the inclusion ofthe cultural resistance of immigrant minorities.
These fault lines appear when the cohesion ofthe community, that which tries to make it
homogenous (i.e. that which fiinctions as prescriptive censorship), starts to break down.
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Dominant discourses are obviously neyer tmly successifil in establishing a state
of perfect homogeneity over others because the threat of hegemony and assimilation will
aiways create resistant discursive strategies. Assimilation happens when the discourses of
a community become subordinated to the colomzing discourses of the other; the (formerly
dominant) discourses ofidentity ofthe colomzed community will consequently become
discourses of resistance, or what Terdiman has called counter-discourses. Counter
discourses are the discourses produced by the community that resists the hegemony of
dominating discourses, and their production is the only recourse the colonized culture has
to escape the threat of silence. Counter-discourses are therefore what make it impossible
for any discourse, however dominant it may be within a community or several
communities, to fully ensure homogeneity:
In modem societies the loci of individual discourses are simply too diffuse
[...J, the social interests in play are simply too divergent, for any poÏicy of
discursive policing ever fully to expunge the subversive. The space for the
counter-discourses [...] is opened in that structural limitation of social
control. (Terdiman 56)
As I see it, in the colonial or neocolonial context, counter-discourses are seen in moments
ofpostcolonial resistance. Postcolonial theory is a field increasingly preoccupied with the
production of counter-discursive trends, regardless of the histoncal context of the
communities that produce them.
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Counter-discourses fttnction much in the same way as dominant discourses. Their
purpose is to become dominant in turn. The only real difference between the two is that
dominant discourses control a larger portion of a community’s means of cuhural
production. As Terdiman writes, “counter discourses are aiways interlocked with the
domination they contest” (Terdiman 16), or:
So no dominant discourse is ever fully protected from contestation. 0f
course the counter-discourses which exploit such vulnerability implicitly
evoke a pnnciple of order just as that which sustains the discourses they
seek to subvea (Terdiman 56)
Terdiman reflects the views that were developed in the anti-colonial era, as we can see in
Menmii’s work: “à quelque chose malheur est bon: l’existence du colonialiste est trop liée
à celle du colonisé, jamais il ne pouna dépasser cette dialectique” (Memmi 78). This
emphasizes the point that it is impossible to determine ob/ectively
- especially in the
neocolomal era
- who is colonizing and who is being colonized. Both are involved with
power, either to acquire it or to keep it, as Terdiman points out: “in instant connection
with the power of such an apparatus [of dominant/hegemonic discourseJ, discourses of
resistance ceaselessly intermpt what would otherwise be the seamless serenity ofthe
dominant” (Terdiman 39). for Terdiman, (dominant) discourses and counter-discourses
are joined together in a cycle in which one is constantly replacing the other; hence his title
Discourse/Counrer-Discourse. As we have seen with the problem of proscriptive and
prescriptive censorship, discourses ofidentity can also at once appear to be both
dominant/colonial discourses and resistantlpostcolonial counter-discourses. It wiÏl always
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depend on the point ofview ofthe observer. Therefore, certain discourses can end up
being dominant and even colonial by the out-group while stili ffinctioning as counter
discourses from the point ofview ofthe in-group. Given this situation, if counter
discourses can end up becoming dominant, we are forced to ask ourselves important
questions: can a community ever see its identity as being shaped by anything other than
counter-discourses (discourses of resistance)? And what happens if it does?
Terdiman sees culture as a fleld of stmggle (Terdiman 25). In this, he echoes
authors like Frederic Dougtass who believed that without struggie there is no progress. As
Terdiman writes:
[...J language intrinsically carnes the traces of struggie, and in which such
traces can be read. The contradictions ofthe social world configure
themselves as oriented networks of semantic and discursive clashes and
campaigns for predominance in such a way that the inscription of conflict is
no longer conceived as a contamination of the linguistic but as its properly
defimng ffinction. (Terdiman 37)
Thus the stmggle and resistance against a common threat will create a certain cohesion
within a community thereby constructing a sense ofidentity. This une ofthinking is
reminiscent ofNorthrop fiye’s garrison mentalit. Fiye argues that
communities that provide ail that their members have in way of distinctively
human values, and that are compelled to feel a great respect for the law
and order that holds them together, yet confronted with a huge unthinking,
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menacing and formidable setting - such communities are bound to develop
what we may provisionally cali a garrison mentaÏity. (Frye 225)
I would suggest that such a garrison mentality is in fact also what gives the community its
sense of self Mthough frye was working on the construction of Canadian identity in the
hostile physical setting ofNorth America, I believe that the gamson mentality theoiy can
have broader applications. In the new world order, which is defined partly as an
information age or as a global village, the threat of intrusive discursive influence has
replaced the ‘formidable physical setting’ ofwhich Fiye writes. Every community will
develop its identity around a certain garrison mentality. Cultural identity is largely defined
by the dialogically constructed boundaries which allow us to distinguish who we are from
who we are flot. But these boundaries, or the walls ofthe garrison, are constructed as
counter-discourses, resisting the potentially colonial tendencies that we see in the others’
discourses. Thus, discourses ofidentity are aiways at some point ifinctioning as counter
discourses.
Fanon certainly makes a similar point when he writes that “la mobilisation des
masses, quand elle se réalise à l’occasion de la guerre de libération, introduit dans chaque
conscience la notion de cause commune, de destin national, d’histoire collective” (fanon
70). In bis preface to Les damnés de ta terre, Sartre goes so far as to suggest that “la vraie
culture c’est la Révolution; cela veut dire qu’elle se forge à chaud” (Sartre 12). So
establishing the connection between cultural identity and resistance is in no way a new
venture. Where there is identity, there is always some resistance.
IUCKS 3$
Mthough Mbert Camus was flot writing on colonial discourses and certainly flot
on postcolonial theory, his L ‘homme révolté can also offer irisight into what has been said
on the relation between resistance and identity. As Camus puts it:
La solidarité des hommes se fonde sur le mouvement de révolte et celui-ci,
à son tour, ne trouve de justification que dans cette complicité [...J De
même cette solidarité, hors du sacrée, ne prend vie qu’au niveau de la
révolte. Le vraie drame de la pensée révolté est alors anoncé. Pour être,
l’homme doit se révolter [...]. (Camus 37)
This allows Camus to wnte the now classic line: “[la révolte] est un lieu commun qui
fonde sur tous les hommes la première valeur. Je me révolte, donc nous sommes” (Camus
3$). Transposing Camus’s view on individual identity to cultural identity, we can see how
the community’s existence relies on a certain degree ofresistance. it is important for a
commumty to at least see itself as resistant to some threat in order to constmct strong
discourses of identity. Strong discourses of identity, ffinctioning as prescriptive
censorship, will be capable of maintaining cohesion and stabillty within the community.
The more efficient or dominant the discoutses of identity are, the more homogenous the
community will seem.
But, as I have already suggested, true homogeneity is illusory and is short lived at
best. Societies are aiways changing. Even though certain discourses may be dominant
within a community at a certain point in time, counter-discourses are always present to
varying degrees. No two people will reproduce the discourses ofidentity in exactly the
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same way, and therefore a community’s identity is constantiy fluctuating. If certain
identitarian discourses are very successful, temporariiy creating the semblance of
homogeneity, the raison d’être ofthe community can become compromised. As Claude
Lévi-Strauss argues, “the more a civilization becomes homogenized, the more internai
unes of separation become apparent” (Lévi-Strauss 20). The more a community and its
discourses becomes dominant, the less its members wiil feel threatened. Ernest Renan
suggests that the nation is built when its citizens consent to remember their similarities
(that which unites them) and forget their differences (that which drives them apart) (Renan
Qu ‘est-ce qu ‘une nation, 1992). When the discourses ofthe nation or community are
dominant in its own cuiturai space and especially when they successffiuly dominate the
cultural space of others, the raison-d ‘être of its foundational resistance becomes more
abstract. As its core identity becomes weaker, its cohesion will consequently begin to
waver. The point I am tlying to make is that without a common unifying threat, the
discourses of resistance that are necessary to identity wifl graduaiiy become meaningiess.
Therefore the community’ s identity wiii risk becoming meaningless as weII. In which case
the discourses that would unite by making the members of the community forget their
differences will lose their dominance to the counter-discourses that promote difference,
thereby ftagrnenting the larger community into smaiier groups. And the discourses of
these smaller groups wiIl fotlow the same process as those of the former community, that
is, prescribing within the group and proscribing without.
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The case ofthe United States illustrates this point quite weli. American culture
was bom as an act of anti-colonial resistance. Its discourses of identity were basicaliy
counter-discourses to those of the British empire. It has been argued that the concept of
Mwzifèst Destiny, aithough formuiated as a way of preserving Arnerican culture, was in
actuality mereiy a way ofjustifying American dominance over others. During the Cold
War, American identity was defined by its resistance to a communist global conspiracy.
The majority of Americans rarely saw their own culture as oppressive or repressive, but
rather as being constantly threatened by others. And in the i990’s, afler the fali ofthe
Soviet Union (America’s significant other in the Cold War). American culture was
desperateiy seeking a common threat that could maintain its cohesion and justify its
cultural dominance ail over the world. But the American community in the 1 990’s was
becoming increasingly heterogeneous. The rise of special interest groups, individuality and
the critique ofAmerïcan hegemony were far more important than during the Cold War
era. In response to this, American culture increased its production ofworks in which the
major theme was alien invasion or, less ftequently, the conquering of new frontiers
(namely Mars). The threat of alien invasion and subsequent human resistance would justify
America’s role as world-leader. In these works, the world would acquiesce to American
dominance in order to better counter the threat of a new significant other that would
threaten us ail. And the American community would once again become united, cohesive,
and would consequently reach a higher level ofhomogeneity and stability. Aiso, such a
threat would help secure its global hegemony. ibis is clearly demonstrated in the 1996
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biockbuster film h?depel?dence Da, when the character playing the president of the
United States makes his pre-battie speech:
We can’t be consumed by our petty differences anymore. We will be united
in our common interest. Perhaps it is fate that today is the fourth ofluly,
and you wili once again be fighting for our fteedom. Not from tyranny,
oppression or persecution, but from annihilation. We are fighting for our
right to live, to exist. And should we win the day, the Fourth ofluly will no
longer be known as an American holiday but as the day when the world
declared in one voice, we wiil not go quietiy into the night, we wiIl flot
vanisli without a fight, we are going to live on, we are going to survive.
Today we celebrate our Independence Day. (Independence Day, 1996)
A community lias to be pretty desperate to flot only produce such a film but aiso to fiock
in vast numbers to see it. Ail ofthis lias changed, of course, since the events of September
the eieventh 2001. In the months following, America was more united than ever (as
President Bush would ceaselessly teil us), American fiags - symbol ofthe community -
were fiying high everywhere in the United States ai,d abroad. Mmost every nation in the
“free” world was happy to step in une behind American interests and even lend a hand. In
a sense, the A1-Qaeda terrorists had given Americans precisely what they most needed: a
reason to unite, to justify their hegemony, a way of escaping decadence. The recent crisis
with Iraq might also serve as an example of my point. President Bush has painted the
attack on Iraq as an act of resistance against future acts of terrorism. The rest of the
world, seemingly, was not so ready to agree with the American point ofview. Now, more
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than ever perhaps, the other communities of the world see American policy as oppressive
and American cultural identity as hegemonic. By much ofthe world, an American attack
on Iraq was seen as an act of aggression, of repression and, as it is already frequently
being said, of colonialism. What should be equally disconcerting to American policy
makers today is that a significant portion oftheir own population is also beginning to see
the war on Iraq as an act of colonialism.
Therefore it is important for a community to sec itseif as resistant if it is to have a
strong identity. Since we cannot detect the prescriptive pressures of censorship, we can
only sec the limits ofthe community when we detect proscriptive censorship. A
community is in trouble when it secs itself as committing acts ofproscriptive censorship;
this is aiways indicative ofa significant inner crisis. The shifi from stability to crisis, like
the shifi between Terdiman’s discourse and counter-discourse, almost seems to be
cyclical. Once a community is too strong, it begins to fali apart. Resistance to colonial
discourses is an important driving force behind cultural identity. It is, I believe, essential to
the construction and sustenance of identities. The need to be resistant to a threat in order
to have a strong identity is a rather paradoxical phenomenon (even if it is quite real). The
paradox is that the more a community is threatened, the more united and strong it will
become - but if h becomes too united, homogenous and strong it will no longer be
threatened and will consequently lose its raison-d ‘être. When there is no apparent threat
of some colonizing discourse, and no subsequent resistance, the community develops an
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identity crisis and begins to collapse. Smaller communities are then formed in resistance to
others and the whole cycle ofresistance is renewed. While I believe that a community
must resist in order to have a strong identity, this however does flot imply that a
community will aiways become stronger when threatened, as seen in the previous sections,
a community must be aware ofthe threat in order to counter it. The insidious nature of
neocolonial discourses and hegemony specifically targets such an awareness.
To reiterate, I have argued that discourses of identity can ofien be interpreted as
either counter-discourses or colonial discourses simultaneously, depending on the context
and the point ofview ofthe observer. What one community perceives as counter
discourse, another can perceive as colonial discourse. The only real constant - other than
change, of course - is, by definition, resistance. Usmg this analytic ftamework, without
resistance there is no cohesion, and without cohesion there is, again by definition, no
community. So the problem becomes one of perception. When you can perceive the
discourses of another community inliltrating your own, these discourses are flot
ffinctioning prescriptively but proscriptively. They are therefore perceived as colonial
discourses. You then perceive your own discourses ofidentity (which ffinction
prescriptively) as discourses of resistance or counter-discourses. Rifis appear in the
community when it lias either (a) unsuccessftilly resisted colonial discourses, thereby
allowing them to function prescriptively - in which case those for whom the discourses are
acting prescriptively wiIl have adopted the same perspective as the colonizer; or (b) so
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successffihly eliminated the threat that the members of the community begin to perceive
their own discourses as functioning proscriptively, that is, colonizing (proscriptively)
without and censoring (prescriptively) within. In the former case, the community is
typically spiit into what its members will define as collaborationist groups and resistant
groups, and this seems common in colonized societies; and in the latter case, more
common in colonizer societies, we typically see a relentlessly resistant establishment and
an increasing number of anti-establishment subgroups.
Up to this point, I have attempted to push the premisses of constmctionist
theories, especially those of Richard Terdiman, to their logical conclusion within the scope
ofthe politics ofidentity. For such theorists, identity is a constmct which is buih upon
foundations ofresistance rather than upon some sort ofessential core. Postcolomal critics
like Stephen Siemon or Helen Tiffin have already applied Terdiman’s counter-discourse
theory to postcolonial studies, but they have flot really explored its full implications. If
nothing else, Terdiman’s counter-discourse theoiy should help put an end to the
essentialist/historical approach to postcolonial theory. Admittedly, the problem with the
constructionist approach is that every culture or community can be in some way studied in
postcolonial terms. But this is in fact precisely my point: postcolonial theoiy should not
limit itself to post-independence states, h should be the study of certain specific
movements or discursive trends which can be apparent in any community. Therefore, the
development of a community, society or culture will always be punctuated by instances in
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which it will define itself as resistant to the colonial discourses of others, in which it
develops counter-discourses to resist the hegemony or at least the threat ofthe other. I
believe that postcolonial theory has oflen been, and should especially continue being, a
field of academic enterprise that attempts to analyse such instances. Thus no society is
ever tmlypostcolonial, but any society can exhibit instances ofpostcolonial resistance.
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1.4 Settler Colonial Resistance and Québec
We have seen how discourses and identity are linked together. Also, we have seen
how resistance is necessary to identïty. To study colonialism or neocolonialism today is
therefore a study of discursive interaction rather than a study of political, economic or
military occupation (even though none of these elements are ever entirely mutually
exclusive). Colonial discourses, as we have seen with Terdiman, can threaten any
community; it can subjugate a community to a foreign power without the need of military
force or politicalleconomic sanctions.
For the past twenty years, postcolonialists have been studying the impacts of
colonialism on the cultures and communities ofthe Third World (mainly), ofcommunities
that have been or are stii colonies of occupation. It is undoubtedly truc that colonies of
occupation have suffered most from, and have resisted the most against, colonial
alienation, as Stephen Siemon writes: “the most important forms ofresistance to any form
of social power will be produced from within the communities that are most immediately
and visibly subordinated by that power structure” (Siemon 106). Despite this, as I have
attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, colonialism should no longer be seen only as a
historical event, but as an ongoing process that can be feit (admittedly to vaiying degrees)
everywhere in the world. Canada or Australia are but two national commumties that are
constantly struggiing with their colonial past and present that are stili nonetheless
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excluded from the typical canon ofpostcolonial theory. This exclusion is clearty
suggested in the works of authors such as Ania Loomba:
White settiers were historically the agents of colonial mle, and their own
subsequent development
- cultural as well as economic - does not simply
align them with other colonized peoples. No matter what their differences
with the mother country, white populations here were not subjugated to
the genocide, economic exploitation, cultural decimation and political
exclusion felt by indigenous populations or other colonies. (Loomba 9)
Here, Loomba exhibits the approach to postcolonialism that I have been trying to avoid. It
suggests a stability where there really is none. The mantie ofthe powerful and the
powerless, ofthe colonizer and the colonized, is constantly shifiing. No one would
suggest that Canadians (for instance) have suffered the same amount of hardships as
people from colonies of occupation, but it can be suggested that the alienation prevalent in
Canadian culture does indeed stem from similar sources. The question of authenticity is
ofien invoked in this problem, as Diana Brydon writes: “the authentic colony is implicitly
defined as poor, nonwhite and resistant, and the inauthentic as rich, white, and complicit”
(Brydon Il). But the question ofauthenticity takes us back to the old problem of
essentialism. It is flot because Canada bas neyer been a colony of occupation that
Canadians cannot or could neyer relate to postcolonial resistance.
It is obvious that settler colonies offer a different perspective on postcolomal
issues. Settier colonies have a colonial past in common with one another that does have an
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impact on their colonial present. When European settiers established themselves around
the world, they were doing so in the name of European expansionism. At the time these
settiements were mere extensions ofluropean cultures, dominating and almost
eradicating the indigenous cultures ofthe colonies. However since then and especially
since the anti-colonial era, settier colonies have feit increasingly different from, and even
ostracised by their European origins. As Alan Lawson writes, “settier post-impenal
cultures are sùspended between ‘mother’ and ‘other,’ simultaneously colomzed and
colonizing.” (Lawson 25). Ahhough clearly flot a part ofthe Third World, the in
betweenness of settler colonies also prevents them from truly belonging to the first World
(i.e. the culturally dominant). For this reason, many scholars see settier colonies as
belonging to a Second World (which is not to be confused with the Second World ofthe
Cold War era). Lawson suggests that postcolonial theonsts should
recognize the Second World ofthe settler as a place caught between two
First Worlds, two origins of authority: the originating world of Europe, the
imperium, as source ofthe Second World’s principal cultural authority; and
that other First World, that of the first Nations, whose authority the
settlers flot only effaced and replaced but also desired. (Lawson 29)
But the inclusion of settier colonies in postcolonial studies is stiil met with considerable
hostiity. And this is always due to the fact that a dominant trend in postcolonialism is stiil
to fixate on a more historical approach rather than on a historiographical approach to
colonialism. A historiographical approach implies that the study of an actuat history and
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colonial past is flot as usefiul or interesting as how communities (especially settier
colonies) construct their histories and identities in relation to a colonial past.
Basically, the inclusion of settler colonies in postcolonial theory implies a rhizomic
approach rather than a monolithic approach. Many theonsts have applied Deleuze and
Guattari’s critiques ofpsychoanalysis to postcolonialism (Deleuze and Guatari, 1972). In
this, we can suggest that colonial discourse and power do flot stem from a single tap root;
power and discourse are more dynamic and are not necessarily anchored in
centre/peripheiy models. What is considered to be the centre and periphery is constantly
shifiing and aiways dependent on the point ofview ofthe observer. According to
Ashcroft, Tiffin and Gnffiths, a monolithic approach has been “less than successffil in
combatting older colonialist legacies and neocolomalism whose practises inherit the
rhizomic operations ofimperialism itself’(Ashcrofi et aÏ. 1998: 207). As such,
postcolonial theoiy can be extended to those cultures that are flot and were neyer colonies
of occupation. Biydon writes that “to argue that postcolonialism must aiways be
‘subversive’ and limited to adopting a ‘position ofresistance to the metropolis’ (Bennett
198, 199) is, however, to oversimplif,i potentially more complex relations” (Brydon 10).
What makes settier colonies interesting from a postcolomal perspective is that their
resistance is constmcted almost entirely on a discursive level. Canadians, Australians or
New Zealanders are, after ail, amongst the wealthiest people ofthe world, but on a
cultural level they ail feel oppressed by the overbearing influence of either their European
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mother-land (England) or by the bombardment of neocolomal discourses from the United
States (Americanisation). Furthermore, there is a certain purity to the discursive resistance
of settler colonies in that settler colonial alienation is limited largely to the
discursive/cultural plane while Third World alienation is feit first and foremost in a
physicallmaterial context. I believe that Man Lawson explains it best when he writes: “In
explicitly or implicitly enacting this exclusion [of settier colonial fesistance] they [certain
theoristsJ have bracketed off from examination the very place were the process of colonial
power as negotiation, as transaction of power, are most visible” (Lawson 22). Due to its
ambivalence, to its intimate connection with the colomzer, settler colonial alienation is
often limited to culture - to the production of discourses
- and is neyer really extended to
the same depths and realities as in colonies of occupation. Nevertheless, settier colonial
alienation allows us to see how colonial discourses can have devastating effects on a
community even outside the scope ofwars, genocide or occupation; Québécois critics
often refer to themselves as victims of cultural genocide.
The passages previously quoted from Brydon’s text suggest that settier colonies
are flot resistant or subversive. I would however reformulate this by statmg that settler
colonies are flot as resistant or subversive. As Man Lawson proposes, “the settier subject
is sïgned, then, in a language ofauthonty ami resistance [my italicsJ” (Lawson 26). The
difference between settier colonial resistance and the resistance ftom colonies of
occupation is that settier colonial resistance is usually textual rather than reat in any Third
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World sense of the term. Because settier colonies feel threatened mainly on a
discursive/cultural level, their resistance will likewise be cultural and discursive. Mthough
you may flot see a revolutionary war taking place in a settier cotony (with the obvious
exception ofthe United States), you will nonetheless notice a considerable production of
counter-discourses. In Canada, for instance, Dennis Lee has written texts that can, I
believe, only be properly interpreted in the ftamework of postcolomal theory. In
“Cadence, Country, Silence: Writing in Colonial Space” Lee writes that
to speak unreflectingly in a colony, then, is to use words that speak only
alien space. b reflect is to fali suent, discovering that your authentic space
does flot have words. And to reflect ftirther is to recognize that you and
your people do flot in fact have a privileged authentic space just waiting for
words; you are, among other things, the people who have made an alien
inauthenticity their own. You are lefi chafing at the inarticulacy of a native
space which may flot exist. So you shut up. (Lee 529)
Lee’s text is typical ofsettler colonial resistance in that it creates an awareness of colonial
alienation without actually proposing any aggressive gestures or strategies to respond to
what he perceives as the colonial establishment. Colonial alienation in Canada, although
real, is flot quite real enough to initiate extreme measures of resistance. The level of
resistance produced by a community will be determined by the threat that is perceived by
that community. Settler colonies, like Canada, have produced what can only be described
as passive resistance in their literature. The literature ftom colonies of occupation have
indeed produced far more active or combative/revolutionaiy resistance.
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The problem with postcolonial critics like Loomba is that they are willing to
concede that colonialism stiil manifests itself today, albeit in a far more moderate and
subtie fashion, or that settier colonies have flot really escaped the yoke of colonial
oppression, but they stiil refuse to acknowledge the possibility that settier colonies are
important producers of postcolonial counter-discourses. 1f colomalism is stili present
today in the shape ofneocolonialism, then there is no reason why its impact must be
limited to former colonies of occupation. In fact, settler colonies are especially interesting
in the neocolomal context because their politics of identity have almost aiways been
limited to the discursive/cultural plane in which neocolonialism manifests itself. Settler
colonies have aiways resisted discursive intrusions and subordination. But being part of
the colonial establishment, settïer colonies were aiways and only indirectly victims of
colonial oppression. Therefore, in the neocolonial context of the new world order, it
would be important to look at those societies that have struggled the most and the longest
against neocolonial discourse-based hegemony, and those societies are settier colonies.
The real question at hand for this thesis is to determine how Québec situates itself
in the postcolonial context. Is Québec a settier colony or a colony of occupation? Has
Québec been producing postcolonial counter-discursive resistance? To the first question,
one could say that Québec is a settler colony because the Québécois are ofFrench
descent, and that they originally came to North America as seif1ers. They also, like the
British, had been involved with the brutal subjugation of the Native peoples in the area.
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On the other hand, the Québécois were also conquered by the British in 1759, and in this
sense they became a colony of occupation. So really, Québec has a unique position in the
postcolonial framework. In this, the Québécois are in a similar situation to that ofthe
United States: neither fit into static or fixed categories very well. Although the US is by
definition a former settier colony, we neyer study American culture in this respect. Even if
there is stiil maybe an underlying settier mentality in American culture, Americans are
neyer seen as being colonized but rather as the modem day colonizer. How Americans
perceive themselves is, however, an entirely different question; as we have briefly seen,
Americans can see themselves as a resistant conmiunity, and when they do flot do so, they
begin to wonder what it means to be American. Therefore, just as American culture can be
seen a being somewhere between the colonizer and the settier colony, it is part of my
thesis to suggest that Québécois identity is constmcted as being somewhere between the
colony of occupation and the settier colony. And in this respect, the Québécois are quite
dissimilar to Canadians.
The next chapters will focus on how Québécois identity is constmcted in resistance
to Canada, and how English-speakers in Québec constmct their identity in resistance to
the Québécois. But the point I have been trying to make here is that postcolonial theory
should always focus on understanding rather than legitimizing. My thesis is about how
these communities produce postcolonial resistance, flot about the merits ofdoing so. I am
far more interested in finding out why and how these communities do so. Regardless of
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whether or flot it is justified, I will analyse how Québécois and Anglo-Quebecer cultures
have constnicted their identities in resistance to what they perceive as colonial discourses.
This, I hope, will leaU us to us to a greater understanding of the confiicts that surround
these communities.
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CHAPTER 2
TUE FNDIGENISATION 0f
QUÉBÉCOIS IDENTITY
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Canadians and Québécois have shared a long history oftense relations. The
Québécois have aiways feared that Canadians, and more broadly the Anglophone
hegemony in North America, would eventually enguif and destroy their distinct identity.
Thus the theme of survivance is generally seen as a dominant theme in much ofQuébec
literature and cultural production. In this, we can certainly see how Québécois identity is
shaped by its resistance to others. Its discourses ofidentity have more ofien than flot been
counter-discourses to the alienation bred from a colonial relationship with the other
This is what should allow us to examine Québec writing and Québécois identity
within the scope ofpostcolomal studies. But as mentioned in the previous chapter, it is
flot easy nor is it as obvious as it may seem to place Québécois identity within the
postcolonial field. At first glance, Québec is a settier colony, like Canada; but upon firnher
analysis we quickly see that the Québécois often tend to define themselves as a colony of
occupation. In this, the Québécois serve as an excellent example of how static categories
or definitions are misleading and inefficient, especially in postcolonial studies.
k is this ambiguousness of Québécois identity that is the foundation of what
Charles Taylor would cail the misrecognition of Québec by Canada. Taylor believes that
misrecognition generates tensions between communities (Taylor 1994). Taylor would
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reject most ofthe theories developed in the first chapter because they suggest that the
politics of identity is an ongoing struggle for power rather than a sincere quest for true
recognition. 11e is careful to warn us that his concept of recognition is flot a form of
condescension.
A favourable judgement on demand is nonsense, unless some such theories
are valid. Moreover, the giving ofsuch ajudgement on demand is an act of
breathtaking condescension. No one can really mean it as a genuine act of
respect. It is more in the nature ofa pretend act of respect given on the
insistence ofits supposed beneficiary. Objectively, such an act involves
contempt ofthe latter’s intelligence. (Taylor, “Politics” 70)
Taylor feels that a neo-Nietzschean perspective, such as the one developed in my first
chapter, is unable to see recognition as anything other than condescension. This however
is flot entirely taie, depending on your defimtion ofrecognition. Uke Taylor, I feel that
recognition is flot something to be granted from above; but to truly avoid condescension,
it must be taken by the misrecognized community as an act of catharsis or collective
affirmation. This way, the community creates a situation in which recognition by the other
becomes inevitable. Mthough this type of recognition is ofien achieved through
revolutions, it can also be achieved through more subtle and less violent forms of counter
discursive practises. Québec, as we shah see ffirther in this chapter, serves as a good
example ofthis.
HICKS 58
The approach I have developed in my first chapter suggests that to have a strong,
viable identity a collective will tend to see itself as being somehow threatened by the
potentially colonial discursive influence of an other. This, however, does flot imply that
every collective will necessarily have to resist or develop counter-discourses in exactly the
same way. A community seeking to be recognized is stili capable of seeing that it flot the
only one that is threatened. A commumty seeking to be recogrnzed can stili, although with
greater difficulty, accept that lis discourses can also be the source of an other’s resistance.
I would argue that peaceffil co-existence happens when there is a balance between a
community’ s own resistance and acceptance of the other’ s resistance. The danger, as seen
in the previous chapter, is that if such a balance is flot achieved the community will either
become decadent (if it no longer has a unifying threat against which it needs to resist) or it
will become a colonizer in turn (if it is unwilling to recognize that it too can have a
dominating influence on others). A perfect balance between the two seems practically
utopian, and has rarely occurred in our history, but it is when we are closest to it that we
see truc moments of or at least the hope of peace. As I see it, the politics ofrecognition
is flot only a question of collective affirmation, but also one of recognizing oneseif as a
potential colonizer. In other words, a community always fiinctions, from a more detached
point ofview, as both colonizer and colonized.
So one ofthe probÏems with Canada, for instance, is that Canadians have been
unable to recognize themselves as a threat to Québécois identity. Canadians are willing to
see their identity as being somewhat colonized by American cultural hegemony or, once,
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by an overbearing British heritage. As such they ffinction as a typical settier colony. But
when it cornes to the Québec question. they tend to see just another settier colony
struggiing for cultural survival. The problem lies partly in Canada’s production ofcounter
discourses that encourage the creation of a new and distinct Canadian identity, allowing
Canadians to break away from the Bntish North American identity that preceded it. There
is much evidence suggesting that the Québécois, on the other hand, have flot forgotten
Canada’s past and are unwilling to do so. Most Québécois today will flot refer to
Canadians as tes Canadiens Anglais but simply as les Anglais. To the Québécois,
Canadians are therefore stili the same colonizers who conquered their land 243 years ago.
Instead of understanding that they are perceived, stiil today, as colonizers,
Canadians are more likely to try and find ways ofinvalidating the Québécois’s daims.
Canadian theorist Linda Hutcheon writes that
Quebec may align itselfpolitically witli colonies such as Mgeria, Tunisia
and Haiti, but there is a major political and historical difference: the pre
colonial history ofthe french in Quebec was an imperialistic one.
(Hutcheon 132)
By writing this, Hutcheon is basically stating that the Québécois should not define
themselves as anything other than a settier colony, like Canada. and it implies that
Québécois counter-discourses, those that strive for sovereignty, are flot as legitimate as
they would be in colonies of occupation. By doing this, authors such as Hutcheon are,
ftom the Québécois perspective at least, relieving themseÏves of the burden of being
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colonizers. In a sense, they are recognizing the Québécois as being equaÏty colonized and
colonizer as they are. b rnany Canadians, the only legitimate daim to being a colony of
occupation in Canada cornes from the peoples ofthe First Nations. In Jocelyne Doray and
Julian Samuel’ s coedited work The Raft ofMedusa, Mawan Hassan states that “we
cannot, nevertheless. situate the Québécois within the same trajectones as the Palestinians
or Vietnamese or South Africans or Mgerians, because the Québécois are flot an
autochtonous people. The question of colonialism has much to do with indigenous status”
(Hassan, qtd in Doray 91). But the Québécois clearly do flot see things this way and tend
to hold Canada accountable for much oftheir alienation. What Canadians should be doing
is recognizing the fact that they are also colonizers frorn the Québécois’s point ofview.
Canadians need to understand that, unlike themselves, the Québécois wilI ofien ponray
themselves as a colony of occupation (this chapter will examine how they succeed in doing
this). The question becomes not one ofdetermining if the Québécois have the right to
such daims but one of accepting why the Québécois daim thern.
Even though I feel that Québec could hold a rather unique position in the
postcolonial field, it is by no means the only wealthy western society that sees itself as a
colony of occupation. We see a similar phenomenon with the Scots, the Irish, the
Basques, or the Corsicans. Cases such as these also destabilise the static definitions we
ofien have in postcolonial theory. Profound alienation is a phenomenon that is flot at ail
iimited to the typical former colonies ofthe Third World. Irvine Welsh’s nove!
Trainspotting (1993) is a beautifiul example of cultural alienation among young Scots:
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Fucking failures in country ay failures. It’s nae good blamin it on the
English tir colonizing us. Ah don’t hate the English. They’re just wankers.
We are colonized by wankers. We can’t pick a decent, vibrant, heaÏthy
culture to be colonized by. No. We’re ruled by effete arsewholes. What
does that make us? The lowest ofthe low, the skum ofthe earth. The most
wretched, servile, miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat intea
creation. Ah don’t hate the English. They just git oan wi the shite thuv
goat. Ah hate the Scots. (WeÏsh 7$)
In bis protagonist’s rant, Welsh describes the Scots as a truty and thoroughly colomzed
people by invoking Fanon’s famous titie The Wretched oJthe Earth (Les damnés de la
terre). On a passing note, in using a heavily accented English, Welsh’s work reminds us of
the Québécois’s usage ofjouat as a means ofcultural resistance. Mso, the self hatred feit
by Welsh’s protagonist is also quite common throughout the literatures ofcolonized
peoples, including the Québécois. It is in this respect that the Québécois can more easily
be compared to the above mentioned cultures than to settler colonies lilce Canada or
Australia.
In an interview published in Marcos Ancelovici ami Francis Dupui-Dén’s
L ‘Archipel identitaire, Charles Taylor distinguishes alienation ftom oppression:
Il y a des cas où il n’y a pas d’oppression bien qu’il n’y ait pas non plus de
reconnaissance, comme c’est aujourd’hui le cas au Canada puisque certains
Canadiens anglais ne reconnaissent toujours pas le caractère distinct du
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Canada français. Bien que l’ancienne situation de domination n’existe plus,
le manque de reconnaissance continue à favoriser un sentiment d’aliénation
sans pour autant qu’il se traduise par une oppression. (Ancelovici, 33)
0f course, there are degrees of oppression that are feit on much deeper levels than could
ever be feit in Québec. The Québécois wilI iikely neyer starve or be arbitrarily imprisoned
as a consequence oftheir colonial reality - flot today in any event. And in this sense, it
wouid be a mistake to compare the Québécois to what others might refer to as ‘real’
colonies of occupation. This is also why I insist on situating Québécois culture as being
somewhere between the settler colony and the colony of occupation. But can we realiy
distinguish alienation from oppression, or should we flot instead make a distinction
between cultural and physical oppression? Alienation or cultural oppression may flot be as
destructive as physical or violent oppression in any ‘real’ sense, but it too can have
incredibly devastating effects on a community’ s identity.
In contemporaiy Québec, those who feel that they are stili colonized, feel it
umquely on a discursive/cultural level. They, in their every day lives, are flot physically
oppressed by Canadian or Anglophone hegemony; but they stiil see their identity as
something that is at risk of disappearing through assimilation and other neocolonial
practises. Québécois authors today will stili portray themselves as victims of discursive
violence. Taylor would link this discursive violence to Canada’s lack ofrecognition
towards Québec. In this, I am in full agreement with Taylor’s views. My insistence on
what he catis neo-Nietzschean theories is more an attempt to strengthen his approach than
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being an objection to it; I see it as a mise-en-garde, as the only real way ofnot falling back
on old essentialisms and the only way to tmly avoid condescension.
The discursive violence felt by the Québécois bas led them to produce strong
identitarian counter-discourses. Just as their alienation is feit mostly on a discursive level,
their resistance to that alienation is also mostly discursive. The relation between discourse
based colonialism and counter-discursive resistance is central to our understanding ofthe
neocolonial tensions prevalent in the new world order. This is why I feel that studying
Québécois counter-discourses within the scope ofpostcolonial theory is so important. I
feel that Québécois resistance epitomises a style of resistance that is already becoming
wide-spread throughout the world.
In Les damnés de ta terre, Fanon theorizes that in the anti-colonial era the
colonized culture had to go through three stages in order to properly counter the
colonizer’s presence:
Dans une première phase, L’intellectuel colonisé prouve qu’il a assimilé La
culture de l’occupant [...J Dans un deuxième temps le colonisé est ébranlé
et décide de se souvenir [...J Enfin dans une troisième période, dite de
combat, le colonisé après avoir tenté de se perdre dans le peuple, de se
perdre avec le peuple, va au contraire secouer le peuple. (Fanon 166)
In this passage, Fanon is referring to colomalism on a cultural level. Therefore in the
neocolonial context, in winch discursive violence is felt on an identitarian!cultural level
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and is responded to with counter-discourses, Fanon’s writings are stili relevant. In
Québec, we can see the same three above mentioned stages, and I would add a fourth one
in which the colonized manages to institutionalise or create viable establishments based on
the efforts produced in the third stage. I will flot develop Fanon’s flrst stage in this thesis
because ofits onmipresence in the three others, it is a necessary precursor to them. The
first stage is basicalÏy definable as cuhural alienation, and without it the three other stages
are unnecessary. What will interest me in the next chapters, is how the Québécois have
constructed their identity in a large measure by producing counter-discourses which
correspond roughly to the three latter stages.
In this chapter, I shall examine the counter-discourses that fail into a category that
I have called discourses ofindigenisation. Ibis first mode ofcounter-discourse, similar to
fanon’s souvenir, is comprised of discourses that constmct a sense ofbelonging and
emphasize the feeling of invasion by the other. These counter-discourses construct a
history that establishes the Québécois as an indigenous people on a land that was
subsequently conquered by the other.
As I have already mentioned, many ofthe problems that exist between much of
Canada and Québec stem from the fact that the Québécois do not generally define
themselves, as do many Canadians, as just another settler colony. By failing to recognize
this most important point Canada bas failed to understand, as I see it, one ofthe most
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ffindamental sources ofthe tensions between the two communities. Even Charles Taylor, a
noted and respected figure in Québec studies, also makes this ffindamental mistake:
Quebec was a colony. But are we Quebeckers “colonized” now? This
would be the shortest way to demonstrate that we must become a
sovereign state. Well, we obviously are flot in some straightforward sense,
not as the Thirteen Colonies were in 1776; nor as, say, India was in 1947.
(Taylor, Reconciting 44)
Taylor is without a doubt a Québec theorist with a great understanding of Québécois (or
what Taylor refers to as ‘Quebecker’) identity. However, in this passage, he repeats the
point ofview so typical to Canadians when looking at the Québécois. He does flot seem to
take into account the ways in which the Québécois in general have, and stili do,
constructed their identity by emphasizing similarities with other colonies of occupation. It
is because they stili construct their identity in this fashion that sovereignty, or at least
sovereignty-association. is stiil such an important theme in Québécois culture today. In
Taylor’ s defence, I agree that Québec is flot a colony in ‘some straightforward sense’, but
I would put more emphasis than Taylor on how the Québécois, in ‘some sense,’ sec
themselves as a colony.
It is therefore important for Canadians, if they truly want to understand the nature
of the CanadalQuébec conflict, to recognize that the Québécois have constmcted their
identity by grounding it in the traumatic events of their past. h is these events, and
especially the emphasis placed Ofl them, that have allowed the Québécois to see
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themselves as a colony of occupation rather than as a settier colony. In order to
understand this aspect ofthe construction of Québécois identity, we must look at how the
Québécois have constmcted their history. I am flot alone in seeing history as a field of
study heavily influenced by discourse or discursive trends. This, nevertheless, does flot
make the study of history any less interesting, it merely implies that history is less a
revelation of a true past than it is a revelation of a present identity. Historians Guy
Rocher, John Meisel and Arthur Silver point out in Sije inc souviens bien/As I Recail
that:
Pour tous les peuples et pour toute collectivité, comme pour toute
personne, le passé est à la fois mémoire et miroir. L’histoire, qu’elle soit la
mémoire d’une personne ou celle d’un peuple, est la source première de
l’identité, individuelle ou collective, elle fournit la matière de la
construction identitaire. Et cette construction est en même temps en
constante reconstruction. (Meisel et al. 11)
In this chapter, I shall look upon the works of Québécois historians as works that have
helped construct Québécois identity, giving it meaning by anchoring it in the past. Rocher,
Meisel and Silver also remark that
Les événements et les interprétations rapportés ici n’ont donc pas à être
connus de tous ni à faire partie de la mémoire immédiate de chacun pour
être signifiants. Ils le sont parce qu’ils esquissent le contour d’une identité
collective. (Meisel et al. 5)
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In other words, even if an individual is not fully aware of the constructed histoiy of his or
her community, he or she - being a willing or even unwilling member ofthat community
-
will stili be affected by it. Some events in history are highlighted by a community as
foundational moments that helped define their identity. Here we have an example of how a
comrnunity can create an essence in order to create a sense of self. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, although I believe that such essences are constwcted rather than ‘real’,
they can stili have a real impact on the collective and (consequently) individual psyche.
This chapter will analyse the works of many Québécois historians in order to
examine how Québécois identity bas been, and is still, constructed as something
indigenous to this land, rather than being something that settled on it. This particular
discursive construction, or what I cali indigenisation, is a form of counter-discourse in that
it defines the Québécois as a people that have always been threatened by the colonial
interference of others. It implies that the Québécois have aiways needed to resist the other
to survive. Discourses ofindigenisation counter the seemingly dominant discourse from
Canada that suggests that despite certain troubled moments, English and French
Canadians have more ofien than not shared a relatively harmonious and productive
relationship.
Since the 1930s the dominant trend in Québécois historiography has been to look
upon two events in its historv as being most important in the understanding of Québécois
identity. The first is the Conquest (1760) and the second is the Annexation (1840). As
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Maurice Séguin writes: “L’histoire politique du Canada français ne se comprend bien
qu’en tenant compte de ce désastre inévitable en deux temps, annoncé dès 1760 par la
colonisation anglaise et consolidé en 1840 par l’union des forces anglaises” (Séguin 162).
Séguin belongs to a group ofhistorians, prolific in the 1940’s and Ï950s, based at the
Université de MontréaÏ and inspired largely by Lionel Groulx. With Séguin, the Montréal
historians are Guy frégault and Michel Bmnet. The writings ofthe Montréal group have
been most influentiai in Québec, and their ideas stiil dominate to a large degree the way
the Québécois perceive their past.
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2.1 The Conquest
Mthough the Conquest and the Annexation have aiways been interpreted as the
two most important moments in Québécois’ past, the Montréal historians had a slightly
different understanding ofthe Conquest ftom their more cornemporary counterparts. The
Montréal histonans saw the Conquest as a cataclysmic event, practically destroying
Québécois culture while it was stiil in an embryonic state. Hence the commonly used term
survivance, to designate the post-Conquest era in Québec. The British conquest ofNew
france was seen as the “arrêt de mort d’une société” (Frégault, La Guerre de ta
(onquête, 1955). Even though the Montréal historians did put a great deal ofemphasis on
the Conquest, an emphasis that portrays the Québécois as a colonized people, their take
on the Conquest was not aiways successful in portraying the Québécois as an indigenous
people. Guy Frégault, in particular, fails to do so by glorifring the society that existed in
New-France, before the Conquest. As Jean Lamarre suggests:
Mais, à la différence de Grouix, pour qui le caractère idéal de la Nouvelle
France est avant tout lié à la pureté de nos origines et aux intentions
providentielles qui ont prévalu, Frégault, plutôt que de situer cette
dimension idéale sur un plan absolu, va, pour sa part, la ramener à une
échelle plus humaine en présentant la Nouvelle-France comme un exemple
parfait de société équilibrée et aussi, sinon surtout, remplie de «vitalité».
(Lamarre 246)
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In idealizing a pre-Conquest society in Québec. frégault is basically suggesting that
Québécois culture was already established. In doing so, he does flot indigemse the
Québécois but rather puts them on an equal footing with the Bntish North American
invaders. Séguin echoes frégault’s views when he writes:
[La Conquête] est une catastrophe, qui arrache cette jeune colonie à son
milieu protecteur et nourricier et l’atteint dans son organisation comme
société et comme nation en formation, à la subordination politique et
économique [...J (Séguin 15)
Although he does flot idealize the pre-Conquest French community to the same extent as
Frégault, Séguin also refuses to create a definitive distinction with the post-Conquest
community. As such, the Montréal historians must have thought ofthe Québécois as being
somewhat more akin to the Boers in South Africa than to the Scots or Irish. By their
defimtion, the Conquest was a battle between two colonial powers, where one settier
colony prevented another from truly coming into existence (or at least fuffilling its
existence).
The Montréal historians’ interpretation ofthe Conquest as the most defining
moment in Québécois history, is a discursive strategy that allowed them to explain the
misery and alienation ofthe Québécois. They saw the Québécois ofthe 1940’s and 1950’s
as a colonized people, and because ofthe Conquest, unable to corne into their owu
economically, politically or culturally. It was a way ofblaming the other for one’s misery.
In contrast to the Montréal historians, the Québec (city) historians based at the tiniversité
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Lavai opted for a different interpretation ofhistory. Instead ofblaming the other, the
Québec historians (Marcel Trudel, Jean Hamelin, Femand Ouellet) chose to blame the
Québécois for their own miseiy. They put the blame chiefly on the fact that the Québécois
were too isolationist, inefficient and lazy to join the modem world. In this the clergy had a
more negative influence than the Conquest or the British. But the Québec historians did
flot take into account the reasons why the clergy came into such power or why the
Québécois were so adverse to individual achievement. This explains why the neo
nationalist perspective of the Montréal historians gained more importance later in
Québécois culture. In his work, Making History in Twentieth-Cenhay Quebec, Ronald
Rudin draws similar conclusions. He remarks that the Montréal and Québec historians,
while different in their approach and conclusions, shared the view that the Québécois were
servile and somewhat backwards. Rudin points out that more contemporary historians are
involved in a revisionist approach, to show how the Québécois
- throughout their history -
did in fact espouse modem values and did evolve in a more or less normal fashion (Rudin,
Making 172, 220). But contemporaiy historians in Québec do flot contradict the Montréal
historians’ neo-nationalist thesis that the Québécois are a colonized people. Although
they are a littie more self-critical than the Montréal historians, they stili sec the Conquest
and the Annexation as the most significant moments in their collective’s past. In fact, as I
intend to demonstrate, their approach is one the most involved in discourses of
indigenisation.
FIICKS 72
Like the Montréal historians, feniand Dumont observes that the Québécois today
stili see in their history traumatic events that have scarred their identity:
Aujourd’hui, des francophones ont beau promouvoir la souveraineté du
Québec au nom d’une plus grande efficacité gouvernementale et de
prétendre avoir exorcisé les démons du nationalisme de leurs grands-pères,
ils ne cachent pas que les désirs d’indépendance se nourrissent aussi des
souvenirs des vexations passées. (Dumont, Genèse 333-334)
It is flot because Québécois nationalism today is far more civic than ethnic, which was flot
the case in the 1940’s and 195Os, that the Québécois have softened their views on the
Conquest. The prevalent idea today is that, although traumatic and devastating, the
Conquest was also a foundational event in Québécois identity. Foundational in that
without it, the Québécois might flot have ever been a trnly distinct people.
Stéphane Kelly, in La petite loterie, remarks that the Conquest forced the people
who would later become the Québécois to see themselves, for the first time, as being alone
in the World:
Cette image du peuple orphelin est très populaire. Le Canadien, après la
Conquête anglaise, est seul au monde. L’histoire de la nation canadienne
[québécoiseJ accordera, par la suite, une prépondérance au motif de
l’abandon. La Conquête, en tant que grande défaite, devient l’évenement
organisateur de l’histoire nationale. (Kelly $1)
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Being ‘orphans’, the new community had to depend on its own means to survive.
According to Kelly the Conquest, and the subsequent feeling ofbeing abandoned, is what
helped create a national sentiment in Québec. Therefore before the Conquest there was
flot a Canadien or Québécois national community.
This idea is also seen in femand Dumont’s Genèse de ta société québécoise:
“[j le sentiment national est renforcé par la Conquête [...J Elle [la coupure avec la
métropole) renvoie à eux-mêmes ceux qui restent au Canada et leur donne l’impression
qu’ils sont abandonnés à leur propre destin” (Dumont, Genèse 103). Dumont, however,
does flot see the Conquest as the definitive starting point of Québécois society. He
theorizes that the community that would become the basis of Québécois society found its
origins before the Conquest:
Nous avons pu observer en Nouvelle-France la germination du sentiment
national; le Canadiens de l’époque formaient indubitablement une
communauté distinct [from the frenchJ. II reste que les similitudes de
coutumes, de langages, d’institutions entre la france et la colonie
empêchaient la rupture qui eût permis de parler de nation. La Conquête
crée cette rupture [...J (Dumont, Genèse 117)
Although the origins ofthe commumty or nation were already there, it is only after the
Conquest or, in a sense, because ofthe Conquest that the national community truly took
shape.
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In Du Canada au Onébec, Généalogie cl ‘une histoire, Heinz Weinmann reiterates
the point ofview expressed by most contemporary authors ofQuébec historical writing.
11e also sees the Conquest as something, albeit traumatic, that helped shape Québécois
identity:
Or, le conquérant donne aux Canadiens un territoire certes rogné, mais en
contrepartie, nettement délimité. C’est lui qui crée l’entité territoriale, le
«pays)>, au sens premier, la «Province of Québec» dont les Québécois
oublieront ensuite qui en a été l’instigateur. [...J La présence de l’Autre
anglais, contrairement à ce qu’on a pu affirmer, aiguise la différence donc,
par contre coup, l’identité nationale des (‘anadiens. (Weinmann 336)
The birth of what the Britrish had called Fifieenth Colony was, in other words, also the
birth ofwhat would become Québécois society. Mthough it was interpreted as an act of
colonial subordination by the Québécois, one cannot deny that it was also a foundational
moment for them. Insofar as indigenising discourses go, Weinmann even suggests that
“[g]râce à la défaite, [il y eu] une presse et une culture autochtones” (Weinmann 33$). So
it is mainly in contemporary historical writing that we truly see discourses of
indigenisation. Even though contemporary Québécois historians and social theorists were
more heavily influenced by the Montréal group, they were really the first to see the
Conquest as a starting point for an indigenous Québécois culture.
Marcel Rioux, a well known separatist writer, goes a step further than Dumont
when he writes: “En gros, on peut dire que les français, ceux qui l’étaient demeurés,
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quittent la colonie, tandis que les Québécois restent, c’est-à-dire les Français qui étaient
devenus Québécois” (Rioux 122). We see here that for Rioux, the Conquest is a pivotai,
transitional moment in which the community is defined more as a settier colony before but
shifis to become a coiony of occupation afier. A colony of occupation comprised of a
people indigenous to the land, as Rioux writes: “Ce sont les habitants qui, après la
Conquête, continueront la nation québécoise” (Rioux 39). The usage ofthe term habitant
is important here. It is a term commonly used in Québécois culture to designate the
agranan hentage ofthe Québécois. It also stresses an attachment to the land.
Other than the habitant, the other image that dominates Québécois mythology is
the coureur de bois: “Dès les débuts de la Nouvelles-france, le coureur des bois est un
personnage à part. [...J ii adopte plus ou moins les moeurs des Indiens, apprend les
langues indigènes, obéit à ses propres normes” (Dumont, Genèse 65). Here, Dumont
shows us how the image ofthe coureur des bois helps the Québécois constmct discourses
of indigenisation. Even though the Québécois were not actually indigenous, they became
indigenous later on by devetoping a coureur de bois or, ahemately, a habitant mentality.
Heinz Weinmann aptly describes this duality in Québécois self-representation when he
writes:
Mais étant donné que la civilisation de l’habitant agriculteur chasse le
castor chassé, un conflit irréconciliable naîtra entre l’espace cultivé,
cultivant, de l’habitant, et t’espace sauvage de la chasse au castor. Bien
plus, ce conflit sera responsable de la naissance et de la coexistence de
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deux types d’homme parfois dans la même personne: l’habitant sédentaire
cultivateur civilisé vivant dans un pays (pagus), et le coureur des bois
sauvage, le voyageur nomade, parcourant un territoire sans feu ni lieu.
(Weinmann 193)
Weinmann treats the coureur des bois and the habitant as two archetypes ever present in
the Québécois collective psyche. Whether or flot we actually agree with this, we can
observe that contemporaly authors are putting forward the idea that there were three
types of individuals living in New-France: French colonials, habitants and coureurs des
bois. While the former would return to France, the latter two would found Québécois
society (and form the basis of what is oflen considered the Québécois de souches). Both
are immersed in an imagery ofbelonging, ofbeing inextricably attached to the land (as
opposed to the French colonials) and, in this respect, indigenous to it. Although the
habitant and coureur des bois are of course mytho-poetic constructions, they are
nonetheless very much a part of Québécois identity.
Regardless of the Montréal historians’ slightly divergent interpretation of
Québécois identity before the Conquest, Québécois historical writing and interpretation
has been more or Ïess unanimous in its understanding of what happened after. The
Québécois were placed in a position where they had to redefine themselves as an occupied
people and had to stmggle for their survival. This era is the beginning of ta survivance, a
trait or mentality that has aiways been seen as central to Québécois culture. Afler the
Conquest, afraid that the Canadiens might join the Thirteen Colonies in their revolt, the
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British created the Quebec Act (1774). which gave the canadiens linguistic as well as
distinct legal rights (based on the french system the Canadiens were accustomed to), and
gave them a certain measure or seif-governance. As Séguin writes: “Le Quebec Act
légalise la survivance. Il encourage les Canadiens à continuer de se considérer comme le
peuple de la colonie” (Séguin 36). Here, Séguin’s stress on le peuple ofthe colony is also
an interesting example ofindigenising discourse. He does flot even mention the Native
people as a presence on the land. The Quebec Act does flot only legitimize la survivance,
it legitimizes the Québécois (tes Canadiens) as the taie and authenllc people ofthe land.
The Québécois today appear to have constmed the Quebec Act as an important moment,
following the Conquest, in which they were longer seen as settiers to the British, but
more as an indigenous people.
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2.2 The Annexation
Another important historical moment highuighted by the Québécois, is the 1791
Constitutional Act. The Constitutional Act defined Québécois territory in the creation of
Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and Québec). To many Québécois, the Constitutional
Act is seen as the first and only recognition by the English of the two distinct national
identities in Canada (British North America). With the Constitutional Act the Québécois
not only had a recognized identity, they also had recognized borders. Some Québécois
authors will interpret the 1791-1 $40 period as an ideal moment in their history. It was a
time when they feit more in control oftheir destiny and less threatened by others. As
Séguin writes: “Ce Bas-Canada, biethnique, biculturelle et bilingue, leur apparaît [aux
Canadiens] comme une merveilleuse réussite humaine” (Séguin 135). The Constitutional
Act established a balance in Canada between the french and English speaking populations
(between Upper and Lower Canada) that, in several ways, the many Québécois have
idealized and are stiil trying to recreate.
From its inception, the Constitutional Act was perceived by the English minority in
Québec as a slap in the face. The English population of Québec afler the Conquest was
actually divided into two main groups with veiy divergent traditions and divergent views
towards the Québécois. The first group, comprised ofthe British military conquerors,
were usually more conciliatory and surprisingly more inclined to protect the Québécois
people. The military governors were more oflen than flot willlng to give more power the
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Québécois, power that would atlow them to survive, in order to avoid uprisings and to
ensure peace. But affer the Conquest, an English merchant class established itself in
Québec with the sole purpose ofreaping the spoits ofwar. It is this second group that
objected most adamantiy to the Québec Act, and especially the Constitutional Act. Both
ofthese treaties were seen by the English merchants as unacceptable obstacles to the
growth oftheir own fortunes in favour ofthe survival of an already conquered people. As
Canadian historian Arthur Lower suggests: “The Constitutional Act took the commercial
men ofMontreal out ofthe fiying pan [the Quebec Act] and put them into the fire”
(Lower 202). Those English merchants in Québec are viewed by most Québécois today as
a powerffil lobby group that pressured the English governors to repeal the Constitutional
Act and with it, ail ofthe rights accorded to the Québécois. The English merchants of
Lower Canada finally found the right man in Governor lames Craig, and as of I $22 there
was a concerted effort by English speakers to unify the two Canadas in order to place the
Québécois in a more controllable minority status. Hence the actual minority of Lower
Canada, which was English, would then become a majority that could finally tmly benefit
from the Conquest. This English effort to unify the Canadas was met with considerable
resistance by the Québécois politicians of the lime. It led eventually to the Patriotes
rebellions of 1837-183$. Thus, as Lower daims, “Sir lames Craig must be considered one
ofthe founders ofFrench-Canadian nationalism” (Lower 15$).
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Perhaps more so today than ever before, theorists feel that Québécois identity has
suffered more from the Annexation than it ever did from the Conquest. As Weinmann
writes:
[La Conquête] est une construction après coup (nachtraglich), au sens
freudien du terme, élaborée à la suite d’un autre traumatisme, d’un impact
psychologique infiniment plus retentissant: l’insurrection de 1837-183$.
(Weinmann 271)
Contemporaiy historians and Québécois social theorists wil tend to look at the rebellion
and the ensuing Annexation as being far more significant to Québécois identity today than
the Conquest was in the 1940s and 1950’s. As Weinmann points out, “[...J il ne saurait
plus faire de doute que la crise d’octobre plonge ses racines jusqu’à cette autre grande
crise du Canada français: la Rébellion des Patriotes” (Weinmann 461). We can see how
Québécois revolutionaries in the I 960’s and 1 970’s could easily ground their resistance to
Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the Patriotes rebellion. M Louis-Joseph Papineau (the leader
of the insurrection) writes afier the Patriotes’ failure:
Aussi, parmi les acteurs de ce drame sanglant, n’y en a-t-il aucun qui se
repente d’avoir tenté la résistance; et parmi leurs concitoyens, il n’y en a
pas un sur mille qui leur reproche de l’avoir fait. Seulement il y a dans
l’âme de tous un chagrin profond que cette résistance ait été malheureuse,
mais en même temps un grand espoir qu’elle sera reprise et prévaudra.
(Papmeau, qtd in Rioux 131)
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The fLQ genuinely believed that they were fulfihling Papineau’s prophecy. Like the
Conquest, the Annexation is, yet again, stili an event that establishes the Québécois as a
colony of occupation. Highuighting the rebellion ami its aftermath (the Annexation), is
another way ofconstmcting Québécois identity as that ofa truly colonized people.
The failure ofthe rebellion led to the infamous Durham Report and the Union Act
of 1840. Lord Durham feit that the Canadiens were a backward people who would benefit
from being assimilated into British culture. The Union Act, to most Canadians is flot seen
as an act of colonial occupation, but as just another step towards the formation of their
country. As Arthur Silver remarks:
De nos jours, la plupart des Anglo-Canadiens ne savent sans doute même
pas qu’il y ait jamais eu un Canada-Uni. Mais s’il est vrai, comme le dit
Samuel LaSelva, qu’ils voient dans la Conquête l’événement qui «a fait du
Québec une partie du Canada», l’Union devrait leur prouver qu’il est
possible pour les Canadiens - francophones et anglophones
- de travailler
ensemble à l’intérieur de ce pays, dans le respect mutuel et pour leur bien
commun. (Meisel et al. 58)
Silver underlines that most Canadians are ofien ignorant of the significance the I $40
Annexation holds for the Québécois, that it is seen as a traumatic event in their collective
memory. When they are not ignorant, Canadians will sec the Union Act as an event that
lcd to a more positive alliance between french and English Canada; it led to the
Lafontaine-Baldwin partnership, to responsible government and to the Confederation. To
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the Québécois, however, the union ofthe two Canadas is almost aiways seen as an
attempt by Canadians to assimilate and destroy Québécois identity. While the term
‘Union’ can be seen as a positive term, the Québécois will often use the term ‘Annexation’
in its stead.
The Annexation, like the Conquest, plunged the Québécois into yet another phase
of survivance. And it is this last phase of .çurvivance that leU the Québécois to the Quiet
Revolution and the instances of self-affirmation that we have witnessed in the past forty
years. This interpretation ofthe Union Act as an annexation is not by any means limited to
sovereigntists or separatists in Québec; it is a view also shared by most federalists.
fédéralistes ou séparatistes, les Canadiens français ne pouvaient rester
indifférents au souvenir de Lord Durham, lui qui avait proposé l’Union
comme moyen d’éradiquer leur nationalité. Son nom continue de
symboliser pour eux une politique d’anglicisation ainsi que l’hostilité des
anglophones à l’égard de leurs traits distinctifs. (Meisel et al. 56)
Upon doser inspection, we sec that most discursive strategies in Québec, whether they be
sovereigntist or federalist, actually attempt to reach veiy similar objectives; it is only in the
means by wbich these objectives are reached that we sec a real difference. Ihe Québécois
do not want to return to a pre-Conquest state; the majority of Québécois want to retrieve
a pre-Annexation state of affairs in which they feel they were recognized as equals and
were (relatively) autonomous. The pre-Annexation state of affairs was the first and only
time when Canada, as seen by the Québécois point of view, was a binational state. The
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1840 Annexation took that away from the Québécois, and it is that injustice that they are
stiil striving to rectify today.
h is interesting to sec how the Conquest and the Annexation are flot only seen as
traumatic events in Québécois identity, but as events that have forced Québécois identity
to redefine itself Up to this point, I have mainly used the term ‘Québécois’ to designate
the French speaking people living in Canada, but as I have already mentioned, the
nomenclature ‘Québécois’ was flot aiways commonly used. Michel Brunet explains it best
when he writes:
[Aller the Conquest the) Canadiens pouvaient au moins se dire qu’ils
avaient prouvé au monde entier et à eux-mêmes qu’ils étaient capables de
défendre leur patrie et qu’ils méritaient de la conserver. [...J [Aller the
Union Act of 1840) Ce fit alors qu’apparurent les Canadiens français. Mis
en minorité dans le Canada-Uni, les anciens Canadiens avaient dû renoncer
à leur ambition de former une nation distincte dans la vallée du Saint
Laurent. (Brunet 166-170)
Brunet is demonstrating here one ofthe only instances in which a member ofthe Montréal
group does flot interpret the Conquest as an entirely devastating event. This is however an
exception that confirms the general rule. The transition from Canadiens to Canadien
français is marked by instances of colonial oppression. But the transition from Canadiens
français to Québécois is seen, by Brunet and most others since, as an act of positive
affirmation:
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f...) Les Canadiens français du Québec ont découvert entre 1942 et 1960
que, s’ils étaient une minorité en Amérique du Nord et au Canada, ils
formaient la majorité des citoyens sur le territoire québécois.
Graduellement, ils ont abandonné ta mentalité de minoritaires qu’ils avaient
acquise après les tragiques événements de 1837-183$ et leur annexion
forcée au Canada anglais. La première phase de cette mutation s’est
traduite par la nationalisation du gouvernement québécois. Celui-ci, depuis
l’adoption du drapeau fleurdelisé en 1948 jusqu’au projet actuel de
proclamer une politique linguistique favorable à la langue de la majorité, se
voit de plus en plus comme la voix autorisée d’une collectivité distincte.
Parallèlement à cette évolution, les Canadiens français du Québec se sont
transformés en Québécois. (Brunet 166-170)
Brunet’s reference to 1942 is invocative ofthe year in which the Québécois first voted
together as a bloc and were able to resist the will ofthe central government in Ottawa. In
that plebiscite, 85% ofthe Québécois voted to prevent Prime Minister King from going
back on bis word concerning conscription. b Brunet, this was an empowering moment
for the Québécois, in that they realized that, although forced into minority status in
Canada, they were a majority in Québec. This allowed them to realize for the first time
since the Annexation that they, as a people, could effect real change.
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2.3 Other Significant Events in Québécois Collective Memory
There were, of course, many other events in Québécois history that are considered
to be significant. But none have taken as much place in Québécois historical writing and
identitanan theoiy as the Conquest and the Annexation. The first crisis that arose afier the
Annexation was the Louis Riel hanging. french Canadians rallied behind Riel and against
the federal government’s treatment ofhim. “Quand Riel se fait pendre, le 16 novembre
1885, c’est, à n’en point douter, l’un des compatriotes canadiens-français qui est touché
de plein fouet” (Gougeon 60). There was thus an important measure of identification in
the Riel affair by the French Canadian population. What they saw in the crisis was the
persecution ofnot only the Métis in Manitoba but ofthe whole french speaking minority
in Canada.
Another important moment was the French schoot confiicts in Manitoba and
Ontario. Both provinces wanted to ban access to Francophone schools. The entirety ofthe
french Canadian population expressed its outrage, but “[heurs protestations devant le
génocide culturel des minorités francophones dans les autres provinces furent stériles”
(Bmnet 163). The expression génocide culturel used by Brunet will be repeated several
times by contemporary Québécois theorists when describing Canada’s treatment of its
Francophone population. Lionel Groulx’s L ‘Appel de la race offers a good example of
how the fight for French schools was representative ofthe cultural survival. The fact that
the protests against Manitoban and Ontarian educational policies were ineffectual had a
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double effect on the Québécois. It hardened their sentiment of being an oppressed
minority and it sent them the message that the only place in which they might be able to
protect themselves was within the borders ofthe province ofQuébec.
One could flot forget the conscription crisis during the First World War as another
event that the Québécois will refer to as an example of Canadian (or Anglo-Saxon)
colonial domination. French Canadians did flot feel concerned by the war and feit that
their forced participation in it was, once again, the resuit of British imperialism. french
Canadians (along with other British colonials) were used as canon fodder during the war.
The French Canadian outrage sunounding the War and especially the conscription is what
led them to vote with such a strong maiority against King in the 1942 plebiscite. In Roch
Carrier’ s novel La guerre, ves sir!, we get a sense of the Québécois’ anger from their
forced participation in the first World War.
The most recent event I would like to mention is the failure of the Meech Lake
Accord. I will flot expand on the October Cnsis or the two Referendums here, as I will
deal with them in the next sections. The Meech Lake Accord was seen by many Québécois
as a last chance for Canadians to show their good will towards them:
En fait, l’opposition de plus en plus forte dans le reste du Canada à la
clause de «société distincte» eut pour conséquence d’inciter les Québécois
à resserrer les rangs derrière l’Accord. Malgré ses lacunes, l’Accord du lac
Meech était vu comme une réparation de l’injustice infligée en 1982,
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comme un minimum vital répondant aux conditions les plus raisonnables
jamais demandées par un gouvernement québécois [...j un ultime test de la
bonne foi du reste du Canada. (Meisel et al. 350)
Had the Meech Lake Accord been accepted by Canada, with its distinct society clause for
Québec and its veto on constitutionai matters, it could at least symbolically have given the
Québécois some ofthe power it had iost in the Annexation. It wouid have also erased the
effects of the 1982 nuit des longs couteaux. Instead, the failure of the Accord was
interpreted as yet another exampie of Canada’ s unwillingness to see the Québécois as
equals. Its failure also pushed many federalists to shifi towards sovereigntist alternatives,
Lucien Bouchard is the clearest exampie of this phenomenon: “Jamais personne n’aurait
pu bloquer l’Accord [...j sans un appui largement répandu [...J dans l’ensemble du Canada
anglais” (Bouchard, qtd in Meisel et al. 354).
M ofthese events, when compounded with the Conquest and the Annexation,
hoid an extremely important place in Québécois histoiy and the construction of Québécois
identity. I have not tried to suggest that these historical events shouÏd be given such
importance, I have merely been illustrating a trend. What I find interesting is that ail of
these events that are so important in Québécois identity also put the Québécois in a
position ofbeing dominated by an other. I feel that it is by putting such a strong emphasis
on these events, that the Québécois are involved in discourses of indigenisation, counter
discourses that aliow them to see themselves as a colony of occupation. From this basis,
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the Québécois position themselves in such a way that they cari justify the counter
discursive strategies that I will expose in the next sections.
These discourses ofindigenisation create a sense ofownership ofthe land. The
land itselftakes on an almost unparalleled significance as a source ofidentity or
identification. In Paul Chamberland’s famous poem L Àfficheur hurle, the author
&equently describes the Québécois as the indigenous people to Québec:
est-ce ma faute si je souffiEe d’une terre à naître
d’une terre occupée
d’un mal qui est le bien des autres
d’une nation qui nourrit la vie des autres (Chamberland, Afficheur 10$)
He expresses an attachment to the land when he refers to it as a “terre maîtresse I terre
matrice” (Chamberland, Afficheur 106). Such passages allow the author to blur the
distinction between the Native people and the Québécois. We sec this when he writes: ‘e
suis l’Indien noué au profil détruit de sa terre le / chasseur désarmé et tranqué qui brame
sous les balles / proie lancinante d’une histoire enrayée” (Chamberland, Afficheur 110). By
suggesting that his people’s histoiy is effaced, Chamberland is really calling for the
construction ofthe past; which is precisely what I have been documenting in tins section.
Without the construction ofhistory, Chamberland compares the ftiture ofthe Québécois
to that of the Native people in the United States, “qui entendra nos pas étouffés dans
l’ornière américaine / où nous précède et déjà nous efface la mort terrible / et bamolée des
Peaux-Rouges” (Chamberland, Afficheur 109). Here, Chamberland is also blurring the
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distinction between colonizers, a frequent phenornenon in Québécois literature. Colonial
oppression in Québec is flot aiways seen as something that cornes only from Canada but
from Anglo-Saxon hegemony in general.
In L ‘homme rapaiÏÏé, Gaston Miron also places a strong emphasis on the land as a
source ofidentity, rather than being merely something to be settled on or exploited:
et toi, Terre de Québec, Mère Courage
dans ta Longue Marche, tu es grosse
de nos rêves charbonneux douloureux
de l’innombrable épuisement des corps et des âmes [...J
Nous te ferons, Terre de Québec
lit des résurrections [... J
Les hommes entendront battre ton pouls dans l’histoire (Miron 103-104)
Whether it is already a source of identity and inspiration or whether it will become one,
the land is very ofien a central theme in Québécois literature. This may be common to
many national literatures, but to the Québécois it is expressed as an outcry to those who
have taken the land away from them or threaten their sense ofbelonging. Gilles Gougeon
remarks on this when he writes:
[...J il y avait les Canadiens [Québécois], d’une part, et les Britanniques,
d’autre part. Pour ces Britanniques, d’une certaine manière, leur
appartenance première n’était pas au territoire d’ici. [...] les conflits
d’influence et les conflits d’ aspiration, en ce qui concerne le nationalisme,
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se maifestaient entre un groupe, le Parti patriote, qui se réclamait de l’idée
même de territoire canadien et de nation canadienne, et l’autre groupe, qui
avait plutôt tendance à définir le territoire comme une colonie
d’établissement pour une population britannique. (Gougeon 39)
We see here an important difference between the British American (Canadian) and
Canadien (Québécois) experience. In Gougeon’s passage, we already see the distinction
between Canàda’s settier colonial identity and Québec’s identity as a colony of
occupation. The Québécois are saying that they are the rightffil habitants and, de facto,
they are acting as an indigenous culture. In an extreme instance of indigenising discourse,
in bis famous letter to L’Abbé Casgrain (in 1867) Octave Crémazie goes so far as to
suggest that the Québécois should adopt Huron or Iroquois as their national language
(Siemerling 184). By suggesting this, Crémazie’s indigenising discourse is twofold: not
only does it create the illusion of the Québécois as a native people, it also emphasises the
Québécois’ s distinctiveness from france.
We see discourses of indigemsation occasionally in Canadian literature as well.
Dennis Lee has written several works that function much in the same way as Québécois
identitarian writing. In bis Civil Etegies, he writes “[wJe live on occupied soi!” (Lee, Civil
40), or “[mJany were bom in Canada, and living unlived !ives they / died of course but
died tmncated, stunted, neyer at / home in native space and flot yet / citizens of a human
body” (Lee, Civil 33). Lee wants to feel a sense ofbelonging, but always seems to come
short of doing so. Dennis Lee is one ofthe first Canadian authors to have tried to estabhsh
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such an identification to the land. While the Québécois were already doing it in the Ï9
century (if not earlier), Canadians ofthat time wouÏd sec the land as something hostile, as
something to escape front Ibis is Frye’s original interpretation ofthe garrison mentality.
Winftied Siemerling observes how nature is described as something hostile in Suzanna
Moodie’s Roughing it in the Bush (1852) and in Cathenne Parr Traili’s The Backwood of’
canada (1836):
[Canada) is the most unpoetical of ail lands; there is no escape for the
imagination; here ail is new - the very sou scems newly formed; there is no
hoary ancient grandeur in these woods, no recollections of former deeds
connected with the country. The only beings in which I take any interest
are the Indians, and they want the warlike character and intelligence that I
had pictured to myselfthey would possess. (Irai!!, qtd in Siemerling 185).
Instead ofidentifying with the Native people or indigenising themselves, as the Québécois
did, these authors would sec the land and the Natives as strange, unfamiliar or
disappointing.
So where we often get a sense ofbelonging or indigenisation in Québécois
identitarian discourses, Canadian identity from its onset is plagued with uncertainty and
detachment. It is arguable that as a consequence to this, Canadians are more ambivalent,
indifferent or occasiona!ly guilt ridden in their interpretation oftheir past. This is
suggested in this next passage:
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D’autres pourraient même ajouter que l’histoire est une préoccupation
moins importante dans te reste du Canada qu’au Québec. La romancière
Nancy Huston traduit fort bien cette idée quand elle écrit: «Oui c’est là le
problème que pose pour moi ce pays: il est impitoyablement,
désespérément, dangereusement moderne, il a effacé son passé - déjà
suffisamment mince! - et vit à la surface de son présent)> (Meisel et aI. 4)
To the Québécois, as we have seen up to here, the pastis of primal importance. They see
their nation as being established as early as the Conquest and subsequently colonized with
the Annexation. In Selling Illusions, Neil Bissoondath writes:
If the French [in Canada) have neyer lost the mentality ofthe conquered,
the English neyer lost the mentality ofthe conqueror. [...] k is a subtie
argument, one that makes great sense from the viewpoint of Quebec,
where history lives, and perhaps less sense from the viewpoint ofEnglish
Canada, where history is littie more than a fading memory ofyesterday’s
breakfast. (Bissoondath 61)
If the Québécois place such importance on the past, it is to highlight the fact that they are
a colonized people; if, as Bissoondath suggests, Canadians avoid looking at their past. it is
perhaps to forget that they were colonizers. But as Terdiman remarks, “genesis amnesia’
cari neyer be total, at some level the dominant knows itself to be usurpation” (Terdiman
64). So, for Canadians, the starting point oftheir national identity is aiways hard to
determine. Was it in 1760 with the Conquest, in 1790 with the creation ofUpper Canada,
in 1840 with the Union Act, in 1867 with the Confederation, in 1931 with the treaty of
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Westminster or in 1982 with the repatriation ofthe constitution? Even though Canada’s
national holiday celebrates the Confederation, there is no reai consensus as to the
begiiming of Canadian identity; after ail, Canada Day was stili called Dominion Day not
too long ago. This lack of consensus is typical to settier colonies in that they are tom
between identities, between a Eurocentric colonial heritage and a distinct identity in the
New World. It has been my experience that when asking a Canadian when Canada first
came into being, the response will usually be vague and difficuit to corne by at first,
followed by a veiy personal answer (“that’s a very difficuk question to answer... but the
way I see it...”). In Québec, the answers seern to corne more easily at first, but are then
expanded on and nuanced afierwards (“we generaliy agree that... but we mustn’t forget
that....”).
It’s interesting to see how the Québécois have also constmcted Canada’s past in
their place. Guy Frégault was actually reluctant to do so, flot seeing Canada as a nation at
ail, “le Canada n’est qu’un État [...]. Contrairement au Canada français, qui est une nation
sans État, le Canada n’est qu’un État sans nation. (Frégauit, qtd in Lamarre 261). Frégault
seerns a fittie hard on Canada, but even Dennis Lee paraphrases frégault when he refers to
Canada’s lack ofa collective rnemory: “Mackenzie knows a word, Mackenzie I knows a
rneaning!’ but it was flot tme. [...1 I if a country has no past. / neither is it a country” (Lee.
Civil 34). Lee’s take on the Upper Canada rebellion, Canada’s would-be equivaient to the
Patriotes revoit, shows us how Canadians can be somewhat impotent when searching for
a source ofidentity in their past.
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Frégault’s successors were a littie more conciliatoiy towards Canadian identity and
constmcted it much in the same way they constructed their own. As Maurice Séguin
writes:
fi faut dater de 1763 la naissance du Canada anglais, la fondation d’un
deuxième Canada, l’origine d’une autre colonie anglaise s’ajoutant aux
colonies anglaises déjà installées le long de la côte de l’Atlantique. (Séguin
13)
for Séguin, even though they were just another British settler colony, Canadians stili
existed as a distinct entity. He sees Canada as being formed by the same events as Québec:
Le Quebec Act, en consolidant le Canada français (le peuple vaincu encore
majoritaire) et en insultant le Canada anglais naissant (le vainqueur
minoritaire à cette époque) accentue et aggrave un conflit national né de la
Conquête, conflit qui a sa racine dans l’existence de deux nationalités
distinctes au Canada. (Séguin 37)
By sharing the foundational events ofhis community’s past with Canada’s, Séguin is also
constmcting the basis for equal association between the two. As I have afready mentioned,
this is a common tactic with the goal of returning to a pre-Annexation state of affairs.
Séguin writes:
Sera-t-il permis au Québec de transformer ses relations de dépendance en
relation d’égalité dans l’interdépendance? Ou sera-t-il possible au Québec
de corriger deux siècles d’histoire? L’Amérique anglaise lui a dit non en
1760 par la conquête. Le Canada anglais lui a dit non en 1840 par l’union
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législative et en 1867 par l’union fédérale. Quelle réponse réserve le
vingtième siècle? (Séguin 210)
What is also interestïng in this last passage is Séguin’s reference to the 1 $67 BNA Act
(the Confederation). There is much evidence suggesting that Canadians are flot fully aware
that the Québécois will often see the Confederation as a mere extension of the
Annexation.
Many Québécois theorists wiÏl see the Confederation as just another way of
putting the Québécois in a minority status - easier to assimilate in the long mn. The
Québécois would see the BNA act as a step in the right direction, better than nothing
because it reestablished some of their autonomy. But it was stiil insufficient in that it did
flot give the Québécois what they most desired: that which was taken away from them
with the Annexation, equatity with Canada rather than only being one fourth and later one
tenth of Canada. In La petite loterie, Stéphane Kelly is particularly harsh with the
Québécois who supported the Confederation. Pointing out that many ofthose supporters
were previously members ofthe Parti patriote, Kelly writes:
Cette petite loterie est un système de distribution des faveurs qui vise à
gagner l’adhésion du rebelle et à en faire un parvenu - c’est-à-dire un
membre de la minorité qui sacrifie les intérêts de celle-ci à ses intérêts
personels. (Kelly 16)
Here, Kelly is describing what postcolonialists have called compradors. Compradors are
defined as intellectuals or members of an elite who owe their membership to that dite to
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their dealings with a colonia.1 power (Ashcroft et al., Concepts 55). Kelly suggests that the
former Patriotes became compradors later on by selling out the interests of their
community; and in doing so, established a tradition of colonial patronage that culminated
with Duplessis and ta grande noirceur. Today, most Québécois share Kelly’s or Séguin’s
views on the Confederation. Most of them feel that it bas to be renegotiated in order to
take into account Québec’ s distinctiveness and correct past injustices. Canada Day is flot
celebrated as a national holiday by most French-speaking Québécois, Saint-Jean-Baptiste
Day is; Canada Day is oflen seen as Québec’s national moving day, in which new leases
are signed and old apartments are abandoned.
* * *
The indigenisation of Québec is also involved in a process of symbiosis. We have
seen that the Montréal historians chose to sec the Conquest as the end of a society and the
beginning ofa long bid for survival. But contemporary Québécois historians will constmct
the Conquest as the beginning of their culture. Therefore, without the Conquest, or the
invasion ofthe other, the Québécois would not exist; there would only be French settiers
living here, not Québécois. The Conquest is what allows the Québécois to sec themselves
as something other than the descendants offrench colonials, as something indigenous to
this land.
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So we sec that contemporarv Québécois identity is constmcted flot only in
resistance to the other (the conqueror), but also - paradoxically - as dependent on it.
While older historians would have avoided this paradox by suggesting that the authentic
Québécois identity is found in its pre-Conquest era, modem Québécois historians are
beginning to see the paradox as the very source of identity itself Without the Conquest
there would be no Québécois identity. The Conquest allowed the Québécois to sec
themselves as an indigenous people, the Mnexation confirmed this by allowing them sec
themselves as a colonized people. When Canadians chose to forget their past while not
giving the Québécois the means by which they could forget theirs (i.e. by granting them
equality) - when Canadians decided to constmct their own identity without making
amends with the people they colonized
- the Québécois. arguably, had no choice but to
seek independence.
ce fut quand le Canada anglais se convertit au nationalisme canadien
que le nationalisme canadien-français se transforma en un nationalisme
québécois et que naquirent les diverses tendances indépendantistes. (Meisel
etal. 15)
Again, a crucial moment in the construction of Québécois identity is determined by the
other. Their resistance is what helps define them. Without that resistance they would Iose
their raison-d’être. It is in this sense that they have a symbiotic relationship with Canada.
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CHAPTER 3
THE APPROPRIATION 0F COUNTER-DISCURSWE
RESISTANCE IN QIJÉBEC
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The discourses ofindigenisation that I have analysed in the previous section are
rampant in the construction of Québécois identity. Or the least we can say is that such
discourses are more dominant in Québécois identity than in Canadian identity. They are
counter-discourses in that they resist Canada’s will to forget, Canada’s “genesis amnesia”
as Terdiman put it. This genesis amnesia allows Canada to flot only forget their own past,
but also to discredit Québec’s demands for recognition as equals. Ibis lias led the
Québécois to a second mode ofcounter-discursive strategy: fanon’s période de combat in
which counter-discourses are constwcted with the objective of “secouer le peuple” (fanon
166). Unwilling to grant Québec what it wanted, Canada forced the Québécois to take
matters into their own hands. While natïonalism lias aiways existed in Québec, it is in the
1 960’s with the Quiet Revolution that nationalism really became a dominant counter
discourse. As we have seen, Brunet feit that 1942-1960 was an era in which francophones
really became aware of their potentiaÏ dominance and power within the boundaries of
Québec, in this we see why the Montréal historians are also known as neo-nationalists.
And as Meisel, Rocher and Silver mention, the rise of Canadian natïonalism in the I 960’s
pushed francophones to shift their identity from the French Canadian minority to the
Québécois nation. In a sense, many Québécois ceased to wait for Canada’s recognition,
and began to develop counter-discursive trends that would impose equality on Canada.
Nationalism in Québec is also a form of resistance to outside influence, in that it is
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portrayed as a defensive measure against colonial dominance and assimilation. As Alan
Lawson writes: “National identity is a form of identity politics: it is formuïated as a
strategy ofresistance toward a dominant culture” (Lawson, “Postcolonial” 30). Although
nationalism is often portrayed après coup as an act of self-affirmation, its original
motivation is often counter-discursive.
The politics of identity in modem Québec have been comprised of a significant
number ofworks permeated with counter-discourses of hard and soft nationalism. I use
the term hard nationalism to designate those who have feit or stili feeÏ that separation or
sovereignty-association is the oniy option lefi to Québec; soft nationalism, which is equally
counter-discursive, includes those who stiil believe that equality is attainable through
constitutionai change. We oflen get the impression that most Québécois theorists are in
agreement in saying that only a small minority of Québécois feit
- or stiil feel - that no
change at ail is needed. Even the Canadian government agrees with this: to sway the vote
towards the No side during the 1980 and 1995 referendums on Québec sovereignty
association, the Canadian govemment assured the Québécois that it was aware that
change was needed and would be granted if Québec remained in Canada. So we can safely
say that the vast majority of Québécois identitanan writing contains counter-discourses of
either soft or hard nationaÏism. These writings resist the current order ofthings and seek
change, albeit through different methods.
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Québécois nationalism could flot have taken such a dominant role in Québécois
identity if it were flot intertwined with discourses of indigenisation. Castoriadis links the
two types of discourses in this next passage:
The nation [...] fils this function of identification by means ofthe threefold
imaginary reference to a ‘common history’ - threefold, because this histoiy
is sheer past, because it is flot really common, and, finally, because what is
known ofit and what it serves as the basis for this collectivizing
identification in people’s consciousness is largely mythical. This imaginary
characteristic ofthe nation nonetheless proves more solid than any other
reality, as two world wars and the survival of nationalism have shown.
(Castoriadis 207)
This paraphrases my approach to histoncal writing and its impact on identity. I have flot
been analysing historians and their emphasis on historical events to determine what
actually happened in Québec’s past. I have only been interested in how historians in
Québec have perceived their past, or if you will, how they have constructed it. The
construction of histoiy is central to the establishment of a collective memory; and a
collective memory is central to the construction ofnationalist discourses (soft or hard). h
has been argued, as we have seen, that Canada’s lack of a collective memory is its main
obstacle to the construction of a strong Canadian national identity. This is also Ray
Conlogue’s argument in Impossible Nation (1996).
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The previous chapter helped expose the ways in which the Québécois have
constructed their identity as being colonized by an other. With the rise of Québécois
nationalism in the 1950’s and 1960s the Québécois began to identify with other societies
in similar situations. Thus they were able to appropriate counter-discursive strategies from
other colonized societies and the anti-colonial ideals prevalent in them. This chapter will
look at how this appropriation took place, and how the appropriation of resistance bas
shifted in the Québécois politics of identity. In order to make my point more accessible, I
will arbitranly divide modem Québécois identity into two periods: the pre-October Crisis
Québec and the post-October Crisis Québec.
Appropriation is a phenomenon studied within postcolonial theor. It is usually
seen when a colornzed culture takes on some ofthe traits ofthe colonizer, and subverts
them in order to resist more efficiently. As Ashcrofi, Griffiths and Tiffin suggest:
By appropnating the imperial language, its discursive forms and its modes
of representation, post-colonial societies are able, as things stand, to
intervene more readily in the dominant discourse, to interpotate their own
cuhural realities, or use that dominant language to describe those realities
to a wide audience of readers. (Ashcrofi et al., Concepts 20)
This chapter, however, will demonstrate that the Québécois have flot appropriated
resistant strategies ftom their colonizer but from other colonized peoples. By doing so, the
Québécois were trying to develop affinities with other colonized societies; or they were at
least trying to develop, in their own way, time-tested modes of counter-discursive
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resistance. As such, Québécois nationalism ofien shows instances of appropriation, and
this appropriation adds to Québec’s distinctiveness ftom Canada and other settier colonial
societies. Anglo-Quebecer appropriation, on the other hand, as we shah see in chapter 5,
is far doser to the above mentioned definition. Québécois appropriation of resistance is
thus much doser to, and can be also be seen as, mimicry than Anglo-Quebecer
appropriation. It is crucial to note that it is not because a counter-discourse is
appropriated that it is less authentic or meaningful to the culture that has appropriated it.
It merely suggests that likenesses can be established between different identities. But as
we shah see in this section, certain discourses or counter-discourses have been more or
less adaptable to the Québécois context.
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3.1 The Appropriation ofAnti-Colonialism in Québec
As already briefly mentioned, the anti-colonial works of Frantz Fanon and Albert
Memmi became extremely important to Québécois writers since the I 960’s. Québécois
authors like André U’ Allemagne, Pierre Vallières, Paul Chamberland, Pierre Maheu, Pierre
Vadeboncoeur and many others applied fanon’s and Memrni’s description ofcolonialism
to their own culture. The appropriation of anti-colonial theories in Québec has been well
documented and I shah flot spend much time exposing the extent to which it was donc.
Rather, I shah focus on the main themes, on the ways in which anti-colonialism was
applied to Québec. I am flot suggesting that this appropriation is or was present in every
Québécois discourse ofidentity, just that it was a popular trend. Being a popular trend. it
requires a doser reading. It is here that we sec the extent to which the Québécois sec
themselves as a tmly colonized people, and why Québec can hold such an intriguing place
in postcolonial studies.
The presence of anti-colonial discourses in Québec is partly what lcd the
Québécois to the FLQ and the October Crisis. That crisis stands out in recent Québécois
history, and is stiil very present in the Québécois’s collective memory. Louis Fourier is
ftequently recognized as an expert on the FLQ and the events surrounding it. Fournier
outhines fanon, Memmi and Berque’s ideological presence in the hard nationahism ofthe
FLQ:
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À la même époque, la montée des mouvements révolutionnaires dans le
monde n’est pas sans influencer les ffiturs militants du fLQ. [...j La voix la
plus radicale de la révolution algérienne s’exprime dans un petit livre qui
fait sensation lorsqu’il paraît: Les damnés de ta terre de frantz fanon.
L’ouvrage deviendra la bible du mouvement de la décolonisation et le livre
de chevet de plusieurs militant du FLQ. [...] D’autres écrits de la
décolonisation trouveront au Québec un certain écho comme Le portrait
du colonisé d’Albert Memmi et les ouvrages de l’ethnologue Jacques
Berque (Dépossession du monde), qui séjourne au Québec en 1962 à titre
de professeur invité à l’université de Montréal. (fournier 22-23)
The fLQ was actually modelled around the Algerian FLN (Front de libération nationale),
which was in turn very much shaped by fanon and Memmi’s theories. Jacques Berque’s
theories on dispossession and alienation are also helpftil in our understanding ofboth pre
and post-October Crisis Québécois identity.
The appropriation of anti-colonial resistance was flot limited to radicals and
revolutionaries. Bmnet alludes to potential similarities between Québec and other colonies
of occupation when he writes:
L’émancipation récente et spectaculaire des anciens peuples coloniaux et la
promotion sociale des classes défavorisées ont appris aux Québécois qu’ils
auraient tort de continuer à croire, comme devaient le faire leurs parents
canadiens-français, qu’ils sont «nés pour un petit pain» et condamnés à se
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soumettre indéfiniment à la domination d’un peuple étranger que l’histoire
avait momentanément privilégié. (Bmnet 8)
So even as early as the 1940’s and 1950’s Québécois theorists could see parallels between
Québécois alienation and Third World alienation. We could already sec the stance
suggesting that ‘if others could do it, so couÏd the Québécois’. But unlike typical settier
colonies, the ‘others’ for the Québécois were colonies of occupation.
One ofthe earliest references to colonialism in Québécois identity, is in the famous
Refus global by Paul-Émile Borduas. In the opemng unes ofthe poemlessay, Borduas
writes of Québec as a “[c]olonie précipité dès 1760 dans les murs lisses de la peur, refuge
habituel des vaincus” (Borduas 63). Here, Borduas is flot onÏy defining Québec as a
colony but is also using the Conquest as an important moment in the establishment of
alienation in Québec. The Refus global did flot really place the blame on the other; h was
more interested in exposing the extent to winch the Québécois were alienated.
Nonetheless, it does end up establishing the Québécois, in that cultural alienation, as a
colonized people.
In Paul Chamberland’s essays, the author is already much clearer in his depiction
of the sources of alienation in Québec and its culprits:
la société canadienne-française fut toujours une société mineure,
infériorisée; une société coloniale où le rôle du colonisateur fut joué
d’abord par l’Angleterre puis par le Canada anglais. [...] Cette condition de
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colonisés, de minoritaires, nous a faits ce que nous sommes, et c’est en elle
que nous pouvons découvrir la raison première de notre aliénation.
(Chamberland, Parti 94)
Hard nationalist authors like Chamberland do flot hesitate in defining Québec as a colony
of occupation. They would see colonialism as the definitive source of oppression and
alienation in Québec. Chamberland is also very clear as to where he finds his inspiration
Je recommanderais fort à Peter Elliott [Pierre Elliott TrudeauJ de relire
“Les Damnés de la terre” [...] Oh! je sais, ils {anti-nationalists and
universalists] tiennent une réponse toute prête: le Québec, ce n’est pas
comme l’Algérie, comme le Cuba, etc. Nous le savions pa& Ce qu’ils se
reffisent à voir, c’est que nous transformons, en l’appliquant à notre
situation, le sens des termes “colonisation” et “décolonisation”.
(Chamberland, Parti 121)
At least Chamberland is willing to accept that the Québécois are flot in exactly the same
situation as other colomzed peoples, and that colonialism takes on a specific meaning in
Québec. We also see in this passage that there were many Québécois who refused to
appropriate anti-colonial discourses, thinking them inappropriate to the Québécois
context. The appropriation of anti-colonial discourses was flot a ‘flash in the pan’
phenomenon, it was extremeïy present in Québécois identity at the time, and is stiil present
- admittedly to a lesser degree - in Québécois culture today.
HICKS 10$
So understanding Québécois alienation as the resuit of colonialism is central to our
understanding of Québécois identity. Pierre Maheu, for instance, writes that “[l]’aliénation
dont nous [Québécois] avons souffert individuellement ne faisait que refléter celle d’un
peuple qui, relativement au contexte nord-américain, est sous-développé, parce qu’il est
COLONISÉ” (Maheu 23). Even though the alienation felt by the Québécois in the 1960’s
is doser to what Taylor would define as ‘oppression’, the authors ofthe day did in fact
use the term ‘alienation’. This alienation is seen in Paul Chamberland’s L ‘Afficheur hurle:
Je n’aurai plus d’autre discours que mon quotidien
désespoir ce que je suis ce qu’ils ont fait de moi de ma
terre dépossédée mon peuple dépaysé ma chair et ma
substance Québec aux mains des autres livrée prosti
tuée (Chamberland, Afficheur 12$)
Here we see Chamberland’s appropriation of Jacques Berque’s theoiy ofdispossession,
which helps him define bis despair. By stating that the only discourse available to him is
that of despair, Chamberland is in a sense expressing a view akin to Spivak’s silence.
Unlike Spivak though, the alienated author does see a recourse other than falling into
silence: being aware of his alienation, he can howi against it. Ibis howling may lack
coherence, which is a symptom of bis alienation, but it is at least a concrete act.
Seeing themselves as a colonized people, and thereby feeling thoroughly alienated,
the Québécois have ofien constructed similarities between themselves and what they call
les nègres. Given the Québécois context, I believe that the term nègre should flot be
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interpreted as the typically pejorative and entirely offensive term ‘nigger.’ The Québécois
usage of this word is flot a way of diminishing other racial communities, it is a way of
identifying with them. Max Dorsinville makes a similar observation in Le pays natal:
C’est dans l’optique d’une histoire modelée par l’assujettissement à une
puissance étrangère que certains théoriciens québécois de la dernière
décennie proclameront leur solidarité avec le Tiers-Monde.
Symboliquement, le Québec se reconnaît dans l’image renversée de la
«négritude» (Dorsinville 11$)
Thus the terni nègre is commonly used to describe a dominated or subordinated individual
or community; it is another way of saying ‘member of the Third World.’ It is generally
accepted today for African Americans to use the terrn ‘nigger’ when referring to
thernselves (this is a more authentic case of appropriation). The Québécois, when using
nègre, are doing a similar thing. This is obviously not aiways the case; there are racist
Québécois, as there are racists ail around the world. But it should be noted that the
authors who concem me here use nègre not in hatred but out of compassion for those
who are in similar predicaments.
The best known usage of nègre to describe the Québécois would corne from Pierre
Vallières in 1968 with his publication of Nègres blancs d’Amérique. The concept ofthe
nègre blanc to describe the Québécois is a fascinating example of appropriation. It
exemplifies the Québécois’s self-portrait as a dominated, subjugated and alienated
community. Nègres blancs d’Amérique offers an excellent depiction of Québécois
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alienation of the time and describes what many Québécois today are stiil struggiing to
escape from.
But Vallières was flot the first to use the term nègre to describe the Québécois.
Amongst the earliest references to the term, is surprisingly from authors who would later
become soft nationalists or even federalists. In an article in the Devoir in 1958, Andrée
Laurendeau - who would later preside over the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism - wrote “La théorie du roi nègre” (Laurendeau 195$). In his article,
Laurendeau is critical ofthe political elite in Québec (Duplessis in particular), the clergy
and the french Canadian bourgeoisie who were ffinctioning as a comprador class selling
out the Québécois people to gain more wealth or power. What is even more surprising, as
Stéphane KeUy points out, is that Pierre Elliott Trudeau, while not using tenu roi nègre
specifically, clearly replicated Laurendeau’ s argument but by being a littie more critical of
the clergy and the Québécois’s subseiwience to it (Kelly 15). By using the expression roi
nègre, Laurendeau (and Trudeau by association) portrayed the Québécois as an oppressed
people. And by extension, because almost every Affican community or community of
African descent at the time was colonized, both authors were involved in a discourse that
suggested that the Québécois were colonized as well. What makes Trudeau different is
that, unlike most of his contemporaries, he seemed to be more influenced by the views
developed by the Québec (city) historians; views that suggested that the Québécois were
to blame for their own alienation and lack of modem values.
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Chamberland, also uses the expression nègre to describe the Québécois and their
alienation:
“[.. .J je suis le mal que vous m’avez fait je suis ce que / vous avez fait de moi
Dorchester Colbourne Durham / je suis la négraille dans la galère Amérique [...]“
(Chamberland, Afficheur 107). Here, we see Chamberland refer to the Annexation as the
event that placed the Québécois in a nègre position. Chamberland even uses the term
nègre blanc in this next passage: je suis cubain je suis nègre nègre-blanc québécois”
(Chamberland, Afficheur). By using the term nègres blancs to describe themselves, the
Québécois were cÏearly stating that regardtess oftheir European origins, and even oftheir
relative weahh, they were stili just as colonized as the colonies of occupation which were
found typically in the Third World, or in Third-World-like contexts. As such, the anti-
colonial writings designed to liberate those cultures could also be applied to Québec.
Obviously, Québécois alienation was flot feit on a racial level but rather on a
linguistic one. As a linguistic community, the Québécois distinguish themselves from the
English-speaking North American majority. And it was on a linguistic level that the
Québécois felt most threatened by that majority. Again, Québécois theorists could look
towards anti-colonial works for inspiration. In Peau Noire, Masques blancs, Fanon
develops the idea that to use a language is to assume a culture. Language is therefore flot
seen uniquely as a communicational tool, it embodies and gives shape to the culture that
uses it. In Le colonialisme au Québec, André d’Allemagne writes along the same unes:
La langue est sans doute le principal véhicule et le plus fidèle reflet d’une
culture. On sait l’importance que les Canadiens français ont toujours
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attachée à ce qu’ils appellent leur «survivance» linguistique: ils en ont fait
le symbole de toutes leurs résistances (D’Allemagne 79)
In other words, when a culture’s language is threatened, its cultural existence is threatened
as well. Pierre Vadeboncoeur makes a similar point when he writes: “Il y a ceci de tout à
fait nouveau: langue, culture, liberté et pouvoir sont aujourd’hui absolument
indissociables” (Vadeboncoeur, dernière 60).
In Québec, the presence of the English language has oflen been seen as an
intrusion, if not an outright invasion. The presence ofboth French and English has
certainly flot aiways been seen as a happy marnage. M Depuis-Déri writes: “Les langues
ne sont pas neutres, et l’anglais n’est pas un simple outil de communication. L’anglais est
impérialiste, ce qui n’empêche pas d’exercer un attrait véritable auprès de nombreux
individus” (Depuis-Déri, in Ancelovici et al. 213). When given the choice between two
languages, the colonized will more often than not choose the language ofthe poweiful. of
the dominant. In Québec, this meant that too many Québécois would choose to speak and
work in English rather than in French. By immersing themselves in the language ofthe
colonizer, those Québécois would find themselves stuck in between two realities, between
two frames of reference, no longer feeling quite at home in either. Memmi comment s on
this problem: “Si le bilingue colonial a d’avantage de connaître deux langues, il n’en
maîtrise totalement aucune” (Memmi 128). This point ofview is also seen in Québécois
texts: “La langue est un instrument de culture [...J Si on ne la possède pas, on a une
culture sclérosée. C’est la langue qui structure la culture. Ainsi, le franglais que nous
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utilisons donne une culture “bâtard&’ (Jean-Marc Piotte, qtd in Chamberland, Parti 66).
The loss oflanguage in Québec, has aiways meant the extinction ofthe Québécois as a
community.
In “Décoloniser la langue” and “Le bilingue de naissance,” Gaston Miron deals
with the problems surrounding the Ïoss oflanguage in Québec. The strong tie between
language and identity is seen in this next passage: “la langue ici opère dans un contexte
global issu d’un colonialisme qui se prolonge dans des structures semi-coloniales. La
langue, au même titre que l’homme québécois, colonisé, est une langue dominée” (Miron
211). Miron cannot disassociate the French language from the Québécois individual. If
one disappears so does the other. Miron also looks towards Algerian anti-colonialism to
ground his views: “Aujourd’hui, en se décolonisant, ils [les Algériensj réapprennent
l’arabe. Le fait qu’ils ne parlaient plus leur langue, c’était une victoire du colonisateur.
Continuons à parler le québécois, ou bien réapprenons le québécois!” (Miron 218)
Again, whether or flot such analogies are happy or appropriate does not concem me here.
My only interest is in pointing out that such analogies were in fact made. We see in Miron
a general attitude that was present in innumerable Québécois texts since the inception of
Québécois identity, an attitude suggesting that if the Québécois do not preserve their
language they will flot survive: “Tant que le Québec ne possédera pas les instruments
politiques de sa culture et de son destin, la contrainte socio-économique anglophone
jouera à toutes fins pratiques ce rôle de coercition et d’unilinguisme” (Miron 232). The
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Québécois have always feit threatened by discrimination, but also and perhaps more so by
assimilation.
It is this fear of assimilation that allows the Québécois to speak of ‘cultural
genocide.’ As I have already mentioned, cultural genocide is a another theme that is very
present in Québécois culture. We’ve already seen it with Bmnet, and we also sec it with
Chamberland: “[Québécois nationalism] exprime l’acte décisif de légitime défense d’un
peuple victime de génocide culturel” (Chamberland, Parti 135). But is cultural genocide
by assimilation really possible7 According to Memmi assimilation does flot really happen:
“dans le cadre colonial, l’assimilation s’est révélée impossible” (Memmi 140). We must
understand that Memmi’s views on this matter rely on a specific racial and historical
context. Given this context, Memmi suggests that the colonizer will want the colonized to
adopt its culture, but it will flot let the colonized integrate ffilly into its identity; the
colonized will always be seen as the other regardless of how well it has assimilated the
colonizer’s culture. But in the case of Québec, truc assimilation is a possibility, or rather a
threat. If the Québécois chose to speak English instead of French, that they would in fact
become a fully ftinctioning part of Canadian identity; and it would certainly be at the cost
of a Québécois identity. The threat of assimilation and subsequent cultural genocide is
what makes it difficult for the Québécois to sec themselves as Canadians.
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3.2 The Appropriation of Anti-Colonial Violence
I have shown that the Québécois have often feit alienated and oppressed on a
cultural (i.e. linguistic) level. This alienation allowed them to identif’y with colonies of
occupation and the anti-colonial writings that were produced by them. But those colonies
of occupation were also alienated on economic and political levels. Being relatively well
off’ one would think that the Québécois appropriation of anti-colonial theories would have
started to break down. But this was flot the case. The Québécois also saw their alienation
as something that extended beyond the cultural plane. As Lise Gauvin writes: “Cette
aliénation existe à tout les niveaux. Politique [...J Économique [...J Culturel [...J” (Gauvin
11). The best known work on the breadth ofcolonialism in Québec is d’Allemagne’s Le
coloniaÏsme au Qnébec in which he precedes Gauvin by almost a decade in describing in
great detail the cultural, the social, the potitical and the economic colonial alienation of the
Québécois (D’Allemagne 2000 - originally published in 1966). What interests me the most
here is how the political and especially the economic alienation perceived by the
Québécois ofthe pre-October Crisis penod led them to the appropriation of violent and
revolutionwy anti-colonial discourses.
The pre-October Crisis Québécois produced a great deal ofliterature that can only
be described as combative. Combative literature is defined by Fanon as follows:
C’est la littérature de combat proprement dite, en ce sens qu’elle convoque
tout un peuple à la lutte pour l’existence nationale. Littérature de combat
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parce qu’elle informe la conscience nationale, lui donne forme et contours
et lui ouvre de nouvelles et illimitées perspectives. (Fanon 179)
The purpose of combative literature is to incite the people to revolt or at least to react
against the colonizer. It is what fanon meant when he writes of secouer le peuple. Pierre
Vallières saw his own Iiterary activity in much the same way: “J’avais en tête de
transformer cette revue (Cité libre), qui avait jusqu’alors servi à promouvoir les intérêts
de la bourgeoisie libérale, en une arme de combat pour les travailleurs québécois”
(Vallières 292). We can clearly see in Valliêres’s work the same Mandst tone as one can
see in much of the anti-colonial texts of the time. b Valliéres and to many of his
contemporaries, it was the masses that were mostly colomzed and they had to take charge
ofthe revolution.
Many ofthe Québécois ofthe pre-October Crisis era felt that there was a french
Canadian elite in Québec that beneflted from the Québécois’ colonial alienation. This
again, was a criticism of a comprador-like situation. It was ftequently argued that the
bourgeoisie libérale and the clergy were ail too happy to maintain a status quo that
sustained their own economic power and political influence: “tout en s’obstinant à prêcher
‘le retour à la terre’, ‘l’achat chez nous’ et ‘l’appel de la race’, le clergé et la petite
bourgeoisie profitaient de l’industrialisation du Québec, particulièrement dans la région de
Montréal” (Vallières 46). Vallières and many ofhis contemporaries would echo fanon’s
view that, “[n]ous sommes tous en train de nous salir les mains dans les marais notre sol et
le vide effioyable de nos cerveaux. Tout spectateur est un lâche ou un traître (fanon 148).
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Those who wouÏd preach for the status quo were labelled traitors by the Québécois who
would appropnate anti-colonial revolutionary discourses.
On a political level, the pre-October Crisis Québécois did have a certain measure
ofcontrol. But even it was seen as a smokescreen, creating an illusion that the Québécois
people could control their destiny:
l’unique action politique que leur [la population québécoise] permet
d’exercer le système est ce fameux “droit de vote”, qui est l’absurde liberté
de choisir entre deux, trois, cinq ou huit voleurs, celui à qui l’on veut
s’accorder le privilège d’exploiter la masse. (Vallières 51)
According to Vallières, true political power had to be given to the workers, the
proleteriat, if there was to be a real liberation in Québec. Pierre Maheu, another important
revolutionary Québécois author, shared Vallères views:
L’avènement d’un Québec indépendant dominé par la bourgeoisie
représenterait un grand pas sur le plan politique [...J Mais la lutte elle-
même resterait à livrer. Nous ne serions pas plus avancés sur le plan
économique de l’exploitation coloniale; nous n’aurions fait que passer à
une forme plus subtile de domination: le néo-colonialisme. Si notre lutte de
décolonisation doit être totale, notre adversaire ultime c’est la bourgeoisie
nationale elle-même, et derrière elle le capital canadian et yankee. (Maheu
237)
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So, we can see that a certain group of Québécois writers, who had incidentally ail
contributed at one point or another to the journal Parti pris, did flot feel that even political
independence was sufficient for Québec. They were critical ofthe Québécois’s Quiet
Revolution and of sovereignty-associationists, feeling that a ‘real’ and consequentty
‘violent’ revolution was the only path to national (cultural, politicat ami economic)
liberation. They saw the Quiet revolution as the bourgeois’ affirmation, flot the Québécois
peopies’, as Chamberland suggests: “La ‘révolution tranquille’ de Lesage serait tranquille
parce que bourgeoise” (Chamberland, Parti 45). In other words, the above mentioned
authors, as welI as a surprising portion ofthe Québécois population, feit that the anti-
colonial revolutionary movements that were prominent at the time in Africa, Asia and
Latin America could (and should) also be extended to the Québécois scenario.
In the anti-colonial movement, revolution was seen as an inevitable step towards
freedom from colonial domination and alienation. As Memmi writes: “Pour voir la
guérison complète du colonisé, ii faut que cesse totalement son aliénation: il faut attendre
la disparition complète de la colonisation, c’est-à-dire période de révolte” (Memmi 155).
Anti-colonial theorists demonstrated how colonialism, by dominating and eroding an
other’s culture, was an act of violence against the colonized peopte. This violence was
obvious in aggressive acts of repression, or proscription; but violence was also inflicted in
more subtie forms of coercion, in prescriptive practises (see chapter 1) that would make
the colonized direct acts of violence towards themselves; self-loathing is another symptom
ofalienation. Vallières felt that the Québécois were victims ofthis type of violence: “Jouir
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de la vie [...] en se saoûtant en fin de semaine, en ‘buvant sa paye’, en battant sa femme et
ses enfants, et en se détruisant dans des colères inutiles” (Vallières 80). Violence was
therefore theorized as the only means by which a colonized people could exorcize its
infenority complex and liberate itselfftom its own alienation. This is made clear in
fanon’s text: “La décolonisation est toujours un phénomène violent” (Fanon 29), or again
“[...] au niveau des individus, la violence désintoxique. Elle débarasse le colonisé de son
complexe d’infériorité” (Fanon 70). Perhaps Vallières summarises this thought best when
he writes: “en somme, une révolution populaire victorieuse, est une psychanalyse
collective” (Vallières 323). Revolution is a counter-discourse to (colonial) violence.
So combative literature promoting violence became quite popular in Québec
during the period leading up to the October Cnsis. Authors like Chamberland feit that true
nationalism had to be violent: “Au Québec, le sentiment national est violemment
revendicateur, ce qui en fait un nationalisme” (Chamberland, Parti 16). Like Chamberland,
Vallières insisted that the Québécois had to pose concrete acts in order to free themselves
ftom their colonial alienation, “[vJous êtes tous complices de l’exploitation, de
l’obscurantisme et de l’injustice tant que vous ne posez pas des ACTES. Des ACTES, pas
des sermons!” (Vallières 192). This type of revolutionary counter-discourse was also feit
in many Québécois novels, an outstanding example ofthis is Hubert Aquin’s Prochain
épisode in which the narrator/protagonist was a member ofthe FLQ: “Seule l’action
insaisissable et meurtrière de la guérilla sera considérée comme historique; seul le
désespoir agi sera reconnu comme révolutionnaire” tAquin, Prochain 90). The theme of
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violence as cathartic release from colonial oppression is also very present in Aquin’s Trou
de mémoire. Jacques Cardinal’s work Le Roman de t ‘histoire (1993) analyses both these
novels and exposes in them the link between coloniaflsm, violence and alienation.
Mthough most ofAquin’s writing is permeated with a certain angst and ambivalence
concerning actual solutions to Québec’s problems, this last passage suggests also that
violent action is the Québécois’ only taie recourse.
In their push for revolution, Québécois writers would often look back to the
Patriotes rebellion as a source ofinspfration. Ibis process is a combination of an
indigenising discourse and of counter-discursive violence. Jacques Ferron’ s p)ay Les
grands soleils is about the 1837 rebellion and has Chénier as one ofits main characters.
Ferron wrote the play seeing similanties between the Québec uprising of 1837 and the
mounting tension in 1960’s Québec. In the play, the author conveys the feeling that it is
only in revoit that the Québécois can really corne alive:
Chénier: Qu’est-ce qui t’étonne Mithridate?
Mlthridate: Qu’entre le cri de l’enfant et le silence des morts, on soit si
ftitile.
Chénier: Pas toujours.
Mithridate: Par bonheur, il y a des moments comme celui-ci.
Chénier: Si courts
Mithridate: Inoubliables. (Ferron 516)
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This scene suggests that it is in battie that the Québécois can find meaning in his or her
existence. Chamberland’s L ‘Afficheur hurle also makes strong references to Québec’s
past:
après que nous avons transgressé l’image de nous-mêmes
selon les stauts de sa majesté l’impératrice des Indes
après les dernières réserves et les dernières politesses [...]
alors que nous apprenons l’amérindienne colère
nous apprenons la férocité de nos racines
nous sommes délinquants nous sommes criminels
nous sommes libres de vos lois
nous sommes Riel et Chémer (Chamberland, Afficheur 137)
Here, we flot only get a reference to the Patriotes but also to Louis Riel, another figure of
violent resistance to the colonizer. His reference to an ‘Amerindian anger’ is yet another
interesting example of indigenisation.
These references to the past, and especially to the Patriotes rebellion, did flot fali
on deafears. They had a direct influence on the FLQ, as we can sec in their mamfesto:
Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les divers peuples dominés du monde
brisent leurs chaînes afin de conquérir la liberté à laquelle ils ont droit.
Après tant d’autres, le peuple québécois en a assez de subir la domination
du colonialisme. [...J Patriotes du Québec, aux armes! L’heure de la
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révolution est arrivée! L’indépendance ou la mort! (Manifeste du FLO, qtd
in Fournier 40-41)
The fLQ bombings began in the 1960s and their targets were the Anglophone
establishment and Anglophone community in Québec. It is safe to say in hindsight that the
majority of the Québécois did flot approve of such violent tactics, especially when they
resulted in killings. But it is important to realize that there was a certain climate in
Québec, that did share a likeness to colonies of occupation invoÏved in anti-colonial
warfare, and in which anti-colonial violence did seem appropriate to many individuals.
Whether they were dominant or flot, violent discourses were veiy present in Québec at the
time. The same certainly cannot be said of Canada. The very presence of such active
resistance already establishes a significant difference between Québécois and Canadian
identities. Canadian resistance to colonial influence and cultural alienation has always been
limited, if present at ail, to passive modes of counter-discursive resistance. For instance,
Canadian authors like Dennis Lee or George Grant may have been involved in certain
discourses ofindigenisation and even in discourses exposing their alienation to a dominant
other; but neyer would they have suggested that it would be acceptable or appropriate to
throw Mototov cocktails at the British and American embassies.
The presence of violent counter-discourses in Québec is an intriguing
phenomenon because it confirms, yet again, that many Québécois did see themselves as a
colony of occupation. However the failure ofthe fLQ in gaining public support during the
October Crisis is equally as interesting. Whatever support they did have was almost
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completely eroded with the killing of Pierre Laporte. In a press conference the day that
Laporte’s body was found, sovereigntist leader René Lévesque accused the terrorists of
being “une bande de voyous” (Spiy, 1994). On a side note, Pierre Vallières appears to be
convinced stili today that Laporte’s death was the resuit of a Canadian conspiracy aimed
at discrediting the fLQ who, according to Vallières, had no intention of killing him
- what
was there to gain? (Lafond, 1994). It is also interesting to note that Bntish diplomat James
Cross was set free while Pierre Laporte, a symbol ofthe comprador cÏass. was
assassinated.
During the October Crisis, and even before as was the case with Vallières and
Chagnon, most ofthe authors who had encouraged violent action in their works were
arrested. In other words, the appropriation of anti-colonial violence was censored
proscriptively by the Canadian (and much of the Québécois) establishment. Ihe only real
conclusion to be drawn ftom this is that although the Québécois did see themselves as
colomzed and alienated, it was flot to an extent that could justify violent or revolutionary
tactics. Ibis, nevertheless, did flot imply that they were now willing to portray themselves
as a sellier colony either.
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3.3 The African American Connection:
Bilingualism Versus Biculturalism
The complete failure of anti-colonial counter-discourses of violence and revolution
in Québec meant that the Québécois had to redefine and reformulate their identitarian
resistance. The Québécois could no longer realistically identify with Algerian or Cuban
nationalisms as they did in the 1 950’s and I 960’s. RougMy speaking, in the pre-October
Crisis years, hard nationalists were revolutionaries (those who would act violently), soft
nationalists were sovereigntists (those who would act politically), and anti-nationalists or
federalists were those who wanted to maintain the status quo (those who would act only
within the ftamework of a Canadian confederation). Afier the October Crisis there was a
shifi in which the mantie of hard nationalism was granted to sovereigntists while
federalists became soft nationalists. The camp that had promoted the status quo was
infused with those who, shocked by the events leading up to the October Crisis, feit that
politicaÏ change had to happen for Québec but could stiil be achieved while remaining
within the Constitution. The pre-October Cnsis status quo had therefore been almost
completely rejected; rather than maintaining the already existing structures of power, the
new federalists understood that the Québécois had to develop ways to assert themsetves
within Canada as equal partners. Daniel Johnson’s theory ofÉgalité ou indépendance
(1965) became doser to the norm in Québec. So the goal of soft and hard nationalists
became quite similar: soft nationalists feit that equality could been achieved while
remaining in Canada while hard nationalists feh that equality without independence was a
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pipe-dream. In both cases, the objective was the same, the assertion of Québécois identity
by establishing it as an equal partner fat least culturally) to the Test of Canada. Separatists
and anti-nationalists of the older sort stili existed, of course, and stiil do today, but they
were relegated to extreme ends ofthe political and identitarian spectrums of Québécois
society. Hard nationalists will criticise the soft nationalist camp for their anti-nationaÏist
extremists, and soft nationalists will criticise the hard nationalist camp for their separatist
extremists.
Either way, no longer believing in revolutionary violence as a viable solution, the
Québécois had to find a new ftamework from which they could resist. The relative wealth
ofthe Québécois made it impossible for them to truly speak of economic alienation aiid as
such they could no longer place themselves alongside Third World communities. Although
there were economic injustices drawri on linguistic/national unes in Québec, the Quiet
Revolution with lis language reforms and the nationalisation of hydro-electricity in the
I 960’s showed the Québécois that, unlike the Algenan context, the balance of power
could 5e shffled without an actual revolution. But this did not mean that the Québécois
feit that the struggie for recognition was over, nor did it mean that they were no longer
alienated. It is in the post- 1970 period that the Québécois really began identifying with
communities like the Irish, or African Americans.
The connection with the Insh was established a long time ago, as Stéphane Kelly
remarks:
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En effet, de tous les groupes marginaux auxquels s’identifient les patriotes,
le plus souvent évoqué est celui des Irlandais. L’image des catholiques de
l’irlande exprime avec éloquence le sentiment d’aliénation de la nation
canadienne face à l’Angleterre. Papineau évoque à de nombreuses reprises
la situation commune de ces deux peuples au sein de l’Empire britannique,
situation qui explique pourquoi la communauté irlandaise penche du côté
de la cause patriote. (Kelly 145)
But the connection between African Americans and the Québécois will be what interests
me here. This connection, as seen previously, has considerable precedence. It is in the
references to the Québécois being the nègres blancs d’Amérique that we first sec it, and
that definition is still occasionally used today to depiet Québécois alienation. 0f course the
Québécois were neyer slaves and were somewhat wealthier, so the analogy does flot really
work; but the Québécois were used as cheap labour by Canadians up to the 1970s, and
when they were told to speak English by Canadians, they were told to ‘speak white.’
Regardless of whether or flot the analogy is acceptable or flot is irrelevant, what is
relevant is that the Québécois sec a connection.
Chamberland writes of a ftaternity between the Québécois and African Americans
in this next passage:
Quand j’irai à New York c’est vers Harlem que j’appa
reillerai et non par exotisme j’ai trop le souci de
parentés précises je connais le goût de la matraque à
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Alabama Il y a des fraternités dans le malheur que
nos libertés civiles savent mal dissimuler (Chamberland, Afficheur 130)
This ‘fraternity’ was confirmed in the dealings between the FLQ and certain African
American movements. In bis work, Louis foui-nier exposes the ties the fLQ had with the
Black Liberation Front, an orgamzation inspired by the nationalistic and radical stance of
Malcoim X (Foui-nier 95). foui-nier also mentions that Vallières and Chagnon, before
getting arrested in New York, made contact with Stokely Carmichael, a leader ofthe
Black Power movement, and later ofthe Black Panther’s Party whose philosophy was also
influenced by Malcoim X and Eldridge Cleaver (Fournier 13$-139).
There are some interesting resemblances between Québécois and African
American resistance that need to be deveÏoped. Like the Québécois, African Americans
went through a revolutionaiy phase. But also like the Québécois, violent discourses
receded or were flot as dominant as discourses of political nationalism. We do flot aiways
realize the extent to which African American nationalism promoted separation; what we
tend to remember are the discourses of integration of the civil-rights movement as
especially seen in the speeches and writings ofMartin Luther King Jr. But there were also
organisations like the Nation of Islam that had in its program and position statements such
as: “We want oui- people in Arnerica whose parents or grandparents were descendants
ftom slaves to be allowed to establish a separate state or temtory oftheir own” (Elijah
Muhammad, qtd in Marable et al. 425) The separatist ideals behind the Nation of Islam or
the Black Liberation front had seduced an important portion ofthe African American
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community of the time. One of its most important and well-known spokesman was of
course Malcoim X. Like in Québec, these separatist ideals stemmed from a strong sense of
cultural alienation which was interpreted as the resuit of colonialism. Anti-colonial
rhetoric was also widespread in Afiican American identitarian writing and would be the
basis for the Black Liberation front and the Black Panther movement.
But one could argue that Malcolm X’s defection from the Nation of Islam towards
a sofler stance on African American nationalism is somewhat similar to the shifi in
Québécois society from revolutionary anti-colonial discourses to discourses ofpolitical
sovereignty - which were nonetheless stiti anti-colonial. M Malcoim X writes, “[tjhe
political phulosophy of black nationalism means that the black man should control the
politics and the politicians in bis own community, no more” (Malcoim X, qtd in Marable et
al. 433). Despite bis shift in stance, Malcolm X would remain a radical and extremely
resistant icon, and lie often serves as a contrast to Martin Luther King Jr’s position on
integration.
In a position paper on Black Power by the SNCC (Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee), we can clearly sec anti-colonial influences:
The broad masses of black people react to American society in the same
manner as colonial peoples react to the West in Africa, and Latin America,
and lias the same relationship - that ofthe colomzed toward the colonizer.
(SNCC, qtd in Marable et al. 453)
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Like in Québec this point ofview which had at first led to violent discourses was recycled
to inspire the discourses of seif-determination or sovereignty. As the SNCC writes:
1f we are to proceed toward tme liberation, we must cut ourselves off from
white people. We must form our own institutions, credit unions, co-ops,
politcal parties, write our own histories. (SNCC, qtd in Marable et al. 450)
We can certainly see a likeness between this type of discourse and the discourses of
Québécois sovereignty. The shift in African American culture ftom discourses ofoutright
separation (as seen in the Nation of Islam and in a younger Malcoim X) to discourses of
sovereignty (as seen in an older Malcoim X and in Black Power), is similar to the shifi in
Québec from discourses of violent revolution (as seen predominantly with the fLQ and
Parti pris) to discourses of Québécois sovereignty (that dominated the hard nationalism of
the post-October Crisis period). In both cases, although the shifi lcd to less radical forms
of counter-discursive tactics, they were stili largely inspired by anti-colonial ideologies.
The advent of Black Power lcd to a spiit in African American identity that is also
similar to the spiit we stilI sec in Québec today. Bayard Rustin was critical of Black
Power. We sec this when he writes:
Indecd, a serious split has alrcady developed between the advocates of
“black power” like floyd McKissick of CORE and Stokely Carmichael of
SNCC on the one hand, and Dr. Martin Luther King of SCLC, Roy
Wilkins ofthe NAACP, and Whitney Young ofthe Urban League on the
other. [...J I would contcnd that “black power” flot only lacks any real
HICKS 130
value for the civil-rights movement. but that its propagation is positively
harmfuÏ. It diverts the movement from a meaningfuÏ debate over strategy
and tactics, it isolates the Negro community, and it encourages the growth
of anti-Negro forces. (Rustin, qtd in Marable et al. 453)
It is interesting to sec how both camps are striving for the same objectives - civil-rights -
but have developed divergent views on how to reach them, Stoke Carmichael feit that
African Americans had to assert themselves independently from white America - “Black
people must do things for themselves” (CarmichaeÏ, qtd in Marable et al. 447) - while
authors like Rustin, inspired by King, feit that dialogue and collaboration were necessary
to achieve the goals ofthe civil-rights movement.
Affer the October Crisis, the Québécois were forced to reevaÏuate their objectives
since outright revolution or liberation through violence was clearly no longer an option.
The concept of sovereignty-association, which had been developed in the 1 960’s but was
rejected as too weak a stance by the more revolutionary writers, became the only viable
alternative for the hard nationalist camp. Those revolutionary authors had to admit that
sovereignty-association was better than nothing; Pierre Maheu in 197$ remarks that:
Nous avons gagné? Oui, nous serons «peut-être kek-chose comme un
grand peuple», le Québec un état souverain-associé au Canada et à
l’OTAN, avec son vrai gouvernement, sa baie James, ses centrales
nucléaires, ses compagnies de papier bien subventionnées.., mais nous
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avons perdu: la révolution, y en a pas eu, y en aura pas de si tôt. En
réalité... (Maheu 256)
Outright separation, albeit stiil valued as a possibility, became more peripheral to the
central sovereignty-association discourse which had corne to dominate hard nationalist
thinking.
The foremost figure of the sovereigntyassociation movement in Québec was René
Lévesque. Afier the October Crisis, Lévesque became the recognized leader of the hard
nationalist camp. His main adversary was of course Pierre Elliott Trudeau. We see in
Lévesque and Trudeau’s positions on Québécois nationalism and identity a rifi that is
remimscent ofthe spiit described by Rustin in the African American community. Both
Lévesque and Trudeau were aware ofQuébec’s alienation and the plight offrench
Canadians. The difference, once again, between the two is the counter-discursive
strategies that comprised their respective solutions to the problem.
I would argue that the ideologies ofboth Trudeau and Lévesque were influenced
by André Laurendeau and his views expressed in hie Royal Commission on BiÏinguaÏism
andBicutturatism. Laurendeau and Dunton’s report suggested that to save Canada from
the looming political and cultural crisis which would mark its demise, it had to flot only
become an officially bilingual state, but it would also have to recogmze Canada’s national
duality. In its PreÏiminaiy Report, the B&B Commission states that “Canada, without
being ftilly conscious of the fact, is passing tbrough the greatest crisis in its history”
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(Preliminaiy Report, qtd in Langlois 4). It is important to remember that the B&B
Commission had aiready deveÏoped the idea that Canada shouid be defined as a binational
state. And it is interesting to see how Laurendeau’s vision for Canada was tom apart kv
both skies ofthe nationaiist dogma.
In 196$, Trudeau foliowed some ofLaurendeau’s recommendations by
establishing the Officiai Languages Act of Canada. The phiiosophy behind this was to
ensure that French Canadians couid feei at home throughout Canada, and flot oniy in
Québec. Mthough the Officiai Languages Act did heip the dialogue between Québécois
and Canadians, it was more successfiui in undermining the discourses of sovereignty
association in Québec (Langiois 9). By making Canada officially bilingual, many
Québécois feei that Trudeau was basicalîy tiying to take the steam out of Québécois hard
nationalism by integrating the Québécois into the rest of Canada.
But as Simon Langlois suggested in a conference commemorating the 4O
anniversaiy ofthe B&B commission, we tend to forget Laurendeau’s recommendations
conceming biculturalism. It shouid be noted that the term ‘biculturalism’ is pooriy chosen.
Biculturalism does flot mean that Canada is comprised oftwo ethnically homogenous
groups. Laurendeau was developing the view that is more commonly defined today as
national duality or binationalism. Laurendeau was afready flifly aware ofthe increasing
muhicuhuralism in both Canada and Québec. But there were stiil two dominant identities
in Canada:
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The chief protagonists, whether they are entirely conscious of it or not, are
French-speaking Quebec and English-speaking Canada. And it seems to us
to be no longer the traditional conflict between a majority and a minority. h
is rather a conflict between two majorities: that which is a majority in ail
Canada, and that which is a majority in the entity of Québec. (PreÏiminary
Report, qtd in Langlois 4)
It is interesting to see how Laurendeau, a person understood to have supported national
unity by presiding over the B&B Commission, was actually proposing a unity between two
nations. The views expressed in the B&B Commission suggest that, by seeing themselves
as a majority, the Québécois were already a separate national community. It is perhaps this
shifi from describing onseif as a minority, dominated by the other, to describing oneseif as
a majority that is the real basis of Québécois nationalism (both soft and hard). In wanting
to be recogrnzed as a majority by the other, the Québécois are struggling to recapture the
position and some ofthe power they had before the Annexation. This struggie is perhaps
symbolic in that the Québécois are neither demographically nor economically on an equal
footing with Canadians today; but to the Québécois, this does flot make the struggle any
less valid orjust.
The idea of national duality in Canada was flot forgotten by sovereigntists. The
hard nationalism ofthe post-October Crisis period essentially embodies the
recommendations of a recognized bicultural state. As Langlois mentions, the B&3
Commission’s recommendations were corrupted when the idea of national bilingualism
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was separated from the ideals behind biculturalism. While Trudeau apparentÏy only took
into account the bilingual aspect ofthe report, Lévesque focussed entirely on its bicultural
themes. Lévesque was neyer interested in a complete separation of Québec from Canada.
He wanted sovereignty-association for Québec. The reason Canadians tend to forget this
important distinction is that the Lévesque camp also inctuded the separatists and
revolutionary extremists ofthe pre-October Crisis period. Lévesque’s views, and those of
his followers, push towards a certain segregation while Trudeau and his followers pushed
for integration.
The segregationist and integrationist approaches of Lévesque and Trudeau bring
us back to the Affican American connection. I am flot suggesting that the politics of
identity in Québec are a direct appropriation ofthe African American expenence. but the
similarities between the two are perhaps slightly more than coincidental. The Québécois
have clearly demonstrated a certain identification with African Americans by defimng
themselves as the nègres blancs d’Amérique; and I have already attempted to estabi ish a
connection in both communities’ appropriation of anti-colonial discourses as well as in
both communities’ rejection of violence. Is it so impossible, then, that the very public
debates over civil-rights in the United States could have had an influence on the Québec
question which was truly taking shape at roughly the same time? I have demonstrated how
Québécois counter-discourses bred certain types of nationalisms and how the same sort of
counter-discourses had led to similar nationalisms in the African American community.
Both communities had gone through a violent phase which then shifted and settled into
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similar hard nationalisms that promoted a certain degree of autonomy rather than
integration. Would it be so shocking, then, to suggest the Trudeau had been inspired by
the same discourses that had been prevalent in Martin Luther King’s integrationist
approach? As with King in the Mrican American context, Trudeau feit that the Québécois
should assert themselves flot by taking refuge in isolationism and nationalism, but by
imposing themseÏves and taking their rightful place in Canada. for Trudeau, being
inherently adverse to ail forms of nationalism, the Québécois had to mix themselves into
the rest of Canada, thereby transforming the Canadian identity itseif, instead of
establishing an equal partnership between the two national identities. Many Québécois
nationalists (soft and hard) feel that Trudeau betrayed the Québécois, and would not agree
with my interpretation. I, however, feel that connecting Trudeau’s position on Québec to
Mai-tin Luther King’s position on African Americans gives us a fairer picture of Trudeau.
As Vadeboncoeur remarks, “Le cas de Trudeau est spéciale. A l’encontre de bien des
choses qui s’écrivent contre lui, je n’ai pas la moindre hésitation à affirmer qu’il ne trahit
pas, qu’il ne peut trahir, mais qu’il est au contraire scrupuleusement fidèle à sa pensée”
(Vadeboncoeur, dernière 53); Trudeau just wanted to help the Québécois in the only way
he felt possible.
The problem, and tins is where the African American connection breaks down, is
that although the Québécois and African Americans may share similar forms of alienation,
they do not share geopolitical realities. While African Americans were spi-eaU throughout
the United States, around 90% of Québécois (French Canadians) were localized within the
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established boundaries of Québec. As such. while integration was the only plausible
solution to the African American problem, it was far less a realistic solution for the
Québécois. So in Québec, the sovereignty-associationist, or segregationist approach has
been a far more realistic solution than it could ever have been for African Americans.
furthermore, assimilation was neyer as much an issue for African Americans as it has been
for the Québécois. African Americans (with the possible exception ofMichael Jackson)
cannot choose to abandon that which makes them distinct from the other; in this particular
case, I would tend to agree with Memmi’s views on assimilation. The Québécois, on the
other hand, could decide to bye in Englîsh instead of in French and were they to do so,
they would in fact disappear mto the Canadian majority; many of french Canadian
descent living outside Québec have made this choice and are no longer seen as, nor do
they see themselves as, members of a separate identity. The threat of assimilation has been
constmed as the strongest argument for the segregation of the Québécois from Canada.
The linguistic aspect ofthe Québécois context makes it, at first glance, different
from the African American context. But upon ftirther reflection, one can yet again draw
points of comparison if one chooses to look at thejoual phenomenon in Québécois
tanguage and the rising popularity of African American siang (ebonics). I will flot go into
any detail here, I merely want to point out the possibiity of research on the subject. Joual,
or Québécois siang, has already been compared to African American slang: “C’est [le
joualJ pratiquer une obscuration de la langue analogue au jive-talk, pig-latin, dog-latin, ou
gumbo que les noirs américains utilisent pour égarer le Blanc dès qu’il s’approche d’eux”
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(Gauvin 71). Both joual and ebonics have been Uescribed as something positive - the
affirmation ofdifference - as well as something negative - as a deterioration oflanguage
which can lead to the deterioration ofidentity. Aware ofboth possibilities. Gaston Miron
suggests that jouai is nonetheless an alternative to assimilation: “Qu’on dise un arbe, âbe,
un arbre, tant qu’on ne dit pas tree on parle québécois” (Miron 217). Today the
Québécois will ofien assert themselves by stating proudly that they speak Québécois rather
that french. Again, factonng in assimilation, one could wonder if the question ofebonics
has the same importance in African American culture asjoual has in Québec.
Even if we can find similanties between the Affican American and Québécois
contexts, it is practically impossible to suggest that what worked for the former ought to
work for the latter. Today, the anti-nationalist stance of Pierre Elliott Trudeau has lost ail
ofthe discursive dominance it might have had in the past in Québec. As I have already
mentioned, even the federalist camp in Québec is generally not satisfied with the current
state ofaffairs between Canada and Québec. Québécois federalists today are more tikety
to try to find ways to create a sense of equality between the two communities by
attempting to amend the Constitution (i.e. the Meech Lake Accord and even the
Charlottetown Accord). It is in this sense that t define these Québécois federalists as soft
nationalists, in that they will also believe in the existence ofa Québécois national identity.
Both soft and hard nationalists are alike in that they seem to be more preoccupied with
Laurendeau’s biculmralism than with bis views on bilingualism; today, more than ever
before, it is in their tactics that they differ. There are stili, of course, Québécois anti-
HICKS 138
nationalists who will see Québec as just another province with its own unique culture, just
as there are stiil many Québécois who feel that outright separation and even revolution are
stiil valid options. But these, I feel, are the exceptions rather than the norm.
* * *
By appropriating anti-colonial counter-discourses, and by identifying with
colonized peoples, especiaÏly African Americans, the Québécois have presented
themselves and have constructed their identity as something that is threatened and
alienated. But this alienation has paradoxically
- in the ways mentioned in chapter I -
given the Québécois something to light for. And in this, the same alienation that threatens
them also gives credence to their identity. In other words, because they are alienated - or
because they fear alienation and assimilation - the Québécois have developed an extremely
powerful sense of self This, I feel, is something Canadians have aiways lacked. In
general, we get the impression that Canadians are fearful of the analogies the Québécois
have made in the past (and stiil make today), because it places them in the role ofthe ‘bad
guy.’ Understandably, Canadians will sooner want to discredit such analogies instead of
trying to understand why they are being made. This chapter lias interpreted these analogies
as the Québécois’s attempt at appropriating the resistant strategies that have worked
elsewhere. As we have seen, some of these strategies were more or less applicable in the
Québécois context; as was the case with Tmdeau’s integrationist approach to Québec.
The next chapter will look at how the counter-discourses prevalent in the post-October
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Crisis nationalisms were institutionalised by the Québécois. We shail see that, by
institutionalising their resistance, the Québécois distinguish themselves yet again from
typical colonies of occupation. However, as I shah attempt to demonstrate, this
demarcation bas flot prevented the Québécois from producing postcolonial counter
discourses that are rarely found in settier colonies.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION 0F
QUÉBÉCOIS COUNTER-DISCOTJRSES
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Afier the October Crisis, the Québécois started to create establishments and
institutions to express their resistance. The events surrounding the October Crisis made it
clear to most Québécois that revolutionary violence was not the way to go. Most ofthe
hard nationalists mentioned in the previous section started rallying themselves around
René Lévesque and his sovereignty-association party that would tater become the Parti
québécois. The Parti québécois, the many language laws in Québec, and the two Québec
referendums, are but a few examples ofinstitutionalised resistance. I interpret them as
institutionalised because they take subversive resistance, or counter-discourses, and
incorporate them into pre-existing political or legislative systems. Their goal is to beat the
dominant other at its own game, working within the power structures that had already
been established and that typically controlled them. This chapter will look at how these
institutionalised counter-discourses function in part as settier colonial resistance but also
how they have retained some ofthe anti-colonial qualities examined in the previous
section.
There are at least seven events that stand out in what could be called the post
October Cnsis era in Québec that have either instigated or have been manifestations of the
institutionalisation of Québécois counter-discourses. I will mention these events here only
in passing, as I am flot so much interested in the events themselves, but on how they have
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been seen as significant moments to many Québécois authors. To begin, there was the
election ofthe Parti québécois in 1976. For the first time in its bistorv, the Québécois had
voted democratically into power a party whose very objective was to change the
relationship between Canada and Québec, to establish a state ofequality between the two
national communities. Many Canadians have forgotten that the objective ofthe Parti
québécois was not to separate Québec from Canada, but to establish an equal partnership
with the rest of Canada, as René Lévesque mentions in one of bis speeches:
Mais c’est aux oubliettes qu’on a renvoyé la question fondamentale de
l’égalité politique [developed by Laurendeau], la seule entre deux
communautés nationales qui puisse sous-tendre et étayer toutes les autres
formes d’égalité dont on peut parler. (Lévesque, qtd in Parti québécois.
fier d’être Québécois 27)
We see here how the Laurendeau-Dunton Royal Commission on Bilingualism &
Biculturalism was important to the post-October Crisis hard nationalists. This is ofien
surprising to those many Canadians whose image of Lévesque is one of a man driven by a
lust to destroy Canada. Even though Lévesque was a sovereigntist, bis views were
inspired by the conclusions ofa report commissioned by Lester B. Pearson in the 1960’s.
Lévesque was essentially reclaiming Daniel Johnson Sr.’s views of equality or
independence. By ignoring Laurendeau’s bicultural recommendations for Canada, Canada
- according to Lévesque - was unwilling to grain Québec equality status, consequently
Lévesque felt that he had to negotiate with Canada to achieve it - this was the basis for the
1980 Referendum. Part of the confusion of the 1980 Referendum was that both sides
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(Yes-Sovereigntist and No-federalist) seemed to be claiming similar objectives. As
Parizeau remarks:
[Claude Ryan in 1980] leur disait, et je cite: «Lin vote pour le Non consiste
à demander aux Canadiens des autres provinces de reconnaître, à l’intérieur
du Canada, deux nations.» Moi et mes collègues pensions que c’était
impossible. Nous pensions, avec René Lévesque, que cette reconnaissance
et cette égalité ne pouvaient être obtenues que par le truchement de la
souveraineté. (Parizeau, qtd in Parti québécois. fier d’être Québécois 67)
Trudeau had made a similar comment to Rvan’s when lie suggested that a vote for the No
side did flot mean that the Québécois were satisfied with their current state of affairs; a No
vote, assured Trudeau, was a vote for change. The fact that Ryan’s drive for equality was
flot followed through afler the No side won the Referendum has been the ffiel for many
sovereigntist counter-discourses in Québec.
The language laws in Québec are another good example of institutionalised
resistance. Fearing that the Frencli language - the most important cultural trait in Québec
-
was threatened, the Québécois decided to protect it through pre-existing legislative
tactics. In 1977, upon the recommendations ofCamille Laurin, the PQ established Bili
101, a more severe version ofBill 22 with broader applications. While Biil 22 had already
recognized French as the only official language of Québec, Bill 101 added certain
protective measures in order to counter the perceived threat of assimilation. These
measures were flot seen as repressive by the Québécois, they were seen as defensive:
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[...j l’essence de la loi 101 est d’être avant tout un programme d’accès à
l’égalité (Affirmative Action) du type de toutes les mesures législatives
réparatrices et correctrices de torts historiques existant dans le monde. De
plus, elle est une protection exceptionnelle contre une situation culturelle et
géolinguistique qui fait que le Québec de langue française constitue une
majorité-minorité non seulement parmi le Canada anglais mais sur le
continent nord-américain (dans un rapport socio-linguistique de un à
cinquante), face à la domination de l’anglais [...] (Le cercle Gérald-Godin
52-53)
Even though Bill 101 lias almost aiways been seen as oppressive by the non-Francophone
populations of Québec and Canada, it lias been supported by every elected government
since its establishment - even the Liberaïs.
The 1982 patriation ofthe Constitution without Québec’s signature (La iiuit des
longs couteaux) and the perception that the Meech Lake Accord was rejected by most
Canadians strengthened the counter-discursive trends in Québec. Even though most
Canadian provinces had signed the Accord, the polls showed that most Canadians were
opposed to it while most Québécois were in favour ofit (Meisel et al. 345-3 50). To the
Parti québécois, and to Parizeau in particular, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord was
interpreted as an extension ofCanada’s general rejection of Québécois identity:
La mort de Meech a démontré que la Constitution de 1982 n’était pas un
accident de parcours, n’était pas le résultat d’une obsession de Pierre
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Trudeau et de son ministre. Meech a démontré, au contraire, que la vision
d’un Canada intolérant envers la différence québécoise, le refus de la
reconnaissance et de l’égalité étaient tellement bien ancrés dans l’opinion
publique canadienne qu’ils étaient désormais les principes moteurs du
nationalisme pancanadien. (Parizeau, qtd in Parti québécois. Fier d’être
Québécois 71)
By reffising to give Québec distinct society stams and the vetos that went with it,
Canadians were seen by the Québécois as unwilling to recognize that the Québécois were
- at least in some sense - their equal partners. So afler the Meech Lake fiasco, flot only
was Québec still not a full member of the Canadian federation, but it could also say that
they it had been rejected by that same federation. Canadians ofien tend to overlook the
fact that the failure ofMeech Lake pushed many Québécois federalists to the sovereigntist
camp. Again, Parizeau comments on this:
La mort de l’accord du lac Meech a provoqué le grand rassemblement des
Québécois. Unis dans leur volonté de reconnaissance et d’égalité, ils
avaient jusque-là suivi des parcours différents, choisi, pour certains, la
souveraineté; pour d’autres, la voie du renouvellement de la fédération.
(Parizeau, qtd in Parti québécois. Fier d’être Québécois 73)
Here, Parizeau remarks how the soft and hard nationalisms ofthe post-October Cnsis era
had become very close in their objectives. The Charlottetown AccordlReferendum is
almost unworthy of mention next to Meech Lake, in that it was rejected by a maiority of
Québécois and a majority ofCanadians. It bas frequently been argued by sovereigntists
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and federalists alike, that the failure of Meech Lake is what leU to an increase in support of
resistance-based institutions. We see this in the 1993 federal elections in which the
Québécois voted massively for the Bloc québécois. thereby creating an important voice in
the Canadian political structure. The Bloc québécois, a prime example of a political
institution shaped by resistant dïscourse. had a sufficient number of seats to form the
officiai opposition in Ottawa. n the 1994 provincial elections, the Parti québécois was
once again elected into power. And finaliy. it lias aiso been argued that the failure ofthe
Meech Lake Accord lcd to the 1995 Referendum.
The failure ofthe Meech Lake Accord is seen as tragic in that it has been
interpreted as the last chance for Canada to give Québec what it needed in order for it to
stay within the confederation. What Meech Lake offered was to a large extent symbolic: it
created the image of a bilateral relationship between the two linguistic commumties of
Canada. Its illusoiy side is what made the Mcccli Lake Accord unappeaiing to the hard
nationalist camp at the rime, but even the sovereigntists feit that it would have been a
show ofgood faith by Canada. Meech Lake’s failure has made many federalist discourses
untenable in Québec: how can one expect to stay within Canada if one feels that
Canadians reject the minimum ofwhat the Québécois require to survive. Many formerly
undecided authors and theonsts feit that they had no logicai choice but to convert to the
hard nationalist discourses ofthe sovereigntists since the failure ofthe Meech Lake
Accord.
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Since Meech Lake’s failure, the concept of distinct society has generally been
abandoned. The only viable option lefi bas been to speak of Québec as a distinct nation
that is stili in the process offorming a partnership with Canada. Ihis partnership is
perceived as being achievable either through sovereignty-association (the hard nationalist
stance) or through yet another senes of constitutional negotiations that could possibly give
Québec the recogmtion it requires from Canada (the soft nationalist stance). But speaking
of Québec as a nation has become an increasingly popular trend in the Iast fifteen years.
This has obviousiy aiways been the officiai stance ofthe Parti québécois, as Bemard
Landry suggests:
You must know if you really want to understand Quebec that we are flot a
distinct society, we are a nation. That’s quite different. A Nation just like
Scotiand. [...] the chiefofthe Officiai Opposition in Quebec told me a
couple oftimes: in your policy, do like Ireland, do like Ireland... and he bas
some Irish foots like a great proportion, by the way, of Quebec population.
I cannot do what Ireland does because I have just provincial powers. But
give us the same powers et watch us go (Landry, qtd in Parti québécois.
Fier d’être Québécois 122-123)
It is important to notice how the dominant discourse in Québec has shffled from a
discourse trying to establish a rapport with the colornzed cultures ofthe Third World to a
discourse estabiishing a kinship with the pseudo-colonized cultures ofthe West. Had
Landry referred to Algeria or Vietnam instead of Scotiand or Ireland, he would have lost
ail credibility with the vast majority of Québécois. Although I will examine this shifi in
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more detail later on suffice it to say that the officiai stance ofthe PQ, of hard nationalists,
had become much doser to the discourses found in settier colonies rather than in colonies
of occupation.
We see this new settier colonial perspective on Québec in Gérard Bouchard’s
writings:
Le Québec est une collectivité neuve, comme toutes les collectivités des
Amériques et de l’Australasie, mais contrairement à la plupart d’entre elles,
il n’a pas eu souvent l’occasion d’exprimer pleinement ses rêves du
Nouveau Monde, de concevoir et mettre en train de véritables projets de
commencement affranchis à la fois de sa dépendance à l’endroit du monde
ancien et des contradictions nées de sa propre histoire. (Bouchard, G. 75)
Bouchard places Québec on an equal footing with other settier communities in the ‘New
World.’ What authors like Bouchard are seeking, is recognition ofthat equal footing; this
would allow the Québécois to confront the same problems and advantages as other settler
colonies. Bouchard is considered moderate in comparison to the hard-une stance
expressed, for instance, by the authors of ‘Le cercle Gerald-Godin’. But even these
authors only seek an equal partnership with Canada:
Plus jamais de «société distinct» pour caractériser le Québec français et
interculturel. Pas de Québec égal «à chacune» des province anglaises. Nous
n’accepterons qu’une égalité: celle du Québec français et interculturelle
devant «l’ensemble» des provinces à majorité anglaise qui constituent le
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Canada. [...] c’est la langue qui est au coeur de l’affirmation souverainiste
et de notre identité de peuple. (Le cercle Gérald-Godin 34)
Again, we see that even the hard-liners have opted for a more conciliatory discourse,
although such discourses still function as counter-discourses, these authors apparently no
longer seek a complete separation from what they saw as the oppressive colonizer in the
1960’s. Largely due to events such as the failed Meech Lake Accord, hard nationalist
counter-discourses have become more cefebral, rational and less violent in contrast to
their more passionate and radical counterparts ofthe 1950’s and 196Os. Bouchard’s
approach is emblematic of this:
Ce pays n’est jamais parvenu à accommoder les deux grandes
communautés linguistiques anglophone et francophone, à les fondre dans
un même idéal et une même appartenance. Préconiser la souveraineté du
Québec, c’est simplement prendre acte de cette incapacité prolongée,
plusieurs fois démontrée. (Bouchard, G. 76)
Many Québécois share Bouchard’s views. They simply feel that time and time again
Canada has shown itself unwilling to offer the partnership they seek. Their only recourse
lefi bas become the sovereignty-association option put forward by the PQ. The view of a
binational, yet pluralist, Canadian confederation has increased its dominance on the
Québécois psyche.
Many Canadians see the institutionalisation of Québécois counter-discourses as
unsuccessffil. Afier ah, the Québécois have twice chosen to remain in Canada (in 1980 and
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1995). But Canadians do flot aiways realize that the promises they made to Québec to
boister the No sides ofboth referendums were taken seriously by many Québécois. Ihe
fact that these promises were flot kept has outraged many Québécois, and has forced them
into a position they would rather flot be in. Canadians will too ofien see the lack of
success of Québécois counter-discursive institutions (such as the PQ recently) as a sign
that ail is weil in Québec. This view is however flot shared by Québécois nationalists, as
Landry points out, “[lie Québec que nous vouions est à portée de la main. [...] De la
marginalité en 1960, nous sommes passés à 50% de support en 1995” (Landry, qtd in
Parti québécois. fier d’être Onéhécois 128). So the Yack of success ofcounter-discursive
institutions is by no means interpreted here as a sÎgn ofthe diminishment of Québécois
nationalism. D’Allemagne shares Landry’s views:
Quoiqu’on puisse dire, les faits demeurent. En 1960 les indépendantistes
étaient au plus quelques centaines. Aux élections de 1966, ils receuillirent
près de 10% des voix. En 1976 le PQ est porté au pouvoir par 41% des
votes. Au référendum de 1995, le oui obtint presque 50%, selon les
résultats officiels qui semblent de plus en plus douteux. (D’Allemagne, idée
239)
We get the same idea ftom Le cercle Gérald-Godin: “Loin d’ftre sans fin, le tunnel qui
mène à l’indépendance est fait de multiples tronçons entre lesquels surgit un air chaque
fois roboratif (24%, 40%, 49%...) et éclate une lumière chaque fois plus vive” (Le cercle
Gérald-Godin 149). Instead of seeing failures, the hard nationalist camp apparently sees a
certain inevitability in the institutionalisation oftheir counter-discourses. Mthough this
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view is flot shared by many Canadians flot by ever Québécois. it is foolish to simply
ignore the argument. The hard nationalist stance has been gaining support, and Canada has
done relatively littie to reverse the tide.
Up to this point in this chapter, I have attempted to expose how the counter
discourses ofthe 1950’s and 1960’s have since then penetrated Québécois institutions and
have even served as foundations for some ofthem. Being institutionalised, these counter
discourses ffinction less violently than in the pre-October Crisis period; they seek peaceful
ways to achieve their objectives. The rest ofthis chapter will focus on what it is that these
institutionalised discourses are countering. As we shah sec, we get the feeling that the
threat bas changed in Québec, that the Québécois are resisting a slightly different
phenomenon today than they were in the years leading up to the October Crisis.
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4.1 Neocolonialfsm in Contemporary Québec
Mthough counter-discursive resistance in Québec has been institutionalised, its
objectives have remained roughly the same. Many authors are stiil pushing for an
independent Québécois state, even though they will more oflen than not acquiesce to the
PQ’s associationist position. There is a grey zone in which the PQ dream ofa binational
Canadian confederation does flot aiways concord with the counter-discourses prevalent in
the identitarian writings ofits intetiectuals. In other words, it is flot aiways clear if hard
nationalist authors today are seeking more independence for Québec (which can be
compatible with the PQ platform) or complete separation. We see this lack of clarity in
d’Allemagne’s Le presque pays (199$):
Les Québécois et les Québécoises sont-ils encore prêts, en restant dans le
système fédéral canadien, à se contenter d’un statut de minoritaires, d’un
gouvernement entravé, d’un pouvoir atrophié et d’un presque pays... ou
veulent-ils enfin, par la souveraineté, se gouverner eux-mêmes, se doter
d’un État moderne et complet, et se donner un pays normal et bien à eux?
(D’Allemagne, presque 95)
There is an ambiguity in this passage that can be disconcerting to many Québécois and
certainly most Canadians. This same ambiguity can be found in Pierre Vadeboncoeur’s
more recent works as well: “De même, il n’y a qu’un moyen pour nous contre la
déchéance et c’est de gouverner. Gouverner ou disparaître. fl faut actualiser absolument
cette disjonction” (Vadeboncoeur, Gouverner 29). Both d’Allemagne and Vadeboncoeur
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were separatists in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but both supported and stiil support the PQ
platform of sovereignty-association. Does this imply that there is a hidden agenda behind
the PQ’s officiai stance whose real goal is a completely independent Québécois nation
state? Whiie it is truc that the officiai counter-discourses prevalent in the PQ (i.e. those
that have been institutionalised) have equality and recognition as their main objective, it is
not always clear that this satisfles certain authors ofthe hard-nationalist camp.
Nevertheless, we can see how the tone in the writings ofthese hard-nationalist authors has
shifted from their original pseudo-revolutionary activism; today, these authors tend to
avoid such terms as ‘separation’ or ‘liberation’ in favour of ‘seif-governance’ or
‘independence’ (both ternis that can be applicable to the sovereigntist piatform).
It is the above mentioned discursive shifi that make the Québécois so interesting
ftom a postcolonial standpoint. One ofthe major points ofthis work is to argue that the
Québécois came to realize that the violent actions of the fLQ and the revolutionary
discourses that led to the October Crisis were ili-conceived and inappropriate to the
Québécois context. Mthough perceiving themselves as a colony of occupation was
appealing to the Québécois at the time, they were eventually forced to accept that they
were flot quite as colonized as the Third World colonies of occupation that produced the
anti-colonial discourses they were so attracted to. Had it been otherwise, the repressive
measures taken against the Québécois with the War Measures Act wouid quite possibly
have been the spark igniting a series of generalized violent reprisais leading to a situation
simiiar to that ofNorthern Ireland. Thankffihiy, Québec and Northern Ireiand are two very
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different places with very different cultures. The Québécois had certain tuols at their
disposai that most other colonized peopies neyer had: they could create institutions, a
recognized establishment, that would embody the resistance they saw - and stili see today
- as necessaiy to their survival. As mentioned in the last chapter, this is also the
ffindamental flaw in the comparison of African American and Québécois identities; unlike
African Americans, the Québécois couÏd form nationalist institutions because they already
had a predeflned territory that encornpassed the vast majority ofthe population that shared
Québécois (french Canadian) identity.
So the Québécois are sornewhat unique in that even though they stiil see
thernseives threatened by colonial discursive influence, they also had to corne to terms
with the fact that their colonial expenence is flot identical to that ofany other ‘colonized’
society. As such, they construct their identity as something that is posited between the
typical settier colonial culture and the colony of occupation. We see this in their awareness
that the colonial inf’uence that threatens them has been seen as being iargely linguistic and
cultural in the post-October Crisis era; and yet, that discursive influence is also seen as
something that can be equally as devastating to their identity as any form of traditiona!
colonialism. Even though economic and political coionialisms are stiil issues today, they
do flot seem to have the same weight they had in the pre-October Cnsis period. In other
words, the Québécois today constmct their identity more in resistance to neocolonialism.
This too is the case with most settier colonial cultures; but the difference with Québec is
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that the Québécois perceive neocolonial discursive influence as something that can
exterminate them. Typical settier colonies, like Canada, will fear that their identity is being
eroded by neocolonial pressures, but they will neyer speak in terms of extermination,
eradication or cultural genocide as do the Québécois. As previously mentioned, the
Québecois have frequently used the term ‘genocide’ to describe their alienation. Pierre
Vadeboncoeur was the flrst to ffihly develop the term in the Québécois context:
Pour la première fois, on peut parler d’une entreprise de génocide sinon
dans l’intention, du moins dans le fait. [...J Cette politique [de dissolution
culturelle] cohérente n’a qu’une explication: c’est qu’elle est au service des
intérêts américains et canadian. (Vadeboncoeur, Gouverner 177)
It is interesting to note how Vadeboncoeur’s perception ofthe Québécois’s aggressors lias
shifted ftom “l’impérialisme américain” (Vadeboncoeur, Génocide 31) in bis original work
Un génocide en douce (1976) to the American and Cwiadian interests seen above in the
revamped Gouverner ou disparaître (1993). It is as though the author began to
understand the complexities of discursive influence, and realized how Canada lias been
playing an inadvertent role in the submission ofQuébécojs identity.
But even Vadeboncoeur tends to nuance bis usage of ‘genocide’ in relation to
Québécois alienation. He is clearly conscious ofthe term’s dramatic value:
Génocide. C’est bien un grand mot. Ce mot suggère le sang dans
l’hécatombe. On ne voit pas, avec raison, qu’une tragédie subite et
déchirante puisse nous advenir. Aucune politique ne vise directement à
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nous éliminer. Mais des intérêts cherchent à nous empêcher de nous donner
les intruments politiques dont notre vie à venir dépend strictement. Cela
officiellement n’a l’air de rien, mais c’est notre existence qui est par là visée
[...] (Vadeboncoeur, Gouverner 179)
In using genocide, it is implied by the author that he is speaking in fact ofcultural
genocide. The cultural genocide perceived by Vadebocoeur is therefore a consequence of
neocolonialism and its insidious nature. Like most Québécois authors today,
Vadeboncoeur does flot sec the Québécois as being subjugated by the same forms of
colonialism that were so present in the I 950’s and Î 960’s. Even André d’Allemagne has
shifted his perception in this matter:
Il n’est plus guère de mise de parler de colonialisme. Le terme fait démodé,
voire rétrograde. 11 désigne pourtant le processus historique qui a amorcé
la décomposition de l’identité québécoise, oeuvre que l’emprise américaine
menace maintenant de mener à terme. (D’Allemagne, presque Î O)
Mthough d’Allemagne was in his later years reluctant to use ‘colonialism’ in the
Québécois context, he still secs the Québécois as victims of colonial-like oppression. what
he is in fact referring to is basically defined by many other authors as neocolonialism. Even
the hard nationalist authors of ‘Le cercle Gérald-Godin’ will also back away from classica]
definitions ofthe colonized in their reference to the Québécois: “Et aussi cette allure, non
certes pas de damnés de la terre mais assurément d’exclus à jamais de la vie
internationale, qui était la nôtre en ce pluvieux samedi 17 avril 1982 [...] [my italics]” (Le
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cercle Gérald-Godin 147-14$). In the same text, they also refer to Memmi’s theories to
suggest that they are no longer quite appropriate to the Québécois context. So we see a
definitive shifi in Québécois thinking about their identity and cultural alienation in the
post-October Crisis period. In the years leading up to 1970, Québécois identitarian writing
was permeated with references to fanon, Memmi and other anti-colonial theones but by
rejecting violent or revolutionary actions, the Québécois were forced to realize that they
were in a slightly different predicament. The Québécois were amongst the first cultures to
realize that they were in fact victims ofneocolonialisrn and its implications.
The idea of economic colonialisrn therefore receded after the October Crisis, the
Québécois, as it tumed out, could flot generally see thernselves as a colonized people akin
to most colonies of occupation ofthe time. As seen in the previous chapter, they began
searching for different colonial models to identify with; this led them to stronger
identifications with Affican Americans. But being in a different geopolitical situation, the
Québécois, unlike African Americans, could create strong and enduring nationalist
institutions to defend their identity. These institutions
- which were manifestations oftheir
resistance, the embodiment of their counter-discourses
- reinforced the construction of
their identity. But these institutions also meant that the Québécois could no longer really
speak of political colonialism either. As such, the Québécois were forced to see that their
alienation was mostly cultural and tinguistic. And it is in this that the Québécois have
corne closest to resembling the typical settier colony. Like other settier colonies, the
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Québécois wete flot actuaÏly starving or being wiped out as a resuit of coloniaÏism, their
alienation. as it turned out, was feit more on a discursive level. What differentiates them
from other settier colonies is that neither their nationalist institutions nor their national
identity have been recognized by their significant other.
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4.2 Anti-Neocolonial Counter-Dfscourses in Québécois Identity
If it is a fact that the Québécois have become more willing to see themselves as
victims of cultural colonialism or neocolonialism does not imply that they have cornptetety
endorsed the view that they are tmly a settier colony like Canada. The fact that they were
capable of institutionalising their resistance may suggest a transition to that effect, but the
counter-discursive basis ofthose same institutions depends on the presence ofa real
colonial threat. Since the failure ofMeech Lake, even the soft nationalists ofthe Parti
libéral du Québec have refused to repeal the language laws, seeing them as a necessary
protective measure against the threat of assimilation. Thus even Québécois federalists are
engaged in counter-discursive tactics. So it is important to understand that there is stiil an
anti-colonial trend in Québécois identity which should be defined more precisely as anti
neocolonial.
In the 1 99Os, understanding ‘colonialism’ as the source of cultural oppression was
stii a prominent theme in several essays on Québécois identity. Jean Larose was one of
the flrst to interpret contemporary resistance to colonialism in Québec as a counter
discourse. In La souveraineté ranîpante (1994), Larose writes: “Dans ce livre, j’étends
l’idée de l’«esprit de colonisé» à celle de ressentiment. J’avance que le ressentiment a joué
chez les nationalistes un rôle analogue à celui de l’esprit de colonisé” (Larose 19). In
writing this, Larose was criticising the sovereigntist stance as being too reactionary rather
than being a more constructive “amour de la liberté” (Larose 41). Larose would
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apparently flot agree with the concept that ail discourses ofidentity are at least at some
level reactionary or counter-discursive. But the important point to remember here is that
the author does nonetheless see colonialism as a significant aspect of Québécois identity.
In his compendious work Récits identitaires (2000), Jocelyn Maclure remarks on
how Serge Cantin perceives the Québécois as being somewhat unaware oftheir own
colonial alienation:
Ce déni du passé prendrait d’ailleurs la forme du refus des francophones de
se reconnaître comme proprement colonisés. Cette négation obstinée
témoigne, selon Cantin, d’une colonisation mentale plus grave et
sédimentée que l’occupation physique: «[lie fait pour le colonisé de ne pas
pouvoir se reconnaître comme colonisé n’est-il pas l’indice d’une
colonisation plus subtile, plus insidieuse, plus profonde aussi peut-être et
partant plus indéracinable que celle qu’ont eu à subir, par exemple, les
Algériens ou les Vietnamiens?» (Maclure 79-80)
Here, Maclure and Cantin touch on several themes present in almost ail discussions on
neocolonialism: the insidiousness of neocotonialism and its degradation of collective
memoiy. Cultural alienation, in such cases, is seen as being as devastating to a people, if
not more so, than older forms of physical colonial oppression. As such, an author like
Cantin would disagree with Taylor in seeing Québécois alienation as a definifive form of
oppression.
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Perhaps the most outspoken critic of colonialism in contemporary Québec has
been Louis Comellier. In Plaidoyer pour Ï ‘idéologie tabarnaco (1997) Comellier equates
Québécois alienation to colonialism: “Les Québécois souffrent d’aliénation culturelle
aigue. En d’autres termes, nous sommes une belle gang de colonisés” (Cornellier, qtd in
Macture $1). In his essay, Cornellier is clearly speaking of neocotonialism; he sees how the
Québécois are flot colonized in the typical ‘colony of occupation’ way. Maclure points this
out welI in bis work:
«la tragédie du colonisé, argue Comellier, c’est que plus son état
s’aggrave, plus les sursauts de conscience lui font défaut». La «colonisation
douce)), pour reprendre l’expression de Comellier, possède comme
corollaire la tragique «indifférence de ses victimes» (Maclure 81)
If for no other reason, Comellier is interesting in that he offers an excellent description of
neocolonialism and shows us how he feels the Québécois are suffering from it; it may be a
colonisation douce, a term that echoes Vadeboncoeur’s génocide en douce, but it is a
form ofcolonialism nonetheless. Comellier, like Cantin, draws out the same key words in
defining neocolomalism in Québec:
nous sommes encore colonisés, mais d’une façon différente et plus
insidieuse, car ce n’est plus seulement le fédéralisme canadien en tant que
tel qui se pose en obstacle à notre affranchissement, mais bien plutôt une
tendance mondiale [...J qui érige le flou identitaire en idéal pour rendre la
vie plus facile au rouleau compresseur de l’impérialisme de l’anglo-culture
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internationale dont les stratégies sont multiples. (Cornellier, qtd in Maclure
81)
We see in this passage the insidiousness typically attributed to neocolonialism, but also the
reference to the colomzer as being diffused in a global imperial tendency tather than in a
single people. Unlike the Mgerians who could easily point their finger to France as their
colonial oppressor, the Québécois today, according to Cornellier, cannot blame Canada
exclusively. Neocolonialism in Québec is seen as a product ofthe hegemony of
Anglophone culture in the world. This angÏo-cutture may be centred in the United States
but it is helped along by agents or lackeys like Canada. So we see how Cornellier
constructs Québécois identity as being more colonized than Canada’s: at least Canada has
a place in, and can benefit from the neocolonial cultural environment prevalent today.
Certain authors like Laurent-Michel Vacher in Un canabec libre (1991) will see
the sovereigntist movement as a necessary response to neocolonialism by the Québécois.
he secs the independence of Québec as the only means by which the Québécois will cease
to see themselves as a dominated people:
Pour tout peuple qui a un jour été vaincu et dominé, l’accession à
l’indépendance apparaît comme une étape rédemptrice de son histoire. Au-
delà de ses manifestations institutionelles et politiques, il s’agit
fondamentalement d’une sorte de psychodrame libérateur, catharsis de
renaissance et de purification de l’inconscient collectif. (Vacher 13)
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Vacher is also quite critical ofthe sovereigntist movement’s associationist stance. He, like
Larose, feels that total separation is the only way ofridding Québécois culture ofits
colonial alienation: “Aujourd’hui, la perspective d’une souveraineté-association sans
cesse plus imprécise a éclipsé celle d’une pure et simple indépendance, ainsi amputée de
toute sa portée d’électrochoc pycho-historique” (Vacher 15). But what authors like
Vacher fail to recognize, are the ways in which being colonized has also helped the
Québécois construct one ofthe strongest identities in North America. Practically no other
North American community can say with such clarity what it means to belong to it. Many
Québécois, perhaps understandably, have failed to see that even if they were completely
independent, they would stiil be under constant pressure ofneocolonialism. The advantage
of the sovereignty-aociation movement is that it responds to a prevalent anti
(neo)colonial strain in Québécois identity whlle avoiding a move towards a complete
separation which would compromise the raison-d ‘être of so many Québécois institutions,
institutions that have strengthened Québécois identity.
I have discussed in this section a type of counter-discourse in contempofary
Québécois identitarian writing that can be qualifled as anti-neocolonial. I would venture to
suggest that anti-neocolonial counter-discourses could be interpreted as being postcolonial
(in the sense developed in chapter 1). These are postcolonial in that they expose newer
forms of colonialism and try to find ways of resisting the hegemony of the other. But such
manifestations ofpostcolonial resistance are flot limited to essays or academic works.
Contemporary Québécois culture is permeated with artists who express similar counter
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discursive strategies. We clearly see this in Pierre falardeau’s movies; Falardeau’s Etvis
Grauon movies are excellent exampÏes of how he sees Québécois culture as being invaded
by American discourses. The main character ofthese movies is a satirical representation of
how the Québécois will efface their own identity in favour ofthe more successful
American image. falardeau’s movie on the Patriotes rebellion - 15février 1839
- or on
the October Crisis - Octobre - are an attempt at reinforcing the Québécois’s collective
memory while expressing his well-known separatist views. Robert Morin’s Yes sir!
Madam... is a video that explores the difficulties that stem from the co-existence of
Canada’s two national identities. The protagonist in Morin’s video, brought up in both
languages, ends up developing a spiit personality in which his English and french personas
end up killing each other. This is somewhat reminiscent oflacques Godbout’s novel Les
têtes à Fapineau, in which the protagonist has two heads - one French speaking
(françois) and the other English speaking (Charles); the two heads are eventually operated
on to be ffised into a single Anglophone head (françois’s language centre ofthe brain
could not be found by the surgeon and was therefore excised). Québécois music is also
rife with postcolonial counter-discourses: Guérllla’s song Guérilla: manfeste was
censored in 1995 by Musique Plus because it made reference to the fLQ manifesto in its
lyrics. More recently, Loco Locass’s disc ManqestJ works on the themes ofalienation to
colonial discourse, the necessity of resistance and the promotion of sovereignty:
[...] Nous défendons notre patrie contre
l’anglosphyxie Tel que le firent les Phrygiens face à
l’Empire Romain Nous avons pris le maquis
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linguistique [...] (Loco Locass, Malarnalangue 2000)
So postcolonial resistance in Québec is flot limited to its intelligentsia it is also present in
Québécois popular culture. This, however, is something that mary Canadians refuse to
acknowledge. It is much casier for them to think that the counter-discursive trend in
Québec is the produet of a small, albeit influential, minority.
The works mentioned in this section ail have the common denominator of
demonstrating how the Québécois are stili colonized today; and this despite the
institutionalisation oftheir resistance. The difference between these works and those of
the 1950’s and 1960’s is that they sec colonialism in Québec more as neocolonialism.
Instead ofresisting colonial oppression, they resist the cultural oppression resulting from
the neocolonial hegemony of the other. It is in this sense that the Québécois function as
both a settler colony and a colony of occupation: it is as a settier colony that the
Québécois were capable of establishing institutions to support their cultural resistance
-
but it is in their relentless production of counter-discursive works, works in which they
perceive themselves as oppressed by neocolonial influence, that they most resemble the
colony of occupation. It is in their awareness of and stmggle with, necolonial discourses
and hegemony that the Québécois can be interpreted as being postcolonial. In other
words, while the Québécois may have been unsuccessftul at constmcting their identity in
anti-colonial terms, they have become quite successful at doing so in postcolonial terms.
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4.3 The Canadian Response
Canadians in general have developed a rather negative impression ofthe
Québécois institutionalised resistance. There are of course those Canadians who do
understand that Québécois language legisiation is a protective measure designed to ensure
the survival of Québécois identity; and that the sovereignty-associationist stance of the PQ
or the Bloc is also seen as a protective measure aimed at enforcing the binational aspect of
Canadian identity (an aspect that is currentiy misrecognized by Canada). However those
Canadians who do try to understand the Québécois’s piight are flot as vocal as those who
reject the notion of Canada as a binational state. Most Canadians do flot share the same
concept of Canada as the vast majority of Québécois; these Canadians witl thus
simuitaneously reject both the Québécois soft nationaiist option (i.e. renegotiating the
terms of a Québec/Canada partnership without a referendum) and the Québécois hard
nationalist option (i.e. imposing basicaily the same partnership after a successffil
referendum).
Canadians will oflen see the Québécois’s counter-discursive institutions flot as
counter-discursive at ail but as repressive to ail those who are not Québécois. They tend
to ignore the officiai PQ stance ofeivic nationalism developed in the following passage:
[...J the Quebec nation, it is perfectly clear now, is a political and civic
nation, flot an ethnie one. The reality consolidated itselfthrough a long
historical process leading from the notion offreneh Canadian to that of
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Quebecer. [...] for obvious reasons we were flot ail French Canadians, it’s
evident, as obviously flOW that we are ail Quebecers. Nous sommes tous
des Québécois, Québécois et Québécoises. (Landiy. qtd in Parti québécois.
Fier d’être Ouébécois 115-116)
Here, the former sovereigntist premier of Québec, Bernard Landry, explicitly teils the
population of Québec that the PQ does flot favour ethnic nationalism. He aiso confirms
the PQ’s rejection ofJacques Parizeau’s infamous statement conceming the ethnic vote on
the night ofthe 1995 referendum. There are, of course, extremists in Québec who do
promote the formation of an ethic state, but such extremists are a minority and are
consistentiy rejected as political representatives ofthe PQ.
Canadians have also on occasion been hostile to the federal government’s stance
on bilingualism. Mordecai Richier remarks that Ron Leach, the president ofthe Alliance
for the Preservation ofEnglish in Canada (APEC), had been self-admittedly inspired by
his reading ofBiÏinguat Tocky, French Tomorrow [1977] by J. V. Andrew.
Andrew had once told an APEC meeting that English Canada needed the
French language as much as anyone needed the AIDS virus and he
anticipated a French takeover of Canada, propelled by Quebec that has
become ‘an impregnable bastion, breeding pen and marshaliing yard for the
colonization ofthe rest of Canada’ (Richier, Canada 3)
It is interesting to see how authors like J. V. Andrew wlll fuel the identitarian resistance of
the Québécois, and how Québécois resistance will fuel the opinions ofpeople like
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Andrews. We see here, yet again, the symbiotic nature ofthe CanadalQuébec conflict. Just
as the Québécois feel threatened by cultural genocide, so do authors like Andrews, as
Richler points out:
[In Enough! Enottgh french. Enough Quebec. (1988), J. V. Andrew] had
established that our country was hostage to ‘a militant and avaricious
minority [of Francophones] which is sworn by secret oath to the
extermination ofEnglish Canada and the English language, province by
province, territory by territory, and municipality by municipality.” (Richier,
Canada 5)
Just as we should flot judge ail Canadians by J. V. Andrew’s views on the French
CanadiaWQuébécois question, so should Canadians flot judge the Québécois by their
extremists.
But k is curious to see how even a minority of Canadians perceive themselves as
threatened by the Québécois. In his work The GauÏlist Attack on Canada, J. F. Bosher
suggests that Canada’s conflict with Québec has actually been largely the product of some
new kind offrench imperialism. In Leo Heaps’ novel, The Quebec Plot, the French
govemment financed and encouraged the separation ofQuébec. It is as though these
authors have a difficult time believing that the Québécois are capable of independent
thought, that they are flot the puppets of some other impenal power. Perhaps this is an
exampie ofhow Canadians are unable to see the Québécois as anything other than a settier
colony, like themselves; as such, Québécois nationalism must therefore be the product of
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an imperial power trying to reclaim its former settier colony. Thus, such works reveal
more perhaps about Canada’s insecunties concerning their own capacity ofindependent
choice, and by denying the Québécois their daims that they are colonized by Canada and
the rest ofthe Anglophone world, they are at the same time reffising to acknowiedge that
Canada can be seen as a threat to another people - afier ail, to acknowledge such a thing
would mean accepting quite an ugly blemish on an otherwise excellent international image.
Mthough only a minority of Canadians will feel directiy threatened by Québec, a
larger majority will see Québécois institutions as repressive to the Anglophone and
Allophone populations living in Québec. Many Québécois institutions and public figures
have been labelled fascist by authors like Diane francis or Mordecai Richler. And the
Québécois have become fed up with Canada’s criticisms and outnght hostility toward their
public figures:
Pendant que Mordecai Richler nous traitait de fascistes, de nazis, entre
autres insultes, un ou deux autres sires comparaient Parizeau et Bouchard à
Hitler. Je me suis demandé quelle intelligence réaliste présidait ce discours,
car l’ordure relève parfois de la stratégie. C’est très simple. Voici la
formule: on dit des choses comme celles-là, sans)’ croire, à des publics qui
eux les croiront. C’est la formule chimique de la propagande.
(Vadeboncoeur, Gouverner 21)
li is interesting to sec how Vadeboncoeur reverses the argument against those who
suggest that the Québécois are fascists, by interpreting such comments as propaganda, he
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accuses them ofusing techniques that were quite prominent in Nazi Europe. The authors
of Le cercle Gérald-Godin perceive Canadian hostility to Québécois institutions as a forrn
ofhate crime against the Québécois people in general; and this hatred is seen as something
that fiels separatist arguments:
Les indépendantistes y verront, pour leur part, motif à sortir d’un pays qui
a un si constant besoin de la calomnie pour se maintenir. Du reste, ils
savent bien qu’à la source de la calomnie d’un peuple par un autre, il y a
toujours quelque rapport inégal (« ie victis» disaient déjà les Romains) et
ils n’ignorent pas que la décolonisation des pays du tiers monde, qui a
rendu illigitime et politiquement incorrecte la calomnie dans laquelle les
Occidentaux maintenaient ces pays, aura ici aussi très exactement le même
effet. (Le cercle Gérald-Godin 154)
We see here yet another reference to Roman imperialism. Such references suggest that the
real threat originates flot only from Canada but from a much larger neocolonial
phenomenoncentred in the United States. But the most important point to outiine is that
the authors sec Canada’s accusations of fascisrn in Québec as another forrn of aggression.
Again, they are reversing the argument and using it against those from whom it originated.
Possibly the best example of this type of reversal cornes from Normand Lester is his two
volume series Le livre noir du Canada Anglais (200 1-2002). Lester firstly exposes in
detail Canada’s hostiity towards Québec’s institutions and Québécois self-affirmation, to
then show how Canada’s past should tell them that they have no right to criticise:
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Depuis la Conquête, le Canada anglais s’est tendu coupable de crimes, de
violations des droits humains, de manifestations de racisme et d’exclusion
envers tous ceux qui n’avaient pas le bonheur d’être Blancs, Anglo-Saxons
et protestants. Ceux qui nous attaquent si allègrement oublient leur passé.
Vous lirez ici ce que l’Histoire retient de ces gens et de leur société.
(Lester, Livre 27)
Lester does flot suggest that two wrongs make a right, but his works do suggest that
Canadian hostility towards Québec may be an act ofavoidance that stems from Canada’s
own culpability towards its minorities. But such works ail function in the same way, they
volley discourses ofintolerance and hatred back and forth. The problem is that Canadian
extremists, who are perhaps too present in the Canadian public sphere, construct their
arguments against Québécois extremists, who likewise are also perhaps too present in
Québec’s public sphere. Fed up with Canada’s lack ofunderstanding and unwiilingness to
look at Québécois institutions for what they really are, the Québécois have retaliated by
throwing Canadian extremism back into its face. But this is hardly a productive or useful
situation.
The Québécois language laws are certainiy the manifestation ofinstitutionalised
resistance that has provoked the most hostility ftom Canada. But these, most of ail
Québécois institutions, are perceived as a defensive or protective response to the
onslaught of assimilative neocolonial culture: “Quel accroc, n’est-ce pas, que nos
dispositions sur l’affichage! Mais l’entreprise génocidaire en marche contre nous au
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Canada et jusque dans nos rangs, ce n’est rien du tout” (Vadeboncoeur, Gouverner 23).
Canadian neocolonialism, as it is ofien interpreted by the Québécois, manifests itself in
Canadian institutions. The concept of Canadian multiculturalism has thus been perceived
as a hostile institution by many Québécois critics. As Jean Larose writes:
Parce qu’elle est le résultat d’une résistance au long effort canadien pour
éteindre la logique duelle à l’aide d’une «pluralité plus moderne et plus
ouverte», la situation québécoise prend donc valeur de symbole pour toute
notre époque. (Larose 97)
This rejection ofthe binary vision of Canada in favour ofthe cultural mosaic is interpreted
by the Québécois as a rejection ofQuébec’s importance in Canada. The Québécois
perception of Canada is that of two multicultural nations within a single state; two distinct
identitarian environments open to plurality and cultural diversity. But they will ofien see
Canada’s insistence on multiculturalism as a neocolonial tactic designed, unconsciously
perhaps, to meit distinct communities into a larger, hegemonic Anglo-centric pan-national
community. In other words, the Québécois fear that Canada’s cultural mosaic is in fact an
agent of an American style melting pot:
Le Canada a inventé l’internationalisme angloplanétaire. [...J L’anglais a
donc changé de nature au Québec, depuis vingt ans. Ce n’est plus la langue
de nos bons vieux conquérants britanniques, même plus celle de nos
puissants voisins, mais le «langage international» de ceux qui veulent
s’entendre. (Larose 101)
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Instead of seeing their nationaÏism as ethnocentric, the Québécois wilÏ ofien now describe
it as a resistance to Anglophone hegemony, and as a something that can actually Iead to a
greater respect and recogmtion of cultural diversity:
L’attachement naturel de chacun à son peuple et à son pays s’assimile au
chauvinisme et à la xénophobie. En toute logique, on peut cependant
soutenir le contraire: le nationalisme des uns devrait leur faire comprendre
et respecter celui des autres. (D’Allemagne, presque 83)
Establishing protective measures to ensure the survival ofthe French language in Québec,
the most common trait of Québécois identity, has been interpreted by a majority of
Canadians as a Québécois rejection of diversity. In this, these Canadians do not appear to
take into account the reality ofthe threat posed to the french language in Canada. They
do not understand or even care about the statistics that show the constantly increasing rate
of assimilation by Francophones outside Québec to the Anglophone majority; they do flot
seem to appreciate the fact that the language laws are the only thing that have proven
successful at halting that rate of assimilation within Québec (sec statistics put forward by
the Office de la tangue française and by the Canadian Commissioner of Officiai
Languages). The Québécois, on the other hand, are largely aware ofthese facts, and this is
arguably why both federalists (soft nationalists) and sovereigntists (hard nationalists)
reffise to retract the language laws. They argue that the language laws, if they continue
being successful at what they were designed for, will end up creating a sense of security
amongst the Québécois which will in tum allow them to feeÏ more comfortable with
cultural diversity. Some Canadians stiil feel that if a cultural trait requires ‘artificial’ means
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to survive (i.e. language laws), it should flot be allowed to survive at ail. One can only
assume that these individuals feel completely secure in their identity; and one can only
wonder what will happen when that sense of security is threatened.
* * *
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate how the Québécois in the post
October Cnsis period have constructed institutions to support their counter-discursive
resistance. These institutions teli us two things: that the Québécois do have enough power
to ensure their survival, and that the Québécois have corne to terms with the fact that they
are threatened by neocolonialism. As such, the Québécois have become more akin to other
settler colonial cultures than ever before. However, unlike any other settler colonial
culture, they stiil see themselves as oppressed and fear that their survival is threatened.
The resistance to this threat serves twa purposes that are in fact intertwined: it nounshes
the institutions by giving them meaning and, at some level, contributes ta the strength and
cohesion of Québécois identity. In other words, one could argue, perhaps paradoxically,
that Québécois identity is strong because the Québécois are colonized. There is thus a
symbiotic relationship between Québec and Canada. The Québécois have become experts
at defining their identity because they feel it is threatened by Canada; Canada consistently
disapproves ofthe Québécois institutions that safeguard their identity; this disapproval is
symptomatic of a lack of recognition which is interpreted by the Québécois as a threat ta
their identity.
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This symbiotic view of the Canada/Québec relationship is only plausible if one
does flot believe in essentialist thinldng in the politics ofidentity. Many Québécois authors
would flot agree with the reasoning suggesting that there will aiways be a symbiotic
relationship between Québec and Canada. Laurent-Michel Vacher is one such author:
l’autre y est au coeur de l’attention, le Québec ne s’y pensant jamais que
par rapport à sa relation, à la fois symbiotique et intenable, avec le Canada
anglais et avec les institutions fédérales, comme si existence et identité
pouvaient lui être conférées par un partenaire et non par lui-même. En ce
sens, le souverainisme en tant qu’idéologie correspond à un complexe
réactif qui ressemble fficheusement au caprice d’un conjoint vexé d’être
négligé mais incapable de s’arracher à sa dépendance. [my italicsJ (Vacher
78)
Vacher would rather sec a completety independent Québec than a sovereign Québec
associated with Canada. He does flot seem to realize that such independence is, at least
from a certain point ofview, unthinkable. There will aiways be an other; there will aiways
be influence.
As opposed to Vacher, Fernand Dumont seemed to be keenly aware ofthe
symbiotic aspect of Québec/Canada relations. He exposes the paradox underlining the
symbiosis:
Ou bien les Québécois acquiesceront au projet de souveraineté. Des luttes
qui remontent à ta Conquête s’éteindront. Me revient à l’esprit la
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constatation désabusée de Salluste dans La Guerre de .htgurtha: «Les
citoyens avaient, pendant la lutte, aspiré au repos; quant ils le possédèrent,
le repos devint pour eux plus dur et plus amer que la lutte elle-même.»
(Dumont, Raisons 30)
Dumont realizes that if Québec does become sovereign. then the Québécois will truly be
confronted with the fact that they are a settler colony. That the Québécois, by becoming
equals with the rest of Canada, may be forced to share Canada’s cultural malaise.
To sum up, we have seen up to here how Québécois identity has depended largely
on its capacity to see itself às a colony of occupation. Despite the institutionalisation of
many counter-discourses in Québec, the Québécois stiil see themselves as a colonized
people; at least stiil more colonized than most settler colonies. If Laurendeau’s vision of
bilingualism and bicuÎturalism (binationalism) had not been warped into the binaiy
opposition ofbilingualism versus binationaiism prevalent since the late I 960’s, we would
likely have seen a different scenario in the construction of identity in Québec. The
institutions and discourses of resistance in Québec are constmcted in such a way as to
reclaim the binational ideal proposed by Laurendeau. Without a recognized binational
structure in Canada, Québécois identity has been constructed time and time again as a
pseudo-colony of occupation. As with settier colonies, the Québécoïs today see
themselves as colonized more on a discursive/cultural level; but what makes them unique.
and untike settier colonies, is that they are convinced that the oppression generated ftom
neocolomalism threatens their veiy survival. Whereas typical settier colonies will feel a
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certain degree of alienation from neocolonial discursive intrusions, their alienation is
aiways interpreted on a cultural level and therefore mamfests itself only as identitarian
ambivalence. The same, however, is flot true of Québec. Québec discourses of identity,
which are prevalent in their institutions and society in general, are entrenched in active
resistance; they do flot suifer from the ambivalence resulting from the passive resistance
typically found in other settier colonies. Mthough technically a settier colony, Québec has
been constructing itself as a pseudo-colony of occupation, and this despite the
institutionalisation of their counter-discourses. Canada has been generally unwilling to
understand this fundamental distinction, and bas consequently been unable to give Québec
the recognition it desires.
HTCKS 178
CHAPTER 5
THE CONSTRUCTION 0F
ANGLO-QUEBECER AND ANGLO-QUÉBÉCOIS
IDENTITY
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We have seen how resistance to colonialism has been an important foundation to
the construction of Québécois identity. But what is most interesting 15 how the
construction of Québécois identity, as seen up to here, has lcd to the emergence and
construction of an entirely different collective identity. While the Québécois pefceive
Anglophone hegemony as a senous threat to their future, a new Anglophone community
has been constmcted partly in resistance to Québécois dominance. Most Anglophone and
Francophone theorists would agree that in the past the Anglophone community of Québec
could flot tmly be differentiated from the rest of Canada. But today Anglophones in
Québec see themselves increasingly as a distinct community. This view is not shared by
many Québécois who enoneously stili hold to the perception ofthe rich Anglo living in
Westmount, the “château fort colonial” of Québec (Foumier 43). Most English speakers
in contemporaly Québec have veiy littie to do with the colonizers of old, and have
relatively littte power in comparison to the pre-October Crisis era. And they see the
institutionalisation of resistance in Québec not as a defensive measure, but as an act of
oppression geared towards the eradication oftheir own community; however, it is
interesting to note that the institutionalisafion of resistance actually marks the starting
point ofa distinct identity in Anglophone Québec. So, in Québec, we see an interesting
phenomenon in which the two dominant linguistîc communities sec each other as
colonizers and themselves as colonized. From the Anglophone perspective, one could look
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to Albert Memmi to explain this phenomenon: “Telle est l’histoire de la pyramide des
tyranneaux: chacun, socialement opprimé par un plus puissant que lui, trouve un moins
puissant pour se reposer sur lui, et se faire tyran à son tour” (Memmi 45). But Memmi
does flot take into account intention in bis analysis. The institutionalisation ofresistance in
Québec was flot intended by the Québécois to be an act ofrepression; as we have seen,
the intention was aimed at cultural stabllity.
Before looking at how Anglophones in Québec have constructed their own
identity, it is important to understand how they are generally perceived by the Québécois.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Anglophone community was already defined as a separate entity
ftom the rest of Canada in the neo-nationalist historical works of Miche! Brunet. Bmnet
speaks of a minorité angÏo-québécoise (Brunet 170) and already distinguishes it from the
rest of Canada: “Les Canadians et les Anglo-Québécois auront réalisé le programme de
lord Durham” (Brunet 171). Although Bmnet sees both communities following the same
agenda, he does make the distinction between the two. Already aware ofthe importance
the Conquest had on Québécois collective memoiy, Brunet foreshadowed the symbiotic
impact it would have on the Anglophone community:
Le phénomène de conquête fait partie de l’histoire depuis que l’homme
existe. Au cours des siècles qui nous ont précédés, il y a toujours eu des
gagnants et des perdants, des vainqueurs et des vaincus, des conquérants et
des conquis. [...] Lorsque les conquis survivent comme majorité, ils
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réalisent une reconquête et les anciens conquérants deviennent une
minorité quand ils ne sont pas complètement assimilés. (Brunet 33)
In this passage, Brunet seems to see a cyclical pattern in the construction of identity
similar to the one developed in my first chapter. The institutionalisation of Québécois
resistance Ïed Englishspeaking Quebecers to see themselves as a minority perhaps for the
first time in their history. As Main Desruisseaux and Sarah fortin suggest:
Pour les Anglo-Québécois, toutefois, l’adoption des lois linguistiques a
considérablement modifié le climat politique. Avec l’adoption de la Loi sur
la langue officielle en 1974, leur traditionnelle mentalité de «majoritaires»
-
fondée sur leur appartenance à la majorité linguistique de l’ensemble
canadien - ftit ébranlée et, sentiment inédit chez eux, ils commencèrent à se
percevoir comme une minorité menacée. (Meisel et al., 253)
So we see how a sense of self-awareness was established in the Anglophone Quebecer
psyche with the establishment ofthe language laws. As a majority, Anglophones in
Québec were part of the Canadian identity, but seeing themselves as a minority, they no
longer had the choice but to recognize themselves as a distinct community.
But not ail Québécois theorists have been willing to see Anglophones in Québec as
a minority. Likewise, most Québécois refuse to recognize the existence of an Anglophone
Quebecer community; all they sec is a residual (English) Canadian presence stubbornly
nostalgic ofa time when they were dominant. This trend is exemplified in Josée Legault’s
work L ‘invention d’une minorité: Les Angto-Québécois. for Legault, it is difficuit to
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speak of an Anglophone cornmunity because she feels that Anglophones stiil see
themseives as conquerors:
Ne serait-ce pas plutôt la persistance d’une mémoire collective de
«conquérant» chez des individus qui font partie de la grande collectivité
anglo-saxonne nord-américaine qui empêche la construction d’un discours
de participation à la dynamique québécoise, discours qui ne peut s’articuler
sans ce fameux sentiment d’appartenance? (Legault 30)
Legault actually questions whether or flot Anglophones in Québec see themselves as a
minority at ail, and she suggests that unless they leam to do so, Anglophones in Québec
wili neyer truiy form a distinct community.
C’est ainsi que les Anglo-Québécois auront mis un peu plus de deux siècles
à tout le moins commencer de se doter d’une identité collective, c’est-à-
dire d’un certain sens de la communauté. Par contre, jusqu’à maintenant,
on ne retrouve pas dans le discours dominant d’indices clairs d’une
acceptation d’un statut minoritaire; elle devrait découler pourtant
logiquement d’une identité anglo-québécoise... (Legault 58-59)
The problem here lies in the fact that Legault seems to think that a community can be
formed without going through a certain process of Lmïnoritisation. In other words, she
should reverse her argument: if Anglophones in Québec do see themselves as a distinct
community, this is because they must see themselves as a minority (regardless of whether
or not they act as ‘typical’ minorities do). She does make more accurate statements such
as: cLe «problème», si l’on peut dire, c’est que cette conscience collective s’est construite
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essentiellement en opposition et en réaction à une majorité s’affirmant de plus en plus”
(Legault 41); but for Legault, because their collective conscience is based in reactionism,
Anglophone Quebecers cannot yet daim to form an ‘authentic’ community. The most she
is willing to acknowledge is that Anglophones in Québec have the potentiat of eventuatly
becoming a community:
Il est indiscutable qu’il existe aujourd’hui un discours dominant anglo
québécois, et qu’il recèle, parmi d’autres éléments, une certaine potentialité
pour l’établissement éventuel d’une identité communautaire distincte de
celle de la majorité anglo-canadienne. (Legault 81)
Unlike Legault, I believe that identity is constructed dialogically, that identity
requires an other in order to exist. Legault seems to see things differentÏy: while she
accepts that there is a certain dialogical construction in Anglophone self-perception, she
also attempts to expose the Anglophone community for what it ‘really’ (essentially) is. As
Gregory Reid writes:
Throughout the body of L ‘invention d’une minorité Legault juggles
constmctionist and essentialist visions ofEnglish Quebec pointing to the
constructed, invented, created nature ofthe community in opposition to its
essential, historic, “true” character and foots [...J (Reid 69)
In other words, Legault is making the common mistake oftrying to determine how
Anglophones in Québec ought to sec themselves rather than how they do sec themselves.
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In this, she reflects the views of Canadian theorists who refuse to try to understand why
the Québécois see themselves as a colonized people. The fact is, as we shah see, that the
Anglophone population of Québec does actually see itself as a community; and in doing
so, it bas used many ofthe same counter-discursive tactics as the Québécois.
Throughout this chapter, I will be using the ternis Anglo-Quebecer to designate
the Enghish-speaking cornmunity that exists in Québec and Anglo-Québécois to designate
the new generation of Anglophones that is more ftilly integrated into Québécois society.
But both are nonetheless subtly different facets ofthe same community. An Anglo
Quebecer, as opposed to a Canadian, is someone who sees himself or herseif as a
Quebecer first and foremost, these are individuals that cannot see themselves living
anywhere else in Canada, regardless ofwhat may happen in Québec. An Anglo-Québécois
is a person who goes a step further to being unable to live in an environment where there
are no Québécois. Both Anglo-Quebecers and Anglo-Québécois nonetheless have English
as their first language, and consequently participate in the Anglophone North American
context without fuhly belonging to it. Mso, as was the case with the previous chapters on
Québécois identity, I will limit my research mainly to essays written by Anglophone
Quebecers on their identity. Much lias already been wntten on Anglo-Quebecer or Anglo
Québécois poetry or prose; what will interest me is how the Anglophone community, like
the Québécois, constrncts its identity in such a powerful way through its non-fictional
genres.
HICKS 185
5.1 Discourses of Indigenisation in Englisli Quebec:
The Transition from Canadian to Anglo-Quebecer Identity
The Québécois misrecognition of Anglo-Quebecer identity has the same eifect as
Canadian misrecognition of Québécois identity: it fuels resistance while at the same time
strengthens identitv. While André Laurendeau saw in Canada two majorities. it can be
argued that in Québec there are two minorities. Both ofthese minonties suifer from a lack
of recogmtion from their significant others. The Québécois see themselves as a minonty in
Canada as well as in North America, and Anglo-Quebecers see themselves as a minority in
Québec. But both ofthese minonties function as each others’ dominant majority, the
Québécois with their institutionalised resistance appear to be threatemng to the
Anglophone population, and Anglo-Quebecers are seen as an extension of Anglophone
North American hegemony by the Québécois.
We have seen how the Québécois have corne to interpret the Conquest as the
starting point oftheir identity. A similar phenomenon has happened within the Anglo
Quebecer community. Ronald Rudin explains in The forgotten Quebecers that “{d]uring
the 1970s many English-speaking Montrealers saw poÏitical factors such as the rise ofthe
Parti québécois and the introduction of language legislation as the key to the exodus that
took place” (Rudin, Forgotten 220). These events had an important impact on the
insecurities of Anglophones living in Québec. The institutionalisation of Québécois
resistance is seen as the event that triggered the construction of a distinct Anglo-Quebecer
HICKS 186
identity. As Rudin suggest: “ttlhe threat, however vague, ofQuebec’s independence
brought ail ofthe various English-speaking groups together” (Rudin, Forgotten 124).
Rudin argues that the Anglophone population in Québec was by no means homogenous.
White Anglo Saxon Protestants have been losing their dominance to other Anglophone
groups (lrish, Italian, Jewish) since the tum ofthe century. But the threat of Québécois
independence, or even Québécois resistance in general, rallied ail of these groups under
their common denominator: being Anglophone.
Before the institutionalisation of Québécois resistance, it was admittedly much
more difficuit to see a distinctly Anglo-Quebecer community, as Reed Scowen writes:
for les anglais themselves, there was no collective identity to speak of
They were simply Canadians living in Quebec. [...J It might be said that the
English “community” in Quebec was invented by the French [...]
Reluctantly, the English accepted the invitation, and the “community,” as it
is known today, was born. (Scowen, Different 25)
So, much in same the way as with the Québécois, Anglo-Quebecers sec the other as
central to the construction oftheir own identity. Just as the Conquest lcd to the exodus of
ail those French colonists who did flot feel a sense ofbelonging to the land here, so did the
‘reconquest’ ofQuébec by the Québécois lead to the exodus ofthose Anglophones who
no longer feit at home in a Québécois dominated Québec. It can thus be argued that those
who lefi in the 1970es turned out to be more Canadian that Anglo-Quebecer, just like
those who lefi in 1760 were more french than they were Québécois (C’anadiens). Those
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who stayed in Québec could subsequently daim to have a special attachment to it. Reed
Scowen’s works offer perhaps the best examples ofindigenising discourses in the Anglo
Quebecer community:
In Quebec however, the English are a minority and unlike the English
speaking minorities in other parts of the world (france for example), they
are flot expatnates living here temporarily, without supporting institutions
and in isolation from the majority group. In Quebec, the English are an
“indigenous” people, or at least as indigenous as the French. (Scowen,
Dqferent 16)
Here Scowen appropnates effectively the Québécois counter-discourse ofindigenisation.
He rightly daims that certain regions ofQuébec were settled by Anglophones before the
Québécois had ever arrived, the Eastern Townships is the best example ofthis. But
Scowen’s argument extends itselfto ail those who stayed in Québec after the
establishment ofthe language laws, the election ofthe Parti québécois and the subsequent
referendums. These forms of institutionalised resistance did their job well; they gave the
Québécois the illusion ofhaving reclaimed or re-conquered their land from the other. But
in doing so they have alienated a people who feel just as attached to the land as they are
This is how Scowen asserts that the Québécois created the Anglo-Quebecer: without the
threat ofa conquering or colomsmg other, there was no need do define the self So the
Québécois, by institutionalising their resistance, have given Anglo-Quebecers what the
conquering British gave them in 1760
- a sense of self And this identity is constructed to
survive regardless of whether or not Québec separates, as Scowen writes: “But even if
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Quebec were to become an independent country, English Quebecers and their language
would stiil be a part ofthe place” (Scowen, Different 61). This sort of comment is what
twly establishes the Anglophones that have remained in Québec as a distinct community.
They intend to exist independently from the rest of Canada if need be.
But the 1970’s was flot the first time Anglophones living in Québec had to become
aware oftheir existence as a distinct community. There are in fact many precursors to the
1970’s, but the most prominent ofthese is the election of Honoré Mercier’s nationalist
govemment in 18$?. As Bmnet suggests:
La politique audacieuse d’Honoré Mercier, son souci de gouverner en
tenant compte des besoins de la majorité canadienne-française [..]
provoquèrent l’inquiétude et la méfiance de ta minorité anglo-québécoise.
Habituée à un traitement de faveur, elle se jugea lésée dans ses droits
acquis. Selon elle, Mercier était atteint de la lèpre nationaliste. (Brnnet
I 78)
Mercier’s popularity amongst the Québécois was largely due to the Louis Riel scandai.
Riel embodied the general angst and injustice felt by french Canadians at the time. In
1888, Mercier created the ministère de t 4gricutIure et de ta Colonisation which was to
be headed by the Curé Labelle. The purpose of the ministry was, in part, to colomze the
northern regions ofQuébec and more particularly its predominantly Anglophone enclaves.
The Eastern Townships was thus a prime target for the Mercier government. The
government would buy ail the ftee land in the Townships and sell it off cheaply to french
HICKS 189
Canadian families, thus contributing to the demographic decline ofthe Anglophone
population ofthe Townships.
The Québécois colonial efforts in the l880’s served as the backdrop to the story of
Donald Morrison, the Megantic Outlaw. Morrison would become a symbol for the
English-speakers ofthe time, just as Riel had been for french Canadians. Donald
Morrison was born in 1858 in the Lake Megantic region of the Eastern Townships. Most
ofthe region was populated by Scottish immigrants like Morrison’s father Murdo. Murdo
lost the family farm to a local ban shark (Malcoim B. McAulay) in 1886. The farm was
then sold in 1887 to a french Canadian settier: Auguste Duquette. In 1888, the Duquette
farm was burned down and gun shots were fired at the Duquette’s house. Donald
Momson became the primary suspect and a warrant for his arrest was immediately issued,
curiously, to an Arnerican gunsiinger - Lucius “Jack” Warren. On lune 22, 1888 on
Frontenac Street in the village ofLake Megantic a Western-style show-down took place in
which Morrison killed Jack Warren. This event would mark the beginning of a highly
publicised man-hunt that lasted almost a year. The Scottish population aided and abetted
Morrison by hiding him ftom the authorities. In March 1889, martial law was declared in
the region by the Mercier govemment. Eleven people were arrested for sympathising with
and!or helping Morrison. The now famous Megantic Outlaw was finally caught on Easter
Monday, 1889. His trial for the murder of Jack Warren would begin five months later in
Sherbrooke, the Duquette farm was once again burned to the ground. Morrison was found
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guilty of rnanslaughter and was sentenced to eighteen years of forced labour. He feu iii in
1894 and was released to die in peace, which he did a few hours tater on June I9.
The Morrison affair is important because it represented one ofthe first times in
which the Anglophone/Francophone roles were reversed. The English of Québec were in a
position in which they were being colonized by a demographicalÏy dominant French
speaking rnajority; and they could do nothing about it. The government was nationalist
and did flot cater to the wiIl ofthe English minority. So the stoiy of Donald Morrison
became emblematic of the fears the English community of Québec had at the time. h was
perhaps their first glimpse at what was to corne. Unlike the Patriote rebellion, the
Québécois (french Canadians) were now using institutions to gain dominance rather than
revoit. Against this new tactic, the English cornmunity could do nothing but complain and
become aware ofits own limits. It could therefore be argued that the Momson affair was
actually one of the first times the Anglophone population of Québec began to see itself as
a comrnunity isoÏated ftom the rest of Canada - as a minority. In contrast to Legault’s
point of view I would argue that, in Québec at least, the concept s of community and of
minority have indeed aiways been intertwined; and it is the angst that cornes with being a
minority that generates the resistance that has been so important in the construction of
identity.
Morrison’s story was the subject of several hteraiy works and newspaper articles
of the time. The English community, as it was to be expected, unanirnously portrayed
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Morrison as a hero. The French Canadian media, also understandably, portrayed him as a
ruffian and a cornmon criminal, they were outraged at the English community’s support of
the outlaw and sympathised with the Duquette family. h a poem by Oscar Dhu,
Morrison’s story was a “Tale ofthe Scottish Pioneers.” Author Peter Span labelled
Morrison the Canadian Rob Roy. And many newspapers compared Morrison to Louis
Riel. A French Eastern Townships newspaper, Le progrès de Ï ‘èst, qualified ail those who
made such comparisons as “les ennemis de la race canadienne-française.” Comparing
Morrison to Riel is, in any event, a flagrant act of appropriation; and it can be argued that
it was also a precursor to the cultural appropriations made by contemporary Anglo
Quebecers (the next section will focus on these appropriations). Another interesting
parallel with more current events is that the Morrison affair happened at a rime when there
was an exodus taldng place ofthe English speaking population ofQuébec. In the latter
halfofthe 19e” centuiy the proportion ofEnglish-speakers in the Eastem Townships
dropped from 60% to 32%. This was due to a combination offactors, including the
colonial agenda of the Mercier govemment and the prospects of greater economic
opportunities in the West (Rudin, forgouen 195).
On a side note, it is intriguing to notice how Donald Morrison bas been more or
less forgotten by the English-speaking community of Québec today. But if Momson is flot
a hero to the Anglophone population, he has surprisingly become one to the now
predominantly Québécois population of Lac-Mégantic. The Lac-Mégantic region is now
over 95% French-speaking and many ofthe surrounding towns have had their names
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changed to sound more French. These Québécois have practically no idea that Morrison
was a symbol of Anglophone resistance to Québécois colonialism. To them, Morrison is a
Ïegendary figure with a story straight out of an American western. The main bar in Lac
Mégantic is called Le Aiorrison, and they even have a festival Morrison every summer.
The Morrnson affair is interesting because it shows us that the 970’s was flot the
first time Québécois resistarice, in the form ofnationalism, had been institutionalised. But
both periods led to similar reactions in the Anglophone populations. The
institutionalisation of resistance in Québec provoked an exodus of Anglophones to other
parts ofthe country and created in those who remained a sense of attachment to the land.
This attachment manifested itself in discourses ofindigenisation, attempting to expose the
other as a colonizing aggressor and the self as the coÏonized victim.
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5.2 Anglo-Quebecers and the Appropriation of Québécois Resistance
Due to the institutionalised resistance ofthe Québécois, the Anglo-Quebecers who
remained in Québec now feel just as indigenous to the land as do the Québécois. As such,
Anglo-Quebecers are beginning to distance themselves from the settier colonial mentality
prevalent in the rest of Canada. WhiÏe it was rather difficuit to define the Anglophone
population before the I 970’s as anything other than a Canadian community living in
Québec, the Anglophone population has since seen itself more as Anglo-Quebecer. Both
terms may flot be mutually exclusive, but they are flot exactly synonymous either. The
institutionalisation of Québécois resistance marks the definitive point when the
Anglophone population of Québec had to define itself as something more than just
Canadian, this was when they became a truly distinct community.
The Anglo-Quebecer community perceived Québécois institutions as a direct
threat to their survival. The most outspoken and, perhaps unfortunately, well-known
Anglo-Quebecer critics are William Johnson, Howard Galganov and Mordecai Richier.
These authors ah feel that the Parti québécois and the language laws are designed to
eliminate the Anglophone community ofQuébec. They are basically reproducing, or
appropriating, the resistant stance ofthe Québécois. Just as the Québécois feel threatened
by cultural genocide, so do many Anglo-Quebecers; as Kenneth Price writes:
A sense was developing [...] that there was a design for the strangulation of
the English in Québec - indeed that “cultural genocide” was the intent of
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the Québec government policy since 1974. [...] The sense that English
tradition was being forcibly eradicated in Québec. (Price 365)
In his notorious 1996 article “The Writing’s on the Wall,” Robert Lecker goes so far as to
compare Québécois nationalism to the tanks in the Tiananmen Square incident. It is these
sort ofwritings that have created in Canada the impression that the Québécois are
inherently ethnocentric and ‘out to get’ anybody who is flot pure laine. This section will
look at how Anglo-Quebecer identity has often been constmcted by discourses of
resistance appropriated ftom the Québécois. M such, Anglo-Quebecer identity oflen
appears to be more reactionaiy than it is constructive.
Mordecai Richler’s Oh Canada! Oh Onehec! is often interpreted as a typical
Anglo-Quebecer work, expressing the fears ofthe community. Richier can be qualifled as
an Anglo-Quebecer rather than a Canadian living in Québec because he ftequently states
how he would flot want to live anywhere else, and this despite the shortcomings he sees in
Québécois culture: “I live in Quebec because it’s home and I like it here” (Richler,
Canada Ï 58). And yet, Richier does flot seem to understand, nor does he even try to, the
motivation behind the Québécois institutions he finds so threatening. We see this when he
writes:
My point, briefly, is that our [AnglophoneJ nostalgia fof the 1 950s is far
exceeded by an exasperating Francophone failure to grasp that the era in
question skidded to an abrupt end thirty years ago: instead locked into a
time warp, Francophones are stili doggedly fighting against injustices that
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no longer exist. {...] Anglophone nostalgia for an earlier Montreal is not
necessarily based on a longing for economic dominance but rather for a
tirne when English, as weÏl as French thrived there and the two cultures
enriched rather than exconated one another. (Richier, Canada 106)
But ofwhat time is Richier speaking of? It certainly is nice to see that he feels that such an
era of peaceffil and harmonious co-existence existed, but seldom do you find any
Québécois who would share his views on the matter. If the Québécois would agree with
him on this point, it is likely that they would also agree with most ofwhat he advances in
his book. But unfortunately, the Québécois seem to be practically unanirnous in their belief
that no such tirne ever existed and would go further in stating that the closest we have
ever corne to peaceful co-existence was when the language laws were doing their job
effectively.
But instead oftrying to understand where the Québécois are coming from, Richier
simply accuses them of racisrn and anti-Semitism; although there are some exceptions to
this mie, Richier tends to portray the Québécois as a tribalist, bigoted group:
René Lévesque was not an anti-Semite. Neither is Jacques Parizeau. Ml the
same, Jews who have been Quebecers for generations understand only too
well that when thousands offlag-waving nationalists march through the
streets roaring “Le Québec aux Québécois!” they do flot have in mmd
anybody named Ginsberg. Or MacGregor, corne to think ofit. tRicher,
Canada 77)
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At least he acknowledges the fact that Lévesque or Parizeau are flot anti-Sernites; his
commentary is aimed rather at the Québécois in general. furthermore, Richier is flot
justified in saying that a Ginsberg or a MacGregor would aiways be rejected by those
chanting “Le Québec ait Québécois!”; it is quite plausible that if a certain Ginsberg or
MacGregor were aware of, and concerned with, the problems surrounding Québécois
identity, they too would be included by the Québécois. There are, as aiways, bigoted
extremists who wouÏd immediately exciude anybody who does flot conform to their
ethnicity. But did Richier tmly believe that these bigots represent the norm rather than the
extreme?
Many Anglo-Quebecer authors will sec Québécois nationalism as flic truc source
ofthe problem. Again, they tend to only look at how Québécois nationalism might affect
them rather that look at what inspires it; or if they do, they tend to once again extend the
views ofa bigoted minority to that ofthe whole. This is what William Johnson does on a
regular basis:
Ml the evidence points to the same conclusion: the objective ofcurrent
Quebec nationalism is, as it was in the I 960s, the creation of an ethnie state
ofQuebec. [...J The best indication that ethnie nationalism stili thrives in
Quebec is the very strength ofseparatism. (Johnson 389-390)
Johnson equates separatism with ethnie natïonalism. While it is truc that there are many
such extremists in the separatist camp, it is erroneous to think that they are responsible for
the rise of sovereigntist thinking in Québec. As we have seen in the previous chapters, it is
HICKS 197
the more level-headed politicians and theorists as well as a generalised discontentment
with Canada that have contributed the most to the popularity of sovereignty in Québec.
But it is much easier for certain Anglo-Quebecer theorists to blame it ail on what they
consider to be an influential minority and a gullible, mindless majority.
The problem, again, stems from the fact that these authors are either unable or
unwilling to look at things from the Québécois point ofview. Richier, for instance, is
capable oflistening but, as we can see in this next passage, he is less capable of
understanding:
“Nationalism often has a bad connotation,” [Lévesquej said, and then went
on to reassure the students that Quebec nationalism, with laws then already
in place to suppress the English language and deny parents freedom of
choice in education, “is not anti-anyone; it is pro-us.” (Richier, Canada
131)
The lack of understanding is actually quite comprehensible here; Richier, Johnson and
many other Angio-Quebecers are unabte to understand Québécois nationalism because
they feel, and indeed are to a certain degree, threatened directiy by it. It is, afier ail,
difficuit to want to understand those whom you feel are against you. Thus it is natural to
expect an initial reactionary response ftom the Anglophone minority. Ibis response
occasionaliy becomes exaggerated, as in the case ofHoward Galganov: “What a bunch of
sniveiling pathetic cry-babies are these underachieving, incompetent, no account,
ethnocentric racist Separatist Bastards” (Galganov 148). Galganov even goes so far as to
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cal! Josée Legault a “separatist cow” (Galganov 234). People like Galganov are extremists
in their own right, and it is unfortunate that they are oflen considered to be representatives
ofthe Anglo-Quebecer mentality.
Perhaps the most interesting reactionary response, and instance of appropriation,
in the Anglo-Quebecer community is the partitionist movement. The partitionist
movement basically has the same daims as Québécois separatists: if Québec can separate
from Canada, so then can the predominantly Anglo-Quebecer regions separate from
Québec. Therefore, those Anglophones who support partition are only Anglo-Quebecer
insofar as Québec remains in Canada. There is a dual allegiance there that is flot
necessarily incompatible, but it does suggest a cleavage and a Iack of integration between
those Anglophones who support partition and the majority of Québécois who do flot. The
argument for partition would be Iogical and tenable only if the Québécois were truly
interested in establishing an ethnocentric state. In other words, the existence of the
partitionist movement shows us to what extent those who support it fear ethnic
nationalism, it seems rather paradoxical that they fear it so much that they themselves are
also willing to draw unes based on ethnicity.
But the partitionist movement is another example ofextremism, and does flot
represent the views of ail Anglo-Quebecers. Many Anglo-Quebecers do want to continue
living side-by-side with the Québécois, and would continue doing so even if Québec
separates. A good example ofthis type ofAnglo-Quebecer is Reed Scowen. Unlike the
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authors previously mentioned, Reed Scow’en’s works are not based on an emotional
response. In A DfJerent 1 ‘ision (1991) and Tirne 10 Say Goodhye (1998), the author
demonstrates a good understanding of the Québécois experience and offers the most
challenging arguments against the excesses of Québécois institutionalised resistance.
Nonetheless, Reed Scowen oflen ends up presenting much ofthe same arguments as the
afore mentioned Mglo-Quebecers: “When the premier ofQuebec states that the English
in Quebec are the most priviteged minority in Canada he should add that it is, for him, an
historical error, and that bis govemment is doing what it can to “correct” the situation”
(Scowen, Dfferent $6). Scowen does indeed see the Anglophone population of Québec as
a minority, and he sees Québécois policy towards them as something hostile, engaged in a
discourse of dominance. As others before him, Reed Scowen reverses the argument that
the Québécois are threatened by assimilation against them; he appropriates their discursive
resistance: “The unilingual state sought by Lord Durham in 1839 is now the goal of
others, but on behaif ofa different language” (Scowen, Dfferent 52). So Reed Scowen’s
work presents many ofthe themes common to what I have called Anglo-Quebecer
identity. This identity ïs constructed in the saine way as Québécois identity, appropriating
the same counter-discursive strategies.
Legauh’s argument against Scowen is that he, and others like him, does not act as
a member of a minority ought to act. According to Legault, to tmly be a minority, Anglo
Quebecers cannot fali back on the identity ofthe majority; for her, one cannot belong to
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both an Anglo-Quebecer minority and an English Canadian majority at the same time.
Reed Scowen clearly does flot agree with this:
My goal when I began this adventure twenty years ago was to ensure that
the members ofthe English community would continue to have a place in
the province they had ealled home for so many generations
- as Canadians.
In the face of a tidal wave of french nationalism I was stiil dreaming of a
bilingual Quebec. (Scowen. Time 16)
But as a Canadian, Scowen must agree that it is difficuit to daim oneself as a member of a
minority in Québec. As with partitionists, we can certainly see that there is a dual identity
in authors like Reed Scowen, this duality may not present a problem for Anglo-Quebecers,
but it clearly does to critics like Legault who stili feel threatened by Canadian dominance.
Typically, minorities are compelled to integrate into the majority. This however
does flot mean they have to assimilate to it. Reed Scowen occasionally appears to confuse
the two terms, thus creating yet another point of contention with Legault:
There is plenty of space between isolation and integration, and somewhere
in this space wiII be found the terrafirma of relationships between the
English and French communities in Québec. We sec two distinct societies
in one political space. (Scowen, DWerent 64)
But Scowen has no need to fear integration; integration and assimilation being two
different things. Reed Scowen bimself is fluently bilingual and is quite integrated into
Quebécois society. One can assume that, when referring to integration, Scowen in fact
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means assimilation. But it is difficuit to confirm this when he makes such statements as:
“An English-speaking person, however, bas no more responsibility to Quebec to speak
French than a french-speaking person has a responsibility to Canada to speak English”
(Scowen, Different 70) The problem here is that a French-speaking person living outside
Québec certainly does have an implicit responsibility to speak English if he or she wants to
communicate with the vast majority oftheir social surroundings - this is just logical. For
instance, to franco-Ontarians, integration is not only necessary, it is also the happy
medium between assimilation and isolation. But this does flot aiways seem to be the case
with Reed Scowen. It is comments such as the one seen in the previous passage that make
the Anglo-Quebecer community a target to authors like Legauh; why do self-proclaimed
Anglo-Quebecers see themselves in a different situation than franco-Ontarians, Acadians
or Franco-Manitobans? Why do they fear integration?
Reed Scowen does makes certain observations that expose the source of the
linguistic tensions in Québec:
If the English were to see themselves in that way [as a minorityl, then the
French would be obliged to behave as a majority. Unfortunately, they did
flot. In fact the very opposite perception was openly encouraged - and stili
is - with the result that French-spealdng Quebecers continue to think of
their cornmunity as a minority group as well, weaker and more threatened
than ever. In such a climate ofmutual insecurity, the possibility for
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reconciliation and accommodation is practically impossible. (Scowen,
Different 5 1)
This brings us back to the cmx ofthe problem. As already mentioned, while in the
Canadian context we are dealing with two ‘majorities,’ in the Québec context we are in
fact dealing with two ‘minorities.’ Or rather, both Québécois and Anglo-Quebecers can
sec themselves and one another respectively as both majority and minority at the same
time. Unlike Legault, I would argue that like the Québécois, Anglo-Quebecers are a
minority but in veiy unusual circumstances.
The Québécois/Anglo-Quebecer relationship offers us perhaps the best example of
symbiosis. Unfortunately, this symbiotical relationship is rather destructive. Truc, both
identities feed off one another, and give each other a strong raison-d ‘être, but they also
breed hostility and end up encouraging isolation. It is easy to wony about where this type
of symbiosis in the construction of identity will eventually lead Québec.
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5.3 The Emergence of Anglo-Québécois Identity
Just like any community, definitions of identïty are neyer unanimously agreed upon
or homogenous. Whule in the previous chapters I attempted to reveat a dominant trend, or
a common thread, in Québécois identity based on the resistance to colonial discourses, the
Anglophone community of Québec presents us instead with the beginnings of a shiji in
identity. In order to make this shift more accessible, I shah cali the new - emergent
-
Anglophone identity Anglo-Ouébécois. Anglo-Quebecer identity is comprised of a strong
discursive trend which constructs in the minds ofAnglo-Quebecers the feeling ofbeing
dominated, or colonized, by another; it also creates a powerful sense of resentment about
flot being recognized for its distinctiveness. Again, both ofthese traits are veiy present in,
and have been appropnated from, Québécois identity. But there is a new trend emerging in
the Anglophone population which is focussed less on fear or resentment as typical Anglo
Quebecer discourses. This section will analyse some ofthe characteristics of this new
Anglo-Québécois identity.
Anglo-Quebecer identity typically relies on the assumption that Québécois
institutionalised resistance lias the objective of eradicating the Anglophone population of
Québec. Anglo-Quebecer discourse is fuelled by the fact that many Anglophones feel that
they are perceived as an undesirable subculture by the Québécois. We certainly get this
impression ftom Mordecai Richier: “Just about everything has been donc to make the
Anglophone youth, even those who are fluently bilingual, feel unwelcome in Québec”
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(Richier, Canada 107). But is it tme that the Anglophone youth in Québec feel as
unwelcome as Richier suggests? In his worlç Sacré Blues, Taras Grescoe gives us an
enlightening look into an alternative interpretation ofthe younger Anglophone generation
of Québec:
With their increased intermarriages with francophones, their higher
enrolments in immersion schools, and their increasingly organic mingling
with French-speakers at work or in ever-more-bilingual suburbs, Québec’s
adapting Anglos are creating a far less combative linguistic atmosphere.
[...j As the voices ofthe older generation ofWilliam Johnsons and
Mordecai Richiers start to fade, the new breed of anglophone Québécois
will undoubtedly help to attenuate the traditional polarizations. (Grescoe
47)
b Grescoe, the emergence of Anglo-Québécois discourse coincides with a generational
shifi. The generations following the Baby Boomers do flot appear to feel as threatened by
the Québécois. Reed Scowen made the same observation in 1991:
The young and the well-educated found it reÏatively easy to adapt to a new,
biingual, mtegrated way of life. They were even, at times critical of those
members of their own community who did flot want to change or did flot
know how to. Just as the more nationalist members ofthe French
community were developing their modet of a “real” Quebecer, some
members ofthe English elite were busy defining the “real” English
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Quebecer - bilingual, integrated, open to the “new reality” of Quebec.
(Scowen, Dfferent 103)
The difference with the younger generations is that they were barely conscious, or flot
even born, when the tanguage laws came into being and the PQ was elected. Unlike the
Baby Boomers or older generations, they did flot have to get accustomed to these new
forms of institutions.
Many ofthe younger generations in the Anglophone population are even ashamed
to be identifled with the older, Anglo-Quebecer population. This is the case with Grescoe:
In coming to Montreal, unfortunately I became a member ofone ofthe
most strident, self-nghteous minorities in North Amenca. Most French
speaking Québécois will aiways consider me an Anglo, which means I
sometimes get lumped in with one of the most paranoid bunches of loud
mouth buffoons on the continent. (Grescoe 46)
Even though Grescoe is a newcomer to Québec, he has nonetheless become a part of the
community, and represents it fairly welÏ. But if one wants to find a more ‘authentic’
example, of an Anglophone born and bred in Québec, one could look to Reed Scowen’s
son
- Peter Scowen. Peter Scowen published several articles in The J-Jour, a Montréal
weekly newspaper, that created a bit of an uproar in the Anglophone community. These
articles were compiled and translated into French in a book entitled Trahison tranquille.
Peter Scowen has become one of the strongest voices of what the Montréal Gazette has
labelled ‘the New Anglo,’ or ofwhat I cail Anglo-Québécois identity. As Peter Scowen
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writes: “Voici le nouvel épisode des deux solitudes au Québec: d’un côté, l’élite
grisonnante de chacun des deux groupes linguistiques, pour qui toute autre langue que la
sienne est une sorte de menace; de l’autre, la jeune génération de Québécois bilingues
{. . .1” (Scowen, p. 24). Peter Scowen is obviously very aware ofthe destructive symbiosis
between the Québécois and Anglo-Quebecer communities. However, he does flot realise
the extent to which Québécois discourses have remained retatively similar in the younger
generation, he seems to project the shift he sees in the Anglophone population to the
Québécois as well. This is perhaps not entirely untrue; even though we find similar
resistant discourses in the younger generations of Québécois, we also get the impression
that they are a littie less threatened by Anglophones than the older generation. Ibis
coincides with the fact that the Québécois are today less likely to compare themselves to
typical colonies of occupation than in the pre-October Crisis era.
Whereas the Anglo-Quebecers are undeniably attached to a physical territory, to
the land, the Anglo-Québécois community is attached to the Québécois people as well. In
fact, instead of constantly feeling threatened by them, they will often defend the Québécois
and show a great understanding oftheir resistance and institutions. They will even be
critical of Canadian intransigence towards the Québécois:
Maintenant, le Canada anglais continue à déprécier la réputation des
Québécois francophones et les médias anglophones s’évertuent à montrer
le Québec comme une république de bananes en pleine déchéance. Cette
réalité met en relief l’une des plus longues et des plus dégueulasses
HICKS 207
campagnes de dénigrement qu’on ait fait subir à un peuple dans toute
l’histoire du pays {..,] (Scowen, P. 79-80)
The Anglo-Québécois are more apt to defend the Québécois against what they see as
unjust attacks from Canada:
In spite of flashes of intolerance expressed by nationalists during the 1995
referendum, Quebec
- in a world riven by serious ethnie conflict - is a
paragon ofday-to-day racial harmony. [..] There are small-minded thugs
and bigots in every society. Yes, a streak of xenophobia runs through the
dinosaurs ofthe Parti Québécois, but a younger generation lias littie time
for the old ethnic shibboleths. (Grescoe 34-3 5)
We clearly see here a shifi ftom the Anglo-Quebecer stance on supposed Québécois
ethnocentricism. This Canadian negative perception ofthe Québécois stems from Anglo
Quebecer discourses; the Anglo-Québécois, on the other hand, will ofien show signs of
solidarity with the Québécois on this particular matter.
On the question of the language laws, the Anglo-Québécois are also rather more
condiliatory than Anglo-Quebecers. Even though Peter Scowen does see Biil lOI as a
form of censorship, lie does flot deny its usefiulness:
À vrai dire, la loi 101 est une réussite, parce qu’elle est l’expression
démocratique du désir des Québécois d’affirmer leur statut au Canada. La
loi a corrigé des erreurs du passé en s’adaptant aux directives de la Cour
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suprême afin de respecter les libertés individuelles telles qu’elles sont
définies dans notre charte des droits. (Scowen, P. $3)
In this, Peter Scowen and Reed Scowen share a similar point ofview. An individual
cannot really be entirely Canadian, Anglo-Quebecer or Anglo-Québécois, one can produce
any one of these three types of discourses. This is the case with Reed Scowen. We have
seen how he bas produced what can be called Anglo-Quebecer discourses, but he is also
often involved in Anglo-Québécois discourses:
[11f English Quebecers were to analyse the restrictions on the use oftheir
chosen language, they would discover that those restrictions are really
quite limited and that Quebec holds enormous potential for anyone who
wants a full and satisf’ying life. Hundreds ofthousands ofQuebecers like
living here in English, and do so. (Scowen, Dfferent 67)
Reed Scowen is also aware ofthe vicious circle that dominates Québécois/Anglo
Quebecer relations, and strives to go beyond it:
If we are blinded by resentment over perceived insuits, obsessed by
imaginary plots, or frozen in reaction, we could quite possibly make our
situation worse. [...] If this [the reinforcement ofthe Francophone presence
in Québec] resuits in the English community being diminished, it is flot
necessarily meant that way, but the resuh is not an important concern for
the members ofthe majority group. (Scowen, Dfferent 74-75)
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So Reed Scowen is a good example ofhow one can be, or usually is, tom between several
identities. He is at times reactionary in bis comments but can also be very understanding of
the motivation behind Québécois institutions and resistant discourses.
The reason the Anglo-Québécois are capable of flot feeling threatened by the
language laws is that they have corne to realize that, living in North America, assimilation
is flot really athreat to them. As Rudin writes: “By sharing the language ofthe rnajority of
North Americans, English speakers wilt neyer have to feel the isolation that contributed to
the assimilation of many French speakers in the other provinces of Canada” (Rudin.
forgotten 289). They realize that in this, they have an advantage over the Québécois.
Anglo-Québécois are more capable placing themselves in the Québécois’s shoes and
seeing that, unlike themselves, assimilation does pose a significant threat to the Québécois:
This fascination with the English language on the part ofFrench Quebecers
is flot reciprocated. Those in North America who speak English do not feel
threatened by the french language, neither do they have the disappearance
of French in Quebec as one oftheir goals. It is flot even an issue. (Scowen,
D&erent $2)
But to the Anglo-Québécois, this lias become an issue. Having chosen to live among the
Québécois, they also want to make sure that Québécois culture does flot disappear. They
are more willing than ever before to collaborate with the Québécois in order to ensure the
survival oftheir identity. Reed Scowen once again alludes to this when lie writes:
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In the eyes ofthe French majority, the English-speaking community had
existed for generations. Now, for the first time, the English came to
understand this definition ofthemselves. Accepting it, they agreed to work,
as a minority, within the political and social structures of Quebec. They
accepted the need to protect the French language in Quebec against
erosion. (Scowen, Different 33)
Although Scowen’s views here are flot shared by Anglo-Quebecers, who only feel
threatened by the Québécois, they are quite representative ofthe new Anglo-Québécois
mentality. The Anglo-Québécois, in other words, are those who are integrated with the
Québécois majority, but have flot assimilated to it. The Anglophone minority ofQuébec is
indeed privileged in that they are perhaps the only minority in North America for whom
integration is flot the first step towards assimilation.
Being in favour of integration, it is flot surprising to see how the Anglo-Québécois
can be as critical of the Anglo-Quebecer partitionist movement as are the Québécois:
Il n’y a pas de justification historique à la partition. Le séparatisme
québécois puise ses racines dans la Confédération et l’histoire de ce siècle.
Ce mouvement ne s’arrête pas à la vengeance et à la destruction de son
adversaire politique, il s’est développé lentement, mais sûrement et
démocratiquement. La séparation ne se réalisera peut-être jamais; tout cela
dépend de la volonté des Québécois et les Québécois continuent de se
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comporter avec sagesse, tolérance et patience. La séparation est
démocratique alors que la partition est réactionnaire, (Scowen, p. 73-74)
Peter Scowen’s adversity towards the partitionist argument is largely due to the fact that
he is flot interested in being separate ftom the Québécois. Again, Anglo-Québécois
identity is flot as isolationist as Anglo-Quebecer identity can be. He does however see how
the partitionist argument is an appropriation of Québécois separatism, but the Anglo
Québécois do flot sec such appropriations as legitimate. Peter Scowen even goes so far as
to suggest (albeit cheekily) that Anglophones should become members ofthe Parti
québécois
- “Sauvons les Anglais - adhérons au PQ” (Scowen, P. 126); this would ensure
that Anglophones have a voice in the future of Québec. If nothing else, such a statement
suggests that the Anglo-Québécois is flot inherently opposed to sovereignty-association.
Neither does it mean that to be Anglo-Québécois one must necessarily favour sovereignty;
it simply means that sovereignty-association is becoming an idea to be considered whether
one is Francophone, Anglophone or Allophone
- it is flot rejected outrightly.
There are many histoncal antecedents to Anglo-Québécois mentality, that are
generally ignored or simply forgotten by Anglo-Quebecers. As Rudin points out, many
English officiais after the Conquest were rather more favourable to the Québécois
(Canadiens) than to the new English merchant class:
[English speakers who belonged to what was known as the “French Party”]
were the advisors ofthe governor who sat on his council and who
ftequently implemented policy which the merchants interpreted as too well
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disposed towards the french, thus the name “french Party.” (Rudin,
forgotten 125)
During the Patriote Revoit, many Anglophones had taken up arms with the Québécois
against the British. Anglophones ofthe rime are generaliy remembered as the Voluiiteers;
those individuals who formed militia units to exact revenge upon the Québécois who had,
according to them, forgotten their place as subordinates. But flot ail Anglophones were
Vohrnteers:
Papineau’s leading lieutenants were English speakers. There were the
Nelson brothers, Woifted and Robert, the Irish newspaperman E.B.
O’Callaghan, and the merchant T.S. Brown. Robert Nelson was sufficiently
important in the Patriote movement that he leU the 183$ “invasion” of
Québec [from Vermont and New York] (Rudin, forgotten 133)
Even in the heyday of Anglophone economic supremacy in Québec, there were authors
like W. Eric Harris who did flot disdain the Québécois (Canadiens-français) as much as
his fellow Anglophones are reputed to have. As Ray Conlogue remarks, Harris actuafly
admired the Québécois for their attachment to their cuhural heritage:
We do flot give our French-Canadian brother the credit for being the able
and cultured man he is. We ourseives become more American each day,
and it is well for Canada that we have in Quebec a people who hold fast to
the older, sounder traditions of life. The attractions of matenalism do flot
take hold of them as they do us. There, there remains a sense of the
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beautiffil, a love of song and legend, an attachment to duty. (W. Eric
Ranis, qtd in Conlogue 28)
Even during the Quiet Revolution and the events leading up to the October Crisis, some
Anglophones in Québec sympathised with the Québécois. Tme, much ofthese sympathies
were based on the lefi wing aspects of Québécois radicalism, but stiil, many of the
Anglophone community displayed a surprising openness to Québécois nationalist and
separatists ideals. Mordecai Richier refers to such sympathies to Québécois nationalism in
his last novel. In Barney ‘s Version, flot only does Bamey’s son get arrested for supporting
the FLQ, but Bamey himself is flot as hostile to the sovereigntist movement as one would
expect Richier to be. Dunng the 1995 referendum Bamey telis his Québécois assistant:
“It would be foolish ofyou to vote Yes. I don’t want you to do it.”
“You don’t want me to? How dare you! What would you do if you were
young and French Canadian?”
“Why, I’d vote Yes, of course. But neither of us is young and stupid any
more.” (Richier, Barney ‘s 170)
Mthough Richier was certainly neyer supportive ofthe sovereigntist movement. We do
get a sense here ofa compassion and understanding for it. These are but a few examples
ofhow Anglophones have supported the Québécois’ resistance rather than feel threatened
by it. There is considerable space for the construction of an Anglo-Québécois collective
memory. A collective memoiy to support an emerging community that is demonstrating an
increased solidarity with the Québécois people rather than a mere attachment to a physical
setting in which to live.
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* * *
If the Anglophone population ofQuébec is oflen seen as being federalist, it is
because they see Québec as an important part ofCanada’s core identity. Many Anglo
Quebecers and Anglo-Québécois are getting frustrated with Canada’s slowness or
reluctance in recognizing this. In an interview with Taras Grescoe, we get to see some of
Charles Taylor’s annoyance with Canada:
“[...J The distinct society is a great reaiity. Among the people ofQuebec,
there’s a sense that this society is different and a puzzlement that the rest of
the country doesn’t see this.” Taylor confesses bis own exasperation over
the issue. “It’s just so obvious. Sometimes you feel like taking people in
the Test ofthe country and shaking them. ‘What’s the matter with your
head7” he says, raising the spread fingers ofhis large hands in mock
entreaty. (Grescoe 297)
What is in fact happening is that Anglo-Québécois federalists share their view of Canada
with the new federalist or soft nationalist Québécois; a view that firstïy clings to the idea
that recognition is stii possible for Québec if it remains in Canada, and, secondly, believes
that Québec is a distinct, national entity. So the Anglo-Québécois tend to follow in the
now predominant Québécois perspective, that Canada is a binational state. They, like the
Québécois, have become comfortable with Laurendeau’s concept ofbiculturalism
(binationalism), and feel that it should be recognized once and for ail by the rest of
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Canada. Grescoe actuatly feels that many Canadians do actually share this binational vision
of Canada:
This is tmly the heart ofthe nation, where the french, the natives, and the
English came together. It’s also the place where the three groups have
coexisted, with improbable civility, for centuries. Hence the panic before
the 1995 referendum, the planeloads of eamest federalists who flooded
Montreal with an embarrassing gush of unrequited love: deep down, many
English Canadians realize that if they lose their significant other, Canada
will start to lose its identity. (Grescoe 302)
Ray Conlogue makes a similar point in his work Impossible Nation. But where were these
Canadians in the months following the 1980 and 1995 referéndums. In both cases, the
Québécois were assured that a vote for No meant a ‘yes for change.’ Where were these
hundreds of thousand of Canadians when the change did flot take place, and in its stead,
federal politics shifled to its hard liner ‘plan B’ regarding Québec?
b reiterate, the typical Anglo-Quebecer mentality regarding Québécois culture is
symptomatic ofa lack ofunderstanding; and regarding Québécois politics is a denial which
manifests itself in the maintenance of a status quo that has been considered obsolete by the
Québécois majority for ages. The Anglo-Québécois tend to be far more active in their
interactions with the Québécois and subsequently in their desire to seek justice for them.
Again, this is due to the fact that the Anglo-Québécois do flot feel as threatened by
Québécois nationalism and cultural policies. But even an Anglo-Quebecer prototype like
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Mordecai Richier shows moments of attachment to the Québécois tather than a mere
attachment to the land:
For ail my complaints about the PQ, a nationalist aberration now in sharp
decline, I could flot live anywhere else in Canada but Montreal. So far as
one can generaiize, the most gracious, cuitivated, and innovative people in
this country are French Canadians. Certainly they have given us the most
exciting politicians of our time: Trudeau, Lévesque. Without them, Canada
would be an exceedingiy boring and greatly diminished place. If I consider
the PQ an abomination it’s only because, shouid their poiicies prevail,
everybody in Canada wouid be diminished. (Richier, Canada 260)
Afier having written this, poor Richier had to live through the resurgence of the PQ and
yet another referendum. Despite his love for the Québécois, Richier - along with a huge
portion of Anglo-Quebecers - refused to sec that Québécois nationaiism and language
policies were representative ofa fundamental need in Québécois culture to resist. He
failed to recognize that this resistance was seen by many Québécois as necessary to their
survival; it was flot a whimsical break from political monotony nourished by a radical and
delusionai dite. It would neverthetess be a mistake to suggest, as does Legauit, that
Anglo-Quebecers do flot constitute a community distinct from the rest of Canada (and
consequently a minority in Québec). Both Anglo-Quebecer and Anglo-Québécois
discourses function as counter-discourses. The difference between the two is that Anglo
Quebecer discourse appropriates Québécois counter-discursive strategy and uses it against
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Québécois institutions. Anglo-Québécois discourse, on the other hand, tends to participate
with Québécois resistance rather than against it.
The Québécois will eventually have to recognize more ffihly the shifi in the
Anglophone population ftom Anglo-Quebecer to Anglo-Québécois identity. Their lack of
recognition ofthe efforts made by Anglo-Québécois gives credence to the sustenance of
Anglo-Quebecer identitarian discourses, 1f there is a symbiotic and destructive cycle that
has established itselfbetween Anglophones and Francophones in Québec, it will be largely
up to the Québécois to put an end to it. Unfortunately putting an end to the destructive
cycle between Canada and Québec will be much more difficuit; this is because the
Québécois, unlike Anglophones in Québec. have proven to be much more vuinerable to
assimilation. In other words, it may be impossible to constmct the equivalent ofAnglo
Québécois identity amongst the Québécois. Or rather, that equivalent may only come to
exist if Canada recognizes Québec as an equal, national partner
- i.e. if Canada becomes a
binational state, following the recommendation ofthe B&B Commission.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to expose a s mbiotic process in which identity is
developed and shaped in resistance to the other. This does flot mean that identity is aÏwavs
the resuit of resistance; it means that resistance can be an important factor in the
construction ofpowerffil identitarian discourses. As I have demonstrated, this has
certainly been the case with Québec. Québec has offered us an excellent example of how
an identity can be constmcted in resistance to colonial and neocolonial pressures. and how
that same resistant identity can be interpreted as being oppressive by others, but in
resisting that oppression, the others create within their own communities a sense of self
following the same cycÏical pattem, these newly constructed identitarian discourses, if
successful, will mn the risk ofbeing interpreted as colonial discourses by their significant
other - and so on and so forth.
Canadianists have too often interpreted Québécois resistance and nationalism as
aberrations. They feel that Québécois resistance is inappropriate to how they see Québec:
Québec is a province of Canada and it should flot be acting as a m&ecognized nation nor
as a colonized people. But this, as I demonstrated in my first chapter, is the worst type of
essentialism. These Canadianists must begin to understand that their view of Québec is not
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shared by a majority of Québécois that their point of view reflects their definition of
Canada only, as opposed to a correct definition of Canada.
This being said, unless one believes in essentialist definitions ofidentity, we are
forced to acknowledge that a community or nation can be at once colonizer and
colonized, oppressor and oppressed. Such definitions will depend entirely on the point of
view ofthe observer. Consequently, as we see in the case ofQuébec, postcolonial theory
can no longer realistically depend on historical criteria to delimitate its field of study. Even
though historically Québec was a settier colony, the Québécois are flot generally engaged
in typical settier colonial discursive practices. Depending on the point of view, Québec can
be interpreted as being both a settier colony and colony of occupation. And despite seeing
themselves as colonized, the Québécois have nonetheless also played the role ofthe
colomzer in the construction of Anglo-Quebecer identity. So instead of speaking of
postcolonial societies, the case of Québec shows us that it may be more appropriate to
speak ofpostcolonial resistance. Postcolomal resistance, as opposed to anti-colonialism,
could then be considered as a counter-discursive strategy designed to circumvent the
hegemonising forces at play in neocolonialsm.
Québec offers us a glimpse at the symbiotic process involved in the shifi between
Terdiman’s discourse and counter-discourse. We see this in the emergence of Québécois
identity as counter-discursive to Anglophone North American hegemony, and in the
subsequent emergence of Anglo-Quebecer identity as counter-discursive to Québécois
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hegemony. Discourse and counter-discourse, like the Francophone and Anglophone
populations of Québec, are locked in a symbiotic cycle - both constantly feeding off one
another. One has to wonder if this cycle extends itself more broadly to social interaction in
general. does the example of Québec extend itself to other communities?
As for the future of Québec, it is impossible to predict what might happen. One
can just as easily foresee that Canada and Québec will continue to resist one another
indefinitely, just as they always have, or that Canada will eventually recognize Québec as
an equal partner. This partnership, if ever it wilÏ corne to be, will be established either
through constitutionaÏ reform or through Québécois sovereignty-association. But both
cornmunities will have to corne to terms with the fact that neither one would exist if it was
flot for the other. Without the Conquest, there would flot have been a distinctly Québécois
identity; and without the Québécois, Canadians would be hard-pressed to define
themselves in contrast to the American juggernaut.
The Anglo-Québécois are becoming aware in this interdependence. Mthough rnost
North American Anglophone communities may flot sec thernselves as colonizers, we do
occasionally sense a certain unease or malaise concerning their participation in
Anglophone global hegemony. The Anglo-Québécois are perhaps the only English
speaking community that will neyer need to feel this type of cultural malaise. The
Anglophone global hegemony protects the Anglo-Québécois from being assimilated, and
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their support of Québécois institutions wiJl help prevent them from becoming the agents of
assimilation.
f inally, Québec is a fascinating subject to study because it is rife with discursive
con±licts. We see in Québec the extent to which discourses have an impact on the life ofits
citizens. it is an exciting environment in which everybody seems to have an opinion on
identity. Québec is also a young society, stili in the process of defining itself Thus Québec
offers us a first hand look at identities as they are shaped; and whether you are a
postcolonialist, a comparatist, a social theorist or other, there is stili much to be learned
ftom what is happening in Québec.
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